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ABSTRACT

Pay communication is an important yet complex organizational practice that
assists organizations in achieving their compensation systems’ goals and objectives (Gely
and Bierman 2003). However, the management literature has neglected the pay
communication concept, resulting in a scarce and undeveloped knowledge base on pay
secrecy and pay openness. Given this opportunity, this dissertation focuses on pay
communication and its influence on employee behaviors.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the pay communication literature in the
management discipline. A broader analysis of pay secrecy practices is provided since it is
the practice primarily focused on in the pay communication literature, including details
about pay secrecy’s legality, benefits, and costs. Additionally, prior research is
summarized.
Chapter 3 involves the development and validation of a pay communication
measure with pay secrecy and pay openness representing the extremes. Three multistage
studies were conducted to validate the pay communication scale. The first study consisted
of generating a pool of items that together represent pay communication and initiating the
refinement process of the items. The second study further refined the items by analyzing
the inter-item correlations, variances, and factor loadings of each item in an exploratory
factor analysis. In the third study, the proposed scale and dimensionality of the remaining

items was confirmed by using confirmatory factor analysis and construct validation was
determined.
Chapter 4 analyzes the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.
This study utilizes the pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) scale
developed in Chapter 3. Specifically, pay secrecy is expected to positively influence
workplace deviance. Additionally, the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship is
expected to be mediated by distributed justice, procedural justice, informational justice,
interpersonal justice, organizational trust, and managerial trust. Continuance commitment
is also proposed to moderate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace
deviance.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation. This chapter provides a summary of the
overall research efforts conducted in Chapters 3 and 4. A brief review of the overall
contributions of this dissertation to the pay communication literature and management
discipline is also provided.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Pay communication is an important yet complex organizational practice that
assists organizations in achieving their compensation systems’ goals and objectives (Gely
and Bierman 2003). However, the management literature has neglected the pay
communication concept, resulting in a scarce and undeveloped knowledge base on pay
secrecy and pay openness. The utilization of certain pay communication practices in the
workplace (e.g., pay secrecy and pay openness) should be further analyzed to identify the
impact each distinct type of pay communication has on employee’s attitudes and
behaviors since compensation is an important factor for employees (e.g., Gerhart and
Rynes 2003) and organizations (e.g., to achieve a competitive advantage; (Gerhart
2000)).
Given this research gap, this dissertation explicitly focuses on pay communication
and the impact pay secrecy and/or pay openness has on employee’s attitudes and
behaviors. Pay communication consists of two main aspects. First, pay communication
refers to the compensation practice that determines when, how, and which pay
information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay levels, pay
processes, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees
and possibly to outsiders. This aspect is called organizational restrictions. The second
aspect of pay communication, called employee restrictions, refers to whether discussions
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involving pay information are permitted amongst employees and also with outsiders. Pay
communication resides along a continuum as organizations vary in the amount and type
of pay information they provide to employees. Pay secrecy and pay openness are the two
anchors of the pay communication continuum. Generally, pay openness is a
compensation practice that allows employees to discuss their pay information amongst
each other (and possibly outsiders) while the organization distributes most, if not all, pay
information to employees on a regular basis or upon request; whereas, pay secrecy
involves prohibiting the distribution and communication of most, if not all, pay
information to employees (and possibly outsiders). Each of the following chapters is
dedicated to advancing knowledge about pay communication and complements the
existing pay secrecy and pay openness research.
Chapter 2 provides a thorough analysis of the pay communication literature in the
management discipline. Based on prior literature, a definitive description of pay
communication is provided. A broader analysis of pay secrecy (opposed to pay openness)
practices is given since it is the practice primarily focused on in the pay communication
literature. Specifically, an overview of pay secrecy’s legality and benefits and costs are
discussed. Prior research is summarized to provide an overview of the previouslyanalyzed employee and organizational outcomes affected by pay secrecy and/or pay
openness practices. Future directions are offered to extend and further develop the pay
communication literature.
Chapter 3 focuses on the development and validation of a pay communication
measure with pay secrecy and pay openness representing the extremes. This assessment
is necessary to determine the extent to which an organization’s pay communication
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resembles pay secrecy or pay openness and to advance the literature by investigating the
impact pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices have on different organizational
outcomes and employee attitudes and behaviors. Three multistage studies were conducted
to substantiate the pay communication scale. The first study consisted of generating a
pool of items that encompassed the entire domain of pay communication and having
management academicians review and assess these items for refinement. The second
study further refined the items by analyzing the inter-item correlations, variances, and
factor loadings of each item in an exploratory factor analysis. In the third study, the
proposed scale and dimensionality of the remaining items was confirmed by using
confirmatory factor analysis and construct validation was determined.
Chapter 4 attempts to identify ways pay communication (specifically, pay
secrecy) impacts different employee attitudes and behaviors. This study utilizes the pay
communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) scale developed in Chapter 3. Following
equity theory (Adams 1965), uncertainty management theory (Lind and van den Bos
2002; van den Bos and Lind 2002), and reactance theory (Brehm 1966), pay secrecy is
expected to positively influence workplace deviance. Additionally, the pay secrecyworkplace deviance relationship was expected to be mediated by several variables.
Specifically, distributive justice (based on equity theory; (Adams 1965)), procedural
justice (based on fairness heuristic theory; (Lind 2001)), informational justice (based on
fairness heuristic theory; (Lind 2001)), interpersonal justice (based on fairness heuristic
theory; (Lind 2001)), managerial trust and organizational trust (based on social exchange
theory; (Blau 1964)) were hypothesized to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy
and workplace deviance. Based on power dependence theory (Emerson 1972; Molm
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2003), continuance commitment is also proposed to moderate the relationship between
pay secrecy and workplace deviance such that the relationship between pay secrecy and
workplace deviance will be mitigated, if not eliminated.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation. This chapter provides a summary of the
overall research efforts conducted in Chapters 3 and 4. A brief review of the overall
contributions of this dissertation to the pay communication literature and management
discipline is also provided.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORY OF PAY COMMUNICATION (PAY
SECRECY AND PAY OPENNESS) WITHIN
THE MANAGEMENT LITERATURE

The management literature has overlooked the organizational practice involving
pay communication causing the overall pay secrecy and pay openness research to be
limited and underdeveloped. Because compensation is an important factor for employees,
the usage of certain pay communication practices should be investigated to identify the
impact pay secrecy and/or pay openness has on employee’s attitudes and behaviors, as
well as organizational outcomes.
This chapter provides a thorough analysis of the pay communication literature in
the management discipline. Since the majority of the pay communication literature
focuses on pay secrecy (rather than pay openness) practices, a broader analysis of this
concept is provided. Specifically, a definitive description of pay secrecy, based on the
prior literature, is developed. Additionally, an overview of pay secrecy’s legality, benefits
and costs, multiple forms, and preferential usage by different entities are provided. Prior
research is summarized to provide an overview of the previously-analyzed employee and
organizational outcomes affected by pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices. Future
directions are offered to extend and further develop the pay communication literature.

5

6
Compensation Systems
Organizations employ valuable human resource practices and policies (such as an
effective compensation system) to improve organizational productivity along with profits
and to create a competitive advantage (Guest 2011; Gerhart 2000). One of the most
prominent human resource structures involves the compensation (pay) system. A
compensation system entails not only the administration of pay itself, but also the
development of procedures and policies used to remunerate employees. The main
purpose of an organization’s compensation system is to attract, motivate, and retain
employees (Heneman, Schwab, Fossum, and Dyer 1989; Weiner 1980). The
compensation system is a critical element in determining the overall effectiveness of the
organization.
Compensation has been indicated as an important job factor by employees
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003; Opsahl and Dunnette 1966); thus, it may influence employee
behavior which, in turn, can affect organizational effectiveness (Beer and Gery 1972;
deCarufel 1986; Lawler 1981). Additionally, employee compensation is a complex notion
since it represents an exchange for work performed (Andersson-Straberg, Sverke, and
Hellgren 2007) or for individual human capital (Lawler 2000), as well as an achievement
or form of recognition (Ackley 1993; Goodman 1974; Lawler 1966,1971; Lawler and
Porter 1963), an indication of organizational value (Lawler 1966,1971), a determinant of
social status (Andersson-Straberg et al. 2007), a motivator (Ackley 1993), performancerelated reward (Ackley 1993), an aspect of performance feedback (Lawler 1965b, 1966),
and a self-esteem booster (Goodman 1974), among other things. Generally, an
employee’s pay is a sensitive issue (especially since it signifies many different things to
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employees) and discussions relating to it are usually avoided altogether. Furthermore,
employee compensation tends to be a considerable, if not the biggest, expense for the
majority of organizations (Ackley 1993; Wallace and Fay 1983). Therefore, a substantial
amount of effort is exerted by organizations in generating the best possible compensation
system, with some organizations seeking advice from compensation consultants
(Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker 2002).
Compensation systems are usually organization-wide structures, rather than only
involving certain departments or divisions, and they evolve over time (Lawler 1981).
Unfortunately, their progression is normally linked to organizational traditions and other
administrative factors rather than changing organizationally and employee desired
outcomes, such as higher performance (Beer and Gery 1972). However, not all aspects of
a compensation system change over time. A subset of the compensation system that tends
to remain unchanged once implemented involves the practices or strategies regarding pay
communication, otherwise known as pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices and
policies.

Pay Communication
Pay communication is the organizational practice that determines when, how, and
which pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay
levels, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees and
possibly outsiders. There are two main forms of pay communication: pay secrecy and pay
openness. Generally, both pay communication practices consist of two aspects:
organizational restrictions and employee restrictions. Pay openness is a compensation
practice that (1) allows employees to discuss their pay information amongst each other
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and possibly with outsiders (employee restrictions) while (2) the organization distributes
most, if not all, pay information to employees on a regular basis (usually at specific time
intervals such as yearly) or upon request (organizational restrictions); whereas, pay
secrecy involves prohibiting the distribution and communication of most, if not all, pay
information to employees (and possibly outsiders).
Pay secrecy, also known as wage secrecy (Danziger and Katz 1997; Gan 2002;
King 2003), is a compensation practice that involves constraining employees from
receiving information about other organizational members’ compensation from the
employing organization (Bamburger and Belogolovsky 2010; Colella, Paetzold,
Zardkoohi, and Wesson 2007; deCarufel 1986). This constriction, termed organizational
restrictions, may involve an organization concealing or not supplying employees with
certain types of pay information, such as individual employee pay, pay ranges, pay
averages, pay raises, and/or the entire pay structure. Additionally, pay secrecy practices
may involve the adoption of a policy (generally referred to as a pay secrecy policy but
also labeled as pay confidentiality rules; (Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely and Bierman
2003)) which restricts employees from communicating or exchanging their personal
compensation information with other organizational members (and possibly outsiders) of
the employing organization (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; Bierman and Gely
2004; Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003; Thompson and
Pronsky 1975). In order to receive compliance with this restriction, termed employee
restrictions, some organizations will compel employees to sign a pledge stating they will
not discuss compensation information with other organizational members (and possibly
outsiders), while other organizations may enforce the restriction by having disciplinary
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consequences (such as tennination) for those employees who violate the policy (GomezMejia and Balkin 1992). Generally, a pay secrecy policy is conveyed either verbally,
usually during employee orientation or employee meetings, or in writing, such as in
employee manuals or handbooks (Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely and Bierman 2003).
Different Forms
Pay communication practices function to support organizations in their attainment
of their compensation systems’ goals and objectives (Gely and Bierman 2003), such as
attracting highly skilled workers or achieving higher organizational performance. The
needs of the organization determine the extent to which a pay openness or pay secrecy
practice is used.
Pay secrecy was originally regarded as a single “all-or-nothing” concept (e.g.,
Lawler 1965b; (Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Thompson and Pronsky 1975)), with
pay openness representing the “nothing” portion. However, pays communication
practices (pay secrecy and pay openness) exist along a continuum (Burroughs 1982;
Colella et al. 2007; Lawler and Jenkins 1992; Patten 1978) as organizations vary on the
amount and type of pay information they present to employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin
1992; Milkovich and Newman 2005).
Lawler (1981) first indicated that pay communication “ranges from almost total
secrecy ... through complete openness ...” (p. 6). Although, Lawler (1981) may have
implied that different degrees of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness)
existed, it was Burroughs (1982) who demonstrated how organizations may differ in
regards to their pay secrecy (or pay openness) levels by illustrating these different pay
secrecy (or pay openness) categories. Burroughs (1982) referred to a “red” organization
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as having complete pay secrecy, where employees are only provided their own pay
information, while a “green” organization was indicated as an organization practicing
complete pay openness, where all pay information on all organizational members is
easily accessible. Additionally, “yellow” and “orange” organizations were identified,
with the former more closely resembling pay openness where individual pay raise
information is available, and the latter more closely resembling pay secrecy where pay
ranges and their corresponding averages are supplied to employees. Building on
Burroughs’ (1982) categories, it has been suggested (and widely accepted) that pay
communication approaches occur along a continuum with one extreme representing
absolute pay secrecy and the other representing absolute pay openness (Colella et al.
2007; Lawler and Jenkins 1992). A variety of pay secrecy and pay openness strategies
reside on the continuum between these two extremes.
Recently, the pay secrecy concept has been further advanced by the proposal of
two different pay secrecy constructs: individual and organizational pay secrecy (Noy
2007). The main difference between the two forms of pay secrecy is the manner in which
they are generated and preserved. Organizational pay secrecy (OPS) is sustained through
the organization and its structure, strategies and policies (such as a pay secrecy policy);
whereas, individual pay secrecy (IPS) is upheld by employees through different norms,
such as social and cultural norms (Noy 2007). A three-factor model of perceived OPS
(POPS) was established, with the three aspects characterizing perceptions of (1) policy
and rules, (2) enforcement, and (3) organizational norms (Noy 2007). However, a
substantiated measure of IPS has not been developed. Therefore, discriminant validity
between the two constructs has yet to be determined.

Similar to Noy’s (2007) notion of multiple pay secrecy dimensions, Colella et al.
(2007) argued for different enforcement approaches within an organization. Following
the work of Burrough’s (1982), these authors argued that an organization’s enforcement
tactics lie on a continuum ranging from implicit to explicit (Colella et al. 2007). The
implicit extreme (similar to IPS) considers the employees more than the organization and
entails a social norm, where employees decide not to discuss pay information on their
own. The explicit extreme (similar to OPS) is more concerned with the organization and
its usage of a formal pay secrecy policy. Various enforcement levels fall between these
two extremes, such as levels consisting of departmental, organizational, or industrial
norms.
Preferences
Even though there is a notion of pay secrecy being a multi-faceted construct (IPS
and OPS), organizations and employees seem to have a similar preference for a certain
pay communication strategy (e.g., HRnext.com Survey 2001). Employees (including
managers) prefer pay secrecy practices (opposed to pay openness practices) in the
workplace (Futrell and Jenkins 1978; Markels and Berton 1996; Schuster and Colletti
1973). Additionally, managers have indicated they prefer pay secrecy practices because
employees are more satisfied and most employees want their pay kept secret (Lawler
1981). Privacy protection is the main reason employees have given for preferring pay
secrecy (Schuster and Colletti 1973; Markels and Berton 1996). This privacy concern
makes sense since pay information is a sensitive issue and discussions about it are
considered crass.
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Over the past several decades, pay secrecy (as opposed to pay openness) appears
to be the favored pay communication strategy for the majority of U.S. organizations
(Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1985; HRnext.com Survey 2001; Lawler 1981; Scott,
Sperling, McMullen, and Wallace 2003). Several surveys have found that around threefourths of employing organizations utilized pay secrecy policies (e.g., Balkin and GomezMejia 1985).
Another survey found that about half of employing organizations do not have a
specific pay communication strategy expressed in writing, such as a pay secrecy policy in
an employee manual (HRnext.com Survey 2001). However, these organizations may
simply not supply pay information to employees or they may unofficially communicate a
pay secrecy policy verbally, perhaps during employee orientation or casual office
meetings (Bierman and Gely 2004). Additionally, this study found that over a third of the
private sector employing organizations imposed a pay secrecy policy that proscribed
discussions of pay information with other employees (HRnext.com Survey 2001).
However, this estimate of private sector employing organizations’ policies may be low
since pay secrecy practices are more prevalent in the private sector than in the public
sector (the majority of these organizations are required to practice pay openness due to
government mandated policies).
Although the majority of organizations seem to prefer pay secrecy practices,
many organizations appear to favor the idea of having pay ranges easily available to all
employees (Lawler 1981). Therefore, organizations may practice pay secrecy where only
individual pay information is withheld or forbidden in discussions, while they provide
employees with pay ranges and possibly pay averages for those pay ranges. Nonetheless,
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less than a fourth of employing organizations release pay range information, while less
than ten percent of organizations supply the base salary (Scott et al. 2003). In regards to
pay openness practices, surveys have found that ten percent or less of employing
organizations utilize this pay communication approach (HRnext.com Survey 2001; Scott
etal. 2003).
Legality
Although organizations seem to prefer and utilize pay secrecy practices, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) along with the federal court system have
consistently found pay secrecy practices (specifically pay secrecy policies) to be in
violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and thus, illegal (Bierman and
Gely 2004; Estlund 2011; Gely and Bierman 2003). Specifically, the violation of the
NLRA occurs when a pay secrecy practice (or policy) prohibits employees from
discussing their employment conditions (such as pay information) with other employees
(King 2003). Additionally, organizations that require employees to obtain preapproval
from management when participating in ‘concerted activity’ (such as collective
bargaining) defy the NLRA (King 2003).
The U.S. Congress ratified the NLRA to protect employees’ rights when engaging
in activities that would help improve their employment conditions. Section 7 of the
NLRA states that employees “shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection” (National Labor Relations Act). Therefore,
discussions pertaining to pay information (whether with organizational members or

14
outsiders) are protected under Section 7 since pay information is used during collective
bargaining and thus, is “concerted activity” (e.g., Brockton Hospital v. NLRB 2002;
(Cote 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003)). Additionally, Section 8 (a)(1) of the NLRA states
that it “shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]” (National Labor
Relations Act). Therefore, a pay secrecy policy practice, including a policy discouraging
malicious and disrespectful conversations about the organization, violates the NLRA
since it impedes on employee rights stated in Section 7 by not allowing employees to
freely discuss their own pay information. Thus, a pay secrecy policy practice that is
formally or casually expressed either verbally (such as during employee orientation) or in
writing (such as in an employee manual) violates Section 7 and 8 (a)(1) of the NLRA and
is unlawful (Cote 2007; King 2003). In support of these NLRA violations, the federal
court system has consistently ruled against pay secrecy policy practices and the
organizations that utilize them, regardless of whether they are actually enforced (e.g.,
Brockton Hospital v. NLRB 2002; NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co. 1990).
There are two instances where the NLRB has found a pay secrecy policy practice
to not violate the NLRA. First, a pay secrecy practice ordained for managers is not
unlawful as managers do not qualify under the NLRA’s definition of an employee and
thus, managers do not have the protection of Section 7 rights (King 2003). This exception
seems appropriate since managers prefer to utilize pay secrecy (Lawler 1981). Second, if
the pay secrecy policy is worded to be understood as protecting an organizations’
confidential information (such as trade secrets or customer information) by prohibiting its
disclosure to unauthorized individuals or entities then it is not in violation of the NLRA.
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The NLRA has never specifically defined or described exactly what “concerted
activity” entails (Cote 2007). However, in order for an activity to be considered
“concerted” under the NLRA, at least two employees must take action together to
ameliorate their employment terms and conditions. Additionally, “concerted activity”
must intend to stimulate group (or perhaps in some instances individual) action, even if
no explicit demands or actions are made. Individual actions qualify as protected and
“concerted activity” provided that the activity is beneficial for a group of employees and
not the individual employee, such as demanding safer working conditions. Activities are
also protected despite their rationality or “reasonableness” provided that they do not
cause the employee(s) to be unfit to perform work duties (NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works
1946).
Despite the NLRA not explicitly defining “concerted activity,” the NLRB and
federal courts have recognized that not all activities pertaining to improving employee
conditions are considered “concerted activity” and thus, these activities are not protected.
Activities that have an intolerable manner or a potentially harmful effect on the
organization (and possibly other employees) are found to be undeserving of NLRA
protection. For instance, unprotected activities include those that are abusive (e.g., NLRB
v. City Disposal Sys., Inc. 1984), violent (e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metalurgical Corp.
1939), illegal (e.g., Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB 1942), in breach of a contract (e.g.,
NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Co. 1939), hinder organizational production (e.g., CanTex Industries v. NLRB 1982), and noncompliant or unfaithful to the organization and its
directives (e.g., NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Company 1990; NLRB v. Local Union No.
1953). Additionally, when an employee with knowledge of other organizational
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member’s pay information for job purposes (such as employees holding positions in the
human resource department) exposes other organizational member’s pay information to
unauthorized individuals it is not considered “concerted activity” since it involves
disclosing the organization’s confidential information.
The NLRA protects all employees (except managers), union or non-union, despite
labor unions being frequently mentioned throughout its provisions. Moreover, the
protection granted by the NLRA does not require non-union employees to form a union.
Therefore, organizations that do not have dealings with labor unions are still not lawfully
allowed to utilize pay secrecy policy practices. The NLRA protection also extends to
employees experiencing disciplinary action for violations of a pay secrecy policy
practice, such as termination.
At-Will
But the question that still remains is why do organizations exercise pay secrecy
policy practices when the NLRB and the federal court system find them unlawful? Why
do organizations thus risk costly settlements with court fines and employee back pay?
There are several explanations for the common utilization of pay secrecy practices. First,
even though employees have protection from the NLRA, the majority of them (especially
non-union employees) are not aware that they are under NLRA protection nor do they
understand their employee rights (Morris 1988; Kim 1997). For example, most
employees do not know they are at-will employees or what exactly that classification
entails (Kim 1997). At-will employees are employees who do not have a contractual
arrangement with an organization and may be terminated for any reason (good, bad, or
wrong) or for no cause at all provided that the organization does break any state or
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federal statutes, such as discrimination (Estlund 2002). Generally, at-will employees are
non-unionized and in the private sector (Kim 1997). Although at-will employees can be
fired for any or no reason, the majority of them believe organizations must lawfully
follow a “just-cause standard” when terminating employment. Employees even have this
false belief when the organization explicitly states verbally or in writing (such as in an
employee manual) that it has the right to terminate employment for any reason (Kim
1997). Specifically, the majority of employees believe that organizations cannot lawfiilly
terminate an employee based on personal dislike (89%), inaccurate beliefs of misconduct
(87%), or a lower-waged replacement (82%; (Kim 1997)). Also, at-will employees tend
to get confused with wording in employment manuals, such as when the manual refers to
them as “permanent” employees or have a policy claiming that employee termination will
only occur when there is just cause by believing that their employment cannot be
terminated at any time (Kim 1997). Therefore, since the majority of at-will employees do
not understand that they can be terminated for any reason, at any time, or that they
receive protection from the NLRA, one could safely presume that these employees also
do not know that pay secrecy policy practices violate the NLRA and their rights. Given
that at-will employees are largely unaware about the illegality of pay secrecy policy
practices, they are unlikely to report such practices and policies to the NLRB. On the
other hand, employees who are aware of the illegality of pay secrecy policy practices
may choose not to report their usage to the NLRB because they are aware of their status
as at-will employees and hence they feel vulnerable to being fired or fear other forms of
retaliation. The decline of labor unions also affects the possibility of the NLRB not being
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informed about an organizations’ pay secrecy policy practice as they are more likely than
individual employees to report such practices to the NLRB (Gely and Bierman 2003).
The fact that the NLRB does not have their own employees to enforce the
employee protection granted under the NLRA may be another reason why organizations
employ pay secrecy policy practices. Because there is no enforcement arm of the agency,
the NLRB only takes action when an employee or entity (such as a labor union) formally
charges an organization with a NLRA violation. Since the majority of employees are
unaware that pay secrecy policy practices violate the NLRA and their employee rights,
violations often go unreported. Therefore, organizations may view the NLRB and its
reactive strategy as weak and ineffective.
Another reason organizations are defiant of the NLRA’s injunction against pay
secrecy policy practices may be because the penalties and fines are rather low (Gely and
Bierman 2003). Therefore, organizations do not reap any costly monetary consequences
that make them want to cease the practice. This low monetary cost for defiance further
supports the notion that organizations may view the NLRB as weak.
Finally, the benefits associated with having a pay secrecy practice may be another
reason why organizations dismiss its unlawfulness. A pay secrecy policy practice may be
viewed as immensely valuable to organizations. Additionally, due to the low monetary
cost associated with a NLRA violation offense, the perceived benefits of a pay secrecy
practice (or policy) probably tremendously outweigh the perceived inconsequential
disadvantages.
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Benefits and Costs
Nevertheless, pay secrecy research has indicated that such a practice provides not
only benefits to organizations, employees, and society but also has costs for all three
entities as well (Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003; Tremblay and Chenevert
2008). As pointed out by Colella et al. (2007), some perceived benefits may also be costs.
For instance, one organization’s perceived benefit may be a cost for employees or for
society, if not for a different organization. Further, Colella et al. (2007) argued that the
extent to which these perceived benefits and costs are endured will vary among
organizations and employees due to diverse pay secrecy practices and different
contextual and environmental factors affecting the organization or employee. Therefore,
perceived benefits and costs may be heightened or reduced in different organizations or
employees, depending on the fluctuations of the environmental factors.
Pay secrecy practices have been argued to have several major benefits (refer to
Table 2.1 for an overview of the perceived benefits). First, pay secrecy offers
organizations and employees privacy protection (Colella et al. 2007; Sim 2001). This is
important since employees have listed privacy protection as their primary reason for
preferring pay secrecy (Schuster and Colletti 1973; Markels and Berton 1996). However,
the reasoning for privacy protection may differ among employees. For instance, lowerpaid employees may want privacy to save them from embarrassment or having others
think less or look down on them; whereas, higher-paid employees may want privacy to
not be referred to as arrogant, risk their “sweet deal” or be targeted as a rate buster
(Patten 1978). Additionally, with all of the advancements in technology and ease of
gathering information, employees and organizations are constantly apprehensive in
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regards to their privacy. In regards to an organizations’ privacy, pay secrecy allows
organizations to attract and retain better employees by giving them higher pay wages
without upsetting current employees (Sim 2001). Another privacy protection benefit for
an organization is the reduction of certain competitive tactics, such as poaching, since
competitors are unaware of current pay information.

Table 2.1 Benefits of Pay Secrecy
Benefit

Entity
Benefitted

Additional Benefits

Privacy
Protection

Employees
Stops embarrassment and peer
Organizations pressure; able to attract and retain
employees by offering higher pay;
reduces competitive tactics
Decline in
Organizations Lowers employee opportunism;
Labor Mobility
enhances continuance commitment;
reduces poaching; decreases labor
costs

Entity
Disadvantaged
Employees
Organizations
Society
Employees
Organizations
Society

Conflict
Avoidance

Organizations Reduces conflict, envy, and
resentment; enhances group
cohesion

Impact on
employee
behavior

Organizations Reduces persuasive or manipulative Employees
behaviors in hopes of getting more
pay

Employees

Organizations Pay reflects performance; less
Freedom &
Flexibility in
compressed pay structure; able to
Pay
fix pay discrepancies; avoid
Administration
confrontations

Employees

Autonomy
Limitations

Organizations Limits employee’s autonomy;
decreases turnover

Employees
Organizations
Society

Enforcement
Approaches

Organizations Hinders pay inequities being found Employees
Society
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The resultant decline in labor mobility is another perceived benefit of pay secrecy
practices to organizations, although it may be a cost to employees and society and
possibly to some organizations (Colella et al. 2007; Danziger and Katz 1997; Patten
1978; Sim 2001). Since employees are unable to compare pay information with external
referents or the job market, the likely discovery of their lower relative pay is minimized,
causing them to be unlikely to leave their current organization (Danziger and Katz 1997;
Lawler 1971). Additionally, since employee opportunism or their perceptions of
additional job opportunities is decreased, employee continuance commitment is boosted.
As previously mentioned, poaching is minimized so competitors are less likely to be able
to lure better-performing employees away from the organization. Therefore, labor
mobility reduction helps organizations keep better-performing employees, while also
evading certain labor costs, such as recruitment and training costs (Patten 1978).
Multiple forms of organizational control are other perceived benefits of pay
secrecy practices (Colella et al. 2007). One form of organizational control is conflict
avoidance (Colella et al. 2007; Patten 1978). Managers have claimed that one of their
primary reasons for implementing pay secrecy practices is to evade “jealousies and strife
among employees” (Bierman and Gely 2004) and the conflicts caused by pay envy and
resentment (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Steele 1975). Additionally, conflicts may
cause a loss of group cohesion (Opsahl 1967). Therefore, pay secrecy practices help
diminish, if not eliminate, any jealousy or inequity employees may experience since
actual pay levels are unknown.
A second form of organizational control that is beneficial to organizations entails
influencing employee behavior (Bierman and Gely 2004). For example, under pay
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openness conditions, employees may participate in certain persuasive or manipulative
behaviors or acts (such as informing management about a co-worker’s misconduct or
attempting to deceitfully befriend managers) in attempt to receive more pay (Bartol and
Martin 1989). These Machiavellian tactics may potentially lead to conflict between
employees and possibly between employees and their managers). Thus, pay secrecy
practices are thought to control employee behavior by preventing Machiavellian
behaviors and the conflicts that may arise from them.
Another perceived advantage that pay secrecy creates for organizations is freedom
and flexibility in pay administration (Bartol and Martin 1988; Colella et al. 2007;
deCarufel 1986; Lawler 1981; Patten 1978). Pay secrecy practices allow managers to feel
powerful and comfortable in making their pay decisions more reflective of employees’
performance differences without having to explain their decisions to the low-performing
or angry employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Lawler 1981,1990; Leventhal,
Michaels, and Sanford 1972). Therefore, managers are more inclined to appropriately
dispense pay raises among employees based on their performance levels, resulting in a
better pay-for-performance system. Additionally, pay secrecy allows pay ranges and the
overall pay structure to be less compressed since managers can successfully, and without
fear of angering employees, implement a genuine pay-for-performance system with
maximum partitioning in the raises given (Bartol and Martin 1988). Organizations also
have the flexibility to fix individual pay and pay structure discrepancies, inequities, or
mistakes at their leisure, without having to deal with angry employees (and their
complaints or whining) or explain the slightest inconsistency (deCarufel 1986; GomezMejia and Balkin 1992; Milkovich and Newman 2005; Patten 1978).
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Some additional forms of organizational control that are enhanced from the usage
of pay secrecy practices are autonomy limitations and enforcement approaches (Colella et
al. 2007). Organizations restrict employees’ autonomy by keeping pay secret without
giving employees the option of knowing. Organizations engage in these autonomylimiting, paternalistic behaviors because they believe they know what is best for their
employees and they want to deter them from acting unreasonably (such as quitting) when
they experience distress from pay inequities. Therefore, organizations benefit from this
type of autonomy control by potentially reducing turnover. Additionally, organizations
control employees through the enforcement tactic they use to ensure the pay secrecy
practice (such as pay secrecy policy) is upheld. Organizations benefit from enforcing a
pay secrecy practice (such as terminating employment for violators) by hindering the
employees’ ability to discover problems within the pay structure (such as pay inequities).
As previously mentioned, the enforcement approach, like the pay secrecy construct,
resides on a continuum ranging from implicit to explicit (Colella et al. 2007).
However, since Noy (2007) has expanded Colella et al’s (2007) enforcement
approach by identifying IPS and OPS, the enforcement approach concept may be better
represented as an enforcement strategy, where organizations control the manner in which
employees comply with a pay secrecy practice (or policy) rather than which entity
enforces the compliance. This enforcement strategy concept falls on a continuum ranging
from permissive to intolerant. The intolerant extreme involves a zero-tolerance rule in
regards to discussions of pay information and any rule infractions result in termination of
employment. The permissive extreme entails the organization not reprimanding
employees for violating the pay secrecy practice. An assortment of enforcement strategies
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fall between these two extremes. For example, one strategy near the permissive extreme
may involve the organization giving a “warning” or a sign of disapproval to any rule
violators without ever actually punishing them. Another strategy closer to the intolerant
extreme may entail the organization having a two-step disciplinary program, such as a
verbal warning and then termination of employment for rule violators.
Despite these perceived benefits, pay secrecy practices have been argued to
produce several perceived costs or drawbacks for employees, organizations, and society
(refer to Table 2.2 for an overview of the perceived costs). Naturally, human instincts
associate a ‘secret’ with something bad. Hence, the notion of pay secrecy leads to the
belief that something is wrong, especially since employees may ponder that “if nothing is
wrong, then why is pay information being hidden?” Therefore, the term ‘pay secrecy’
influences the perception of the practice being detrimental for employees, organizations,
or society. One perceived disadvantage of using a pay secrecy practice is the potential
loss of fairness perceptions among employees (Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971). It is
argued that when pay information is undisclosed, employees are unaware of the reasons
for organizational salary differentials (such as whether they are based on performance
levels or seniority), forcing employees to rely on managements’ claims that pay
administration and pay decisions are honest and not based on bias, mistakes, or chance
(Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971,1990). Since employees cannot be completely sure of
the organizations’ sincerity in pay administration and pay decisions, beliefs of unfair pay
or pay inequities (such as pay discrimination) are likely to develop. In fact, a vicious
cycle may develop where pay inequity beliefs may develop over time as employees begin
to speculate about why pay information is being hidden, especially if pay issues are
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handled illegitimately. These unfair pay perceptions may lead to a lack of trust with
management and the organization, especially when employees cannot perform their own
inspection of the compensation system (Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1990). This distrust of
management and the organization in general may further lead to conflict between the
employees and managers and perhaps even result in workplace deviance (such as
employee theft or equipment sabotage) out of retaliation for the injustice. However,
organizations not utilizing pay secrecy practices (as they are exercising a pay openness
practice instead) are able to demonstrate the integrity and consistency of their pay
decisions and related matters by providing pay information and showing no bias or
mistakes exist, or that they are minimal and are attempting to be slowly resolved
(Milkovich and Newman 2005). For instance, pay openness practices help employees
recognize the pay-for-performance system by showcasing that higher-performing
employees receive larger earnings and raises (Lawler 1990). Additionally, pay openness
practices will enhance employees trust in management and the organization since
employees are able to evaluate the pay system and determine its credibility.

Table 2.2 Costs of Pay Secrecy

Cost

Entity
Disadvantaged

Additional Costs

Entity
Benefitted

Unfairness Employees
Perceptions

Lack of trust in management and the
Organizations
organization; may lead to conflict
between employee and managers; may
lead to workplace deviance

Lower
Employees
Work
Organizations
Motivation

May lower job performance; may
increase turnover and pay
dissatisfaction

None
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Table 2.2 (Continued)
Inefficient
Labor
Market

Employees
Organizations
Society

Restricts employee opportunism;
Organizations
employees are unable to identify job
alternatives; employees may be
underemployed or underpaid;
organizations are incapable of
attracting higher-performing applicants

Another perceived disadvantage may be employees experiencing lower work
motivation, which potentially leads to other undesired organizational outcomes
(Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Futrell and Jenkins 1978; Lawler 1965a, 1966,
1971; Opsahl and Dunnette 1966; Schuster and Colletti 1973). Lawler (1965a, 1966,
1971) has long argued that pay secrecy practices lead to lower employee motivation
because employees lack the pay information needed to make accurate comparisons.
Additionally, pay secrecy practices are argued to lower job performance (Futrell and
Jenkins 1978) while increasing pay dissatisfaction (Opsahl 1967; Thompson and Pronsky
1975).
An inefficient labor market is another perceived cost of utilizing pay secrecy
practices (Colella et al. 2007; Danziger and Katz 1997). This is a cost to employees,
organizations, and society. Pay secrecy practices cause employees to lose power by
restricting them from gathering pay information, which could possibly lead them to
identify a better job. Consequently, employees may be underemployed and/or underpaid
because of their lack of awareness of higher paying job alternatives. Organizations are
also affected by an inefficient labor market as they are deprived of potentially higherperforming applicants since they are incapable of marketing competitive pay information
and, consequently, making better workers elsewhere realize the attractiveness of their
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organization’s compensation system. Therefore, by publicizing pay information,
economists would argue the labor market would become more efficient and society
would benefit from appropriate job transitions.

Theoretical Foundations
Over the past several decades, the pay secrecy literature has expanded its usage of
theoretical foundations to explain empirical results. In the beginning, pay secrecy
research did not explicitly utilize theories to justify hypotheses or to clarify findings (e.g.,
Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972). However, prevalent theories
(such as equity theory) quickly penetrated the pay secrecy literature (e.g., Lawler 1971,
1972). There have been several major theories continuously employed throughout the pay
secrecy literature that comprise its theoretical framework. A review of these theories and
their implications for pay secrecy are examined here.
Equity Theory
Equity theory (Adams 1965) is one of the most prominent theories used
throughout the pay communication literature. Its prevalence is probably due to the
importance of (and managerial desire for) a compensation system being fair or equitable.
Adam’s (1965) equity theory mainly emanated from cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger 1957) with additional influences from the principles of distributive justice
(Homans 1961), social comparison theory (Festinger 1954), and relative deprivation
(Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams 1949). According to equity theory,
employees contribute inputs and receive outcomes, while continuously comparing their
ratios of inputs to outcomes with the perceived ratios of referent others to analyze the
fairness of their pay. Equity theory claims that employees are concerned with the relative
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value or fairness of their outcomes rather than the absolute value of their outcomes
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003). However, equity theory is ambiguous as to which referent
others (such as internal versus external referents) are used when making comparisons.
Employee inputs include contributions such as education, experience, skills, abilities,
effort, creativity, and loyalty. Employee outcomes include rewards such as pay, benefits,
working conditions, and job security. Perceived equity is attained when employees
believe their personal input/outcomes ratio is equivalent to the referent others’
input/outcomes ratio. The perceived equity relationship is expressed by the following
equation:
Outcomes (self)

Outcomes (other)

Input (self)

Inputs (other)

However, employees differ in which inputs and outcomes they use in their
personal and referent others’ ratios. Employees also differ in which inputs they believe
should have a major role in determining their outcomes and which outcomes are of
greater importance. For instance, employees tend to believe that more weight should be
put on their superior inputs rather than have an equal weight for all inputs, which makes
their weaker inputs more noticeable and influential in the ratio (Lawler 1966,1981).
Additionally, employees tend to overrate their personal inputs (e.g., Kane and Lawler
1979). Therefore, employees are unlikely to experience perceived equity in their
comparisons.
Perceived inequity occurs when an employee perceives their personal
inputs/outcomes ratio to be nonequivalent with the inputs/outcomes ratio of a referent
other. There are two perceived inequity configurations: under-reward (positive) and over-
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reward (negative) inequity (Kreitner and Kinicki 2001). The perceived under-reward
(positive) inequity occurs when an employees’ personal inputs/outcomes ratio is smaller
(or less than) the referent others’ inputs/outcomes ratio. This type of inequity is more
common and harmful for both employees and the organization as it may cause employees
to engage in selfish and uncooperative behaviors (such as workplace deviance;
(Greenberg 1990a; Harder 1992)) due to feelings of relative deprivation. Under-reward
inequity may develop from several scenarios. For example, under-reward inequity
transpires when employees perceive they supply the same amount of inputs as a similar
co-worker but receive smaller outcomes. Perceptions of under-reward also develop when
employees believe they provide more inputs than a similar co-worker but receive the
same outcomes. The under-reward (positive) inequity relationship is expressed by the
following equation:
Outcomes (self)

Outcomes (other)
<

Inputs (self)

---------------------------

Inputs (other)

The perceived over-reward (negative) inequity occurs when an employees’
personal inputs/outcomes ratio is larger (or greater than) the referent others’
inputs/outcomes ratio. This type of inequity is typically innocuous to the benefitting
employees since they are less likely to criticize this inequity; however, it is harmful to the
organization as it may lower profits due to certain employees receiving higher pay. There
are several ways for this type of inequity to manifest. For instance, when employees
believe they do not put forth as much effort or time as a similar co-worker but receive the
same outcomes, negative inequity transpires. Also, over-reward inequity develops when
employees perceive their outcomes to be more than a similar co-worker who supplies the
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same amount of inputs. The over-reward (negative) inequity relationship is expressed by
the following equation:
Outcomes (self)

Outcomes (other)
>

Inputs (self)

---------------------------

Inputs (other)

Both types of perceived inequities exist along a continuum, with the magnitude of
the inequity increasing as the discrepancy between the two ratios becomes larger (Opsahl
and Dunnette 1966). The discrepancy between the two ratios can be caused from
differing amount of inputs and/or outcomes in the ratios. Generally, minor inequities arise
when a discrepancy is between either the inputs or outcomes, while larger inequities are
perceived when both the inputs and outcomes are nonequivalent or there is a substantial
difference between either the inputs or outcomes (such as the employee exerts twice as
much effort or referent others’ pay is double). Although the majority of employees may
tolerate small inequities (Jaques 1961), the thresholds for under-reward and over-reward
inequity differ. For instance, over-reward inequity may be more tolerable at lower levels
than under-reward inequity since the employee is actually benefitting from the inequity.
Additionally, the perceived inequity creates tension within employees at an amount
proportional to the magnitude of the inequity. This tension causes employees to attempt
to reduce dissonance and to restore equity through different cognitive and/or behavioral
courses of actions. The strength of these equity restoration attempts is proportional with
the tension created. Some of the tactics used to restore equity involve employees
modifying their inputs (such as by increasing performance or withholding effort) or
outcomes (such as by requesting a raise or donating money to charity), distorting their
personal or referent others’ actual inputs and outcomes, changing their referent other(s)
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used for comparison, engaging in various behaviors to adjust inputs or outcomes (e.g.,
deviant behaviors such as employee theft, absenteeism, sabotaging equipment or others’
contributions), participating in alternative efforts (such as complaining, filing formal
grievances, attempting to form a union), or changing jobs (such as transferring jobs or
terminating employment). The chosen tactic is determined by the employee, and the
amount of tension and other feelings experienced. Generally, employees enduring an
under-reward inequity experience feelings of anger and behave selfishly and
uncooperatively with the organization (Harder 1992); whereas, guilt and anxiety is felt
for those undergoing an over-reward inequity (Homans 1961; Jaques 1961).
Equity theory explains the impact pay secrecy has on employees and the
organization. Lawler (1965a, 1965b, 1967) has continuously argued (and empirically
supported) that the motivational role of pay is weakened under pay secrecy practices
because inaccurate and unfair pay comparisons are unavoidable when pay information is
hidden. Specifically, managers tend to make inaccurate pay comparisons by
underestimating their superiors’ pay and overestimating the pay of their subordinates and
peers (Lawler 1965a, 1967,1972; Milkovich and Anderson 1972; Mahoney and Weitzel
1978). According to equity theory, these inaccurate comparisons (specifically
overestimating subordinates’ pay) will cause employees to feel tension and proclivity to
restore equity through various methods. For example, employees who inaccurately
overestimate their peers’ or subordinates’ pay and experience under-reward inequity will
most likely reduce the dissonance by decreasing desired organizational outcomes, such as
performance (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010), or by increasing unwanted and
possibly harmful behaviors, such as self-interested or counter-productive behaviors (such
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as reducing effort or performance; (Harder 1992); stealing; (Greenberg 1990a); or
sabotage of others’ contributions; (Skarlicki and Folger 1997)). Additionally,
underestimating superiors’ pay undermines motivation as it lowers the expectancy that
promotion will lead to a significant pay increase.

Referent Others and Comparisons. Although equity theory does not specifically
explain which or how referent others are chosen, prior research on referents gives further
insight in regards to comparisons. There are two types of referents: social and selfreferents (Gerhart and Rynes 2003; Goodman 1974,1977; Scholl, Cooper, and McKenna
1987). Self-referents involve the employees’ unique personal experiences (such as pay
history) and expectations (such as ability to meet financial needs and future pay). Social
referents entail using other employees in the comparison process and there are two types:
external and internal referents (Hills 1980; Lawler 1990). External referents are
individuals employed outside of the organization, but usually within the same job
domain. Internal referents are individuals who are employed within the same
organization, but not specifically in the same position, department, or job level. Internal
referents may involve comparisons of employees at the same job level (horizontal
comparisons), downward comparisons (subordinates or lower level employees; (Wills
1991)), or upward comparisons (superiors or higher level employees; (Martin 1982))
within the organization. Generally, equity theory implies the usage of social referents
(rather than self-referents) in either a similar position or job level (instead of downward
or upward comparisons). Pay inequities with both external and internal referents have
consequences for the employing organization, with external inequity usually being more
severe (Lawler 1981,1990). External inequity may cause organizational deviance (such
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as absenteeism or withheld effort), intentions to quit, and turnover. On the other hand,
internal inequity may not increase turnover (especially if there is external equity) but it
may lead to interpersonal deviance (such as sabotage of others’ contributions) or other
organizational problems (such as formal complaints and grievances being filed).
Additionally, employees tend to use more than one referent and make multiple
comparisons simultaneously (Goodman 1974). Therefore, employees may experience pay
equity with some referents and pay inequity with other referents (Scholl et al. 1987).

Organizational Justice/Fairness. Similar to and deriving from equity theory
(Adams 1965), the notion of organizational justice (Greenberg 1987a) argues that
employees make judgments or fairness comparisons with referents in regards to the
organizations’ behaviors towards the employee (such as pay outcomes) which, in turn,
determines the attitudes and behaviors exhibited from the employee. Rather than
prevailing as a single theory, organizational justice is regarded as a multi-dimensional
construct (Latham and Pinder 2005) having four distinct dimensions (Colquitt 2001;
Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, and Ng 2001): distributive justice (Adams 1965),
procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker 1975), and interactional justice (Bies and Moag
1986) which encompasses informational justice and interpersonal justice (Greenberg
1990a, 1993).
The organizational justice concept attempts to explain the impact of justice or
fairness perceptions in the workplace (Colquitt 2001; Greenberg 1990b). In other words,
organizational justice research helps interpret and explain organizational behaviors
(Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Greenberg 1990b). Typically, the resulting attitudes and
behaviors are displayed in a reciprocative and complementary manner. Therefore,
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equitable judgments or perceptions of fairness suggest a social exchange relationship and
are likely to lead to cooperative and organizationally beneficial attitudes and behaviors
(such as organizational commitment and trust; (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001;
DeConinck 2010)); whereas, unfair or inequitable perceptions suggest an economical
exchange relationship (Organ 1990) and are inclined to cause uncooperative, selfish and
potentially harmful attitudes and behaviors (such as organizational distrust and workplace
deviance; (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Johns 2001)). All organizational actions
and decisions (such as pay outcomes) are used in determining perceptions of fairness or
injustice. There are numerous distinct aspects of organizational justice that encompass all
organizational actions, such as pay justice regarding fairness perceptions of individual
compensation.
Pay justice refers to employee’s fairness perceptions of their distributed
outcomes, the process used to determine their outcomes and the manner in which the
outcomes and process are communicated to them (Andersson-Straberg et al. 2007). Even
though both employees and organizations consider pay to be an important job factor
(since it achieves employees needs and increases organizational productivity), the pay
justice literature is limited (Greenberg 2001; Pfeffer 1997) with only a few studies
analyzing fairness perceptions in regards to certain pay-related aspects (such as
performance appraisals and pay allocations; (Colquitt, Greenberg, and Zapata-Phelan
2005; Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, and Rupp 2001)). Generally, favorable or positive
pay perceptions (such as a higher pay raise) tend to coincide with feelings of pay justice,
while unfavorable or negative pay perceptions (such as a lower or no pay raise) lead to
unfair feelings about pay (e.g., Folger and Konovsky 1989).
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Perceptions of organizational justice, especially pay justice, are influenced by pay
secrecy practices since they hinder the availability of pay information. Pay secrecy
practices impede an employee’s ability to make accurate comparisons since the needed
information is hidden, thereby suggesting illegitimacy and unfairness. Therefore, pay
secrecy practices collide with the principles of organizational justice and produce
perceptions of injustice. On the other hand, pay openness practices are consistent with
organizational justice principles as the organization gives the impression of authenticity
and fairness. Although each organizational justice dimension (such as distributive and
procedural justice) is expected to be negatively affected by pay secrecy practices (Colella
et al. 2007), each dimension is affected in a slightly different manner.
Distributive justice (Adams 1965) refers to the perceived fairness of the allocation
of outcomes. Distributive justice (or injustice) is determined in the same manner as
described in equity theory, where employees compare their personal inputs/outcomes
ratio to referent others. As previously mentioned, when pay secrecy practices are
implemented, employees are likely to make inaccurate pay estimations (e.g., Lawler
1965a, 1967), which lead to negative comparisons and perceptions of unfairness and
injustice. Additionally, pay secrecy practices create uncertainty for employees (Colella et
al. 2007), especially since they are unable to receive actual pay information and must
depend on innuendo and gossip (deCarufel 1986). According to uncertainty management
theory (Lind and van den Bos 2002), this uncertainty of specific position in the pay
structure and organizational worth is likely to cause employees to experience anxiety and
an increased concern for fairness in order to cope with the tension. Additionally, when
employees’ emotions are involved, to the extent that high levels of dissonance or anger
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are experienced, misperceptions or inaccurate comparisons are most likely to transpire
(Lawler 1981) and thus, most likely causing feelings of unfairness or injustice. On the
other hand, pay openness practices alleviate misperceptions and feelings of unfairness by
allowing employees to examine the pay structure and their personal positioning in it.
However, if the pay structure is not equitable or prone to favoritism, prejudice,
discrimination or the like, then pay openness practices will actually strengthen the
feelings of unfairness. Nevertheless, pay inequities are likely to be reduced under
conditions of pay openness (deCarufel 1986). Additionally, fairness heuristic theory
(Lind 2001) argues that when information is unavailable and specific perceptions of
fairness (such as fairness of pay process) are unable to be made, employees will use other
fairness perceptions or an overall perception of organizational fairness to infer judgments.
Thus, when pay information is unavailable, employees will use their fairness perceptions
of other organizational outcomes (such as office space or resources) or other forms of
justice (such as procedural or interpersonal justice) to make a fairness judgment about
their personal outcomes.
Procedural justice (Leventhal 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry 1980; Thibaut
and Walker 1975) refers to the perceived fairness associated with the process and
procedures used to determine outcome distribution. In order for an outcome process to be
perceived as fair or justified, there are several criteria (or standards) that the process
should possess (Folger and Konovsky 1989; Leventhal 1980; Leventhal et al. 1980):
consistency, accuracy, bias suppression or neutrality, representation of all entities
affected, comprehensiveness, social morality, and opportunity to correct mistakes.
However, employees do not always follow these standards to evaluate all procedural
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fairness perceptions in that they change under different conditions, situations, or
processes (Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Jones, Scarpello, and Bergmann 1999; Leventhal
1980). For instance, pay rate processes and pay raise processes use different justice
standards or criteria to assess fairness (Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008). Procedural justice is
likely to be affected by pay secrecy practices since they prevent the knowledge of the
criteria or standards (such as being accurate and unbiased) used to verify its existence
(Noy 2007). Therefore, perceptions of procedural unfairness or injustice are likely to
prevail under pay secrecy practices since employees cannot determine that the procedures
used to determine their outcomes reflect reality and were accurate, unbiased, and
consistent with other employees’ procedures (Leventhal et al. 1980; Thibaut and Walker
1975). Pay openness practices confirm that organizational rules were not transgressed or
neglected for certain employees and that all pertinent information was accurate and
utilized in determining the employees’ outcomes. Therefore, the practice of pay openness
leads to perceptions of fairness. As previously mentioned, fairness heuristic theory (Lind
2001) argues that when there is a lack of information (as there would be under pay
secrecy conditions), procedural justice may be determined by the fairness perceptions of
other organizational processes (such as disciplinary or raise procedures) or other justice
dimensions (such as distributive justice). Therefore, if employees view the disciplinary
process as being fair or their personal outcomes as being favorable then procedural
justice (rather than unfairness) is likely to exist. Also, procedural and distributive justice
create the “fair process effect” (Folger 1993, p.241), in that even when outcomes are
unfavorable, as long as the processes used to determine those outcomes are perceived as
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fair, the employee will be more inclined to accept the outcome as being fair and not
respond negatively or in retaliation (Cropanzano and Folger 1991; Greenberg 1987b).
The social component of organizational justice, interactional justice, refers to the
interpersonal treatment employees receive from the organization (usually from their boss
or superiors) as procedures are executed (Bies and Moag 1986). Interactional justice is
comprised of four criteria: justification, truthfulness, respect, and propriety (Bies and
Moag 1986). In the beginning interactional justice lacked consensus in regards to its
measurement competency in that some researchers considered it to be a subset of
procedural justice (e.g., Niehoff and Moorman 1993) while others treated it as a third
type of organizational justice (e.g., Skarlicki and Folger 1997) or originally tested it as a
third type of justice but then combined it with procedural justice due to high
intercorrelations (e.g., Skarlicki and Latham 1997). Additionally, interactional justice was
separated for research purposes into two dimensions: explanations and sensitivity
(Greenberg 1990a). This separation led to the formation of interpersonal justice, which
encompassed the respect and propriety criteria, and informational justice, which included
the justification and truthfulness criteria (Greenberg 1993). Further research
demonstrated the importance of having separate measures not only for interactional
justice but also for interpersonal and informational justice as each separate component of
organizational justice displayed different effects (e.g., Colquitt 2001).
Informational justice is the social side of procedural justice and refers to the
amount, quality, and timing of information provided to employees that explain the
procedures used to determine outcomes (Bies, Martin, and Brockner 1993; Greenberg
1993). Information needs to be accurate, complete, and supplied in timely manner in
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order for perceptions of fairness to prevail. Therefore, employees are more likely to
experience informational justice (rather than injustice) when they are more adequately
informed about the processes used to determine their outcomes (Andersson-Straberg et al.
2007). Additionally, perceptions of informational justice are likely to be enhanced when
information is given on a regular basis and face-to-face (Bies et al. 1993). Informational
justice is likely to be affected by pay secrecy practices since they prohibit employees
from receiving pay information. Therefore, informational unfairness or injustice is likely
to be experienced when pay secrecy practices are in effect since no information is
supplied to the employees. On the other hand, pay openness practices lead to
informational justice since pay information is given to the employees. However, if the
pay information has flaws or is obtained in an untimely manner, perceptions of
informational justice will decrease.
Interpersonal justice is the social side of justice and refers to the extent to which
employees are treated with politeness, dignity, and respect from the organization (usually
from their boss or superiors) when procedures used to determine their outcomes are
executed (Greenberg 1990b, 1993). In order for perceptions of interpersonal justice to be
positive, employees need to be treated courteously on every occasion where pay
information is supplied. Pay secrecy practices are likely to affect interpersonal justice
negatively since the employees’ superior is not allowed to supply pay information and
may come across as being rude, uncaring, or disrespectful of the employee and his/her
feelings toward their pay. However, pay openness practices may lead to positive
perceptions of interpersonal justice since employees may feel as though their superiors
respect them and their feelings by providing pay information. Although pay openness
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practices may lead employees to feel as though their superiors respect them by providing
them with pay information, if the pay information is given in a rude or insensible manner
then perceptions of interpersonal unfairness are likely to transpire. Additionally, when
there are no interactions about pay information (as may occur under pay secrecy
conditions), fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001) argues that employees will supplement
this perception of fairness with other judgments involving interactions with superiors
(such as conversations about scheduling) or other justice dimensions (such as
informational justice). Therefore, perceptions of interpersonal injustice are likely to occur
when other interactions involving superiors are discomforting or negative.
Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory (Vroom 1964) is a motivation theory which argues that
employees choose to engage in certain behaviors because they are motivated by the
expectation of receiving a specific outcome that is associated with the chosen behavior.
According to expectancy theory, there are different motivational elements (expectancy,
instrumentality, and valence), rather than only the desired outcome, that determine the
behavior selected. The formula for motivation involves two components: expectancy and
valence. Valence refers to the value the employee personally attributes to a certain
outcome or reward.
Expectancy refers to an employee’s belief that specific outcomes will result from
engaging in certain behaviors. There are two parts of the expectancy element: effortperformance expectancy and performance-outcome expectancy. The effort-performance
expectancy refers to the employees’ belief that increased effort will lead to achieving
desired performance levels. The performance-outcome expectancy, also referred to as
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instrumentality (Kreitner and Kinicki 2001), refers to the employees’ belief that
attainment of expected performance levels will result in an outcome or reward (such as a
pay raise or promotion).
Expectancy theory is expressed by the following equation:
Expectancies
Motivation = [Effort-Performance x Performance-Outcome] X Valence
The most significant portion of the expectancy model relating to pay secrecy
practices is the instrumentality element (performance-outcome expectancy) since it
motivates employees. However, expectancy theory requires employees to identify a payfor-performance relationship since an outcome or reward (such as pay raise) is used as
the motivator. Nevertheless, several scholars (e.g., Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971,
1990) have argued that pay secrecy practices prevent employees from recognizing this
relationship because pay information is withheld. Therefore, a direct relationship between
pay and performance cannot be established and motivation for higher performance levels
is reduced. For instance, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010) found that a decrease in
pay-for-performance perceptions partially explained the relationship between pay secrecy
policy practices and lower task performance levels among employees with lower inequity
tolerance levels. On the other hand, pay openness practices have been suggested to
substantiate a pay-for-performance relationship (Lawler 1990; Mulvey, LeBlanc,
Heneman, and Mclnemey 2002). In support of this supposition, Futrell and Jenkins
(1978) found employee performance increased when an organizations’ current pay
communication practice changed from pay secrecy to pay openness, where the existence
of a pay-for-performance relationship was able to be corroborated and hence to motivate
performance.
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Prior Research
Even though pay secrecy practices have been commonly acknowledged by
practitioners as a good human resource and compensation practice (Lawler 1965b, 1966,
1972), their usage has been a controversial issue for researchers for decades (Bamberger
and Belogolovsky 2010; Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003). Despite the fact
that discussions about pay are widely considered crass, inapt, and uncomfortable,
researchers have been successful in getting employees and organizations to openly
discuss (or at least respond to questionnaires) their beliefs, attitudes, outcomes, and
expectations about pay secrecy and pay openness practices (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1967;
Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010). However, the pay communication literature is best
described as scarce and confusing. Because pay secrecy practices (specifically pay
secrecy policy practices) are both unlawful and a crucial decision for top management
and organizations (Henderson 1985), it is baffling as to how limited the pay
communication (especially pay secrecy) literature is since it began almost fifty years ago.
These limitations (such as few organizational outcomes analyzed) further confuse
scholars and practitioners, leading both to question the value of pay secrecy.
Additionally, the pay communication research has somewhat conflicting results (e.g.,
Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Thompson and Pronsky 1975), leading to further confusions
about pay secrecy’s overall efficiency and common practice in the workplace.
Nonetheless, this limited research insinuates that pay secrecy practices are detrimental for
employees and organizations and thus, should not be utilized (e.g., Bartol and Martin
1989; Lawler 1965a, 1967).
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Lawler (1965a, 1965b, 1967) is generally recognized as the seminal researcher in
the pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) literature (Noy 2007). He is the
most notable opponent of pay secrecy practice usage in the workplace (Lawler 1965a,
1967,1990). For decades Lawler has argued for the usage of a pay openness practice and
more pay information dispersion to employees. Lawler’s rationale for these arguments is
that pay secrecy practices lower employee motivation which, in turn, decrease other
desired organizational outcomes (such as pay satisfaction and organizational trust). Thus,
pay secrecy practices are counter-productive and contradict organizational goals and
objectives.
Pay Level
The compensation literature has categorized employees’ pay into several
dimensions, such as pay level, pay structure, form and basis of pay (Gerhart and Rynes
2003). Even though pay communication practices can involve and vary across all of the
pay dimensions, the majority of the pay communication research has utilized the pay
level dimension (e.g., Lawler 1965a; (Gerhart and Rynes 2003)), with some also
including pay structure (e.g., Lawler 1965; Milkovich and Anderson 1972). The pay level
dimension has conventionally been used throughout the pay communication literature
because employees tend to have a bigger concern for it than other pay matters (such as
certain benefits), because it is associated with an employees’ decision to quit or to apply
with an organization, and because it is easily observable to make pay comparisons
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003).

Pay Estimations
One of the main reasons organizations claim to utilize pay secrecy practices is to
eliminate employees from making negative pay comparisons with internal referents,
which leads to pay dissatisfaction (Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967,1972). Basically,
organizations believe that employees will be incapable of making pay comparisons when
pay information is limited. However, Andrews and Henry (1963) found that even when
organizations used a pay secrecy policy practice, managers made pay comparisons. Based
on this finding and additional work from Patchen (1961), Lawler dedicated his initial pay
communication research to analyzing the effect pay secrecy practices would have on
producing accurate pay comparisons among managers (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1966,1967).
For an overview of the pay estimation studies refer to Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Prior Research Involving the Pay Estimation Outcome
Study

Sample

Lawler
Lower- and
(1965a,
middle-level
1965b, 1966) managers in
several
organizations
Lawler
(1967)

Pay Communication
Practice
Some organizations used
a complete pay secrecy
practice and some used
an extreme pay openness
practice (only individual
pay hidden)

Lower-level Used a pay secrecy
managers to practice
top
management
in one
organization

Main Findings
Pay secrecy negatively affects
pay comparisons;
overestimated subordinates’
and peers’ pay;
underestimated superiors’ pay
Overestimated subordinates’
and peers’ pay;
underestimated superiors’
pay; misestimations were
manifested two levels away;
overestimation of peers’ pay
correlated with pay
dissatisfaction
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Table 2.3 (Continued)
Milkovich
and
Anderson
(1972)

Lower and
middle-level
managers in
one
organization

Used a moderate pay
secrecy practice
(supplied pay ranges
and median pay for
personal pay level)

Lawler
(1972)
Study 1

Managers in
one
organization

Used a pay secrecy
practice

Overestimated subordinates’
and peers’ pay;
underestimated superiors’
pay; misestimations were
manifested two levels away;
accurate estimations were
correlated with higher levels
of pay dissatisfaction;
overestimations of peers’ pay
correlated with higher levels
of pay satisfaction
Overestimated subordinates’
and peers’ pay;
underestimated superiors’
pay; misestimations were
manifested two levels away;
overestimation of peers’ and
subordinates’ pay associated
with higher levels of pay
dissatisfaction; accurate
estimations were correlated
negatively with pay
satisfaction

Lawler
Managers in One organization gave
(1972) Study two
annual raises but
2
organizations amount was unknown;
one organization gave
10% raises but
frequency was
unknown

Overestimated unknown
parts (size & frequency) of
the raises

Mahoney
and Weitzel
(1978)

Overestimated subordinates’,
peers’, and superiors’ pay;
accurate estimations of
peers’ pay correlated with
higher levels of pay
dissatisfaction;
underestimations of peers’
pay correlated with higher
levels of pay satisfaction

Managers in
one
organization

Used a moderate pay
openness practice
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Lawler’s (1965a. 1965b. 1966) Pay Secrecy—Pav Comparisons Study. Lawler’s
original study (1965a, 1965b, 1966) was comprised of lower- and middle-level managers
employed with several organizations in different industries. Some of the organizations
utilized pay secrecy practices and others practiced pay openness with only individual pay
information being hidden. The data revealed that pay secrecy practices do negatively
affect the accuracy of pay comparisons among managers employed in both the public and
private sectors. Specifically, the managers (in both sectors) consistently overestimated the
pay of their peers and subordinates. Additionally, the private sector managers (but not the
public sector) had a propensity to underestimate the pay of their superiors; however, the
public sector managers tended to be more accurate in their superiors’ pay estimation. The
managers from the public sector tended to be more accurate in their pay estimations than
the private sector managers. Lawler (1965a, 1965b) claimed the reasoning for this was
most likely due to the fact that public sector organizations supply more pay information
to their employees than private sector organizations. Overall, the results show that pay
secrecy practices do not stop employees from making pay comparisons but actually
increase the likelihood of making inaccurate and unfavorable pay comparisons, especially
since the public sector managers were more accurate in their estimations.
In addition, the majority of the managers (77%) indicated that pay information
was best undisclosed. However, this is most likely due to the fact that most of the
managers also thought their pay was too little. The results also show that managers
believed the pay structure to be too compressed, in that the pay differentials were not
large enough between managerial levels, since they had a tendency to overestimate their
subordinates’ pay and underestimate their superiors’ pay. Therefore, Lawler (1965a)
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claimed that managers were most likely to be dissatisfied with their pay since they
generated negative pay comparisons and perceived the pay differentials to be too small.
Additionally, since the downward pay differentials were more likely to be viewed as
smaller than the upward pay differentials, Lawler (1965a) claimed that the
overestimations of subordinates’ pay would probably have a bigger impact on pay
dissatisfaction. Lawler (1965a) concluded that pay secrecy practices may not only lead to
pay dissatisfaction, but also decrease managers’ motivation for better job performance
and desire for a promotion.

Lawler’s (1967) Pav Secrecy—Pav Estimations—Pav Satisfaction Study. Lawler
(1967) conducted another study in hopes of replicating his original (Lawler 1965a,
1965b, 1966) findings of inaccurate pay estimations and to analyze outcomes he expected
to be associated with the misestimates, such as pay dissatisfaction and job performance.
The participants ranged in their managerial level (from lower-level to top management)
and were all employed in the same organization that utilized a pay secrecy practice. In
this study, the participating managers not only estimated pay for those directly above and
below them in the organizational structure but also two levels above and below them.
Similar to his original study’s (Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1966) findings, managers
had a tendency to underestimate their superiors’ pay and overestimate their peers’ and
subordinates’ pay. These trends were even more manifested for the managers’ pay
estimates of those two levels away from the participants. Therefore, the further away a
position was from the participating managers’ position, the more pronounced the
inaccuracy of the pay estimations became. This demonstrates that managers misinterpret
their organizations’ total pay structure. Additionally, due to these inaccurate pay
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estimations, managers believed there was not enough pay distance between the
managerial levels.
In regards to satisfaction with pay, pay dissatisfaction was associated with
overestimations of peers’ pay but not with inaccurate estimations of subordinates’ or
superiors’ pay. The non-relationship between overestimations of subordinates’ pay and
pay dissatisfaction is surprising and against expectations. Lawler (1967) concluded this
result may have occurred due to the participating managers not using their subordinates
or superiors as reference groups in their pay comparisons, especially since the data
revealed external referents to be the most significant group used in pay comparisons.
As expected, managers who underestimated superiors’ pay were more likely to
indicate how nonessential a promotion was to them. Contrary to expectations, managers
who overestimated their superiors’ pay (and therefore, those potentially more likely to
view promotion as important) had been given lower performance (or effort) ratings by
their superiors. Lawler (1967) reasoned that this surprising result may be due to managers
not making an association between pay and performance, possibly also causing
employees to receive incorrect performance feedback. Thus, pay secrecy practices not
only resulted in managers making negative pay comparisons but (as argued throughout
Lawler’s original study; (Lawler 1965a)) also affected pay satisfaction, promotion
desirability, job performance, and possibly perceptions of performance feedback.

Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) Replication Study. Milkovich and Anderson
(1972) attempted to replicate Lawler’s (1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967) prior findings in
hopes of better understanding the effects pay secrecy and pay openness practices have on
managers’ pay estimations and additional work outcomes, such as pay dissatisfaction.
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This study was fairly similar to Lawler’s (1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967) studies except
Lawler’s (1967) questionnaire was vaguely tailored to add questions about the extent to
which pay communication was expressed by the subjects’ supervisor and the degree to
which the organization utilized pay secrecy was different. In this study, participants were
lower- or middle-level managers working for the same organization which used a
moderate pay secrecy practice (supplied pay ranges and median pay for the manager’s
personal pay level).
Similar to Lawler’s (1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967) studies, managers in this study
had a propensity to systematically underestimate their superiors’ pay and overestimate
their peers’ and subordinates’ pay. These inaccurate estimations were manifested at two
levels away from the managers’ own level as found in Lawler’s (1967) study. However,
this study produced higher overestimations of subordinates’ pay than Lawler’s (1967)
study. Therefore, the weakened pay secrecy practice did not help deteriorate inaccurate
estimations of others’ pay. Additionally, even though the majority of the managers
indicated they had received their managerial levels’ pay range (79%) and pay median
(64%) information, only a small percentage of them (8% and 10% respectfully) were able
to successfully estimate the mean salary for their managerial level. Surprisingly, those
managers who indicated they were not given pay range or median information were
identical in their accuracy (or inaccuracy) of estimations. Actually, the managers who
were not informed of pay range information had a better likelihood (15%) of accurately
approximating pay estimations than those who were given the pay information (9%).
Milkovich and Anderson (1972) claimed this may have occurred due to communication
issues (such as the information communicated was not accurate or information was not
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actually communicated) or trust issues (such as employees may not trust that the
information is accurate).
Contrary to Lawler’s (1967) expectations, this study found that managers who
underestimated subordinates’ pay (53%) were more likely to believe the pay differential
between them and their subordinates was too small than those who overestimated their
subordinates’ pay (31%). As expected though, the results indicated that managers who
underestimated their superiors’ pay (24%) were more likely to believe the pay differential
between them and their superiors was too small than those who overestimated their
superiors’ pay (23%).
In regards to pay satisfaction, this study had a much larger percentage of
managers (40%) who were satisfied with their pay than in Lawler’s (1967) study (13%).
Despite expectations, the data revealed that managers who were more likely to be
accurate in their pay estimations were the most dissatisfied with their pay; whereas, those
who were the most satisfied with their pay were the managers that overestimated their
peers’ pay. This contradicts Lawler’s (1967) findings that managers experiencing the
highest dissatisfaction were those who overestimated their peers’ pay. Milkovich and
Anderson (1972) argued this discrepancy may be due to pay satisfaction (or pay
dissatisfaction) being manipulated to some extent by pay communication efforts or an
overall satisfaction perception.
Despite the inconsistencies in Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) and Lawler’s
(1967) studies, the results substantiate that inaccurate pay estimations will prevail despite
the utilization of a semi-open pay practice. These previously mentioned discrepancies
may be due to several differences in the methodology and samples used. For instance,
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Lawler’s (1967) study had some participants that were higher-level or top managers;
whereas, Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) study only had lower- and middle-level
managers. Also, Lawler’s (1967) study only analyzed total pay secrecy and its effects;
whereas, Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) study examined the effects of a semi-open or
semi-secret practice. However, since the studies differed in the pay communication
variable used to predict organizational outcomes the results are expected to vary to some
degree.

Lawler’s (1972) Additional Outcome Study. Due to previous unexpected findings
(Lawler 1967) regarding pay dissatisfaction (specifically the nonexistent relationship
between pay satisfaction and the overestimation of subordinates’ pay) and the possibility
of inaccurate perceptions of performance feedback, Lawler (1972) conducted two
separate studies to further analyze these relationships. Contrary to previous pay
communication studies, this research utilized theoretical foundations (specifically social
comparison theory, equity theory, and relative deprivation theory) to assist in developing
the hypotheses and interpreting the findings.
Study 1 was concerned with the prior surprising results involving pay satisfaction.
The sample consisted of managers from one organization that utilized pay secrecy
practices. The pay estimates for other managers included those two levels away and
referent groups were also measured. As found in prior research (e.g., Lawler 1965a,
1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972), managers tended to underestimate their superiors’
pay and overestimate their peers’ and subordinates’ pay. Also similar to previous findings
(e.g., Lawler 1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972), the incorrect estimations were
evident at two levels away from the participants’ own managerial level. As expected, the
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pay differential between the subjects and their subordinates was believed to be too small.
Contrary to previous findings (e.g., Lawler 1967) and as expected, pay satisfaction was
affected by the overestimation of subordinates’ pay. In fact, the higher the
overestimations of subordinates’ and peers’ pay, the more pay dissatisfaction was
experienced (with subordinates’ pay being more significantly correlated with pay
dissatisfaction). Pay satisfaction was also negatively related to accuracy of pay
estimations and pay differentials (especially the discrepancy between the managers and
their subordinates’ pay). Additionally, the managers’ perceived relative standing better
predicted pay satisfaction than the actual relative standing.
Study 2 analyzed performance feedback as a possible outcome of the pay
secrecy—inaccurate pay estimate relationship. This study used pay raises instead of pay
level since raises signify recent performance feedback. Participants were managers from
two organizations that both used a merit system for dispersing raises. However, one
organization gave yearly raises but the size of the raise was unknown, while the other
organization gave ten percent raises but the frequency of the raises were unknown.
Performance feedback was represented by the relative size and frequency of the raises. In
both organizations, the participants overestimated the unknown parts of the pay raise
systems (the average size or frequency of raises given to their peers). Therefore,
managers were interpreting negative performance feedback from their superiors since
they believed they were receiving pay raises either less often or less in amount. However,
the managers’ perceived personal pay raise characteristics only had a small relationship
to self-evaluation of performance. Therefore, pay raise characteristics did not influence
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the managers’ self-evaluation. Lawler (1972) concluded that under pay secrecy
conditions, inaccurate performance feedback was being given to managers.

Mahoney and Weitzel’s (1978) Regression Study. This study was conducted to
analyze the same effects of pay communication practices (such as pay secrecy
influencing inaccurate pay estimations and pay dissatisfaction) utilizing regression. The
participants used in this study were all employed in one organization and ranged across
five different managerial levels, with the majority holding positions in the top two levels.
The organization used a moderately open pay practice, in that managers were given pay
ranges and midpoints for their own managerial level and contiguous levels (immediate
above and below levels). Contrary to previous studies (Lawler 1967; Milkovich and
Anderson 1972), this study examined the pay estimates of the managers’ peers and
adjacent managerial levels (not two levels away).
Similar to the previous studies (e.g., Lawler 1967; Milkovich and Anderson
1972), managers had a propensity to overestimate their peers’ and subordinates’ pay.
Surprisingly, this study found that managers were also more likely to overestimate their
superiors’ pay. This contradicts Lawler’s (1965a, 1965b, 1966, 1967) and Milkovich and
Anderson’s (1972) results of managerial tendencies to underestimate superiors’ pay. This
study, like the prior studies (e.g., Lawler 1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972), had a
relatively small number of managers make accurate estimations of peers’, superiors’, and
subordinates’ pay.
This study had three distinct measures for pay satisfaction: with compensation
amount, with compensation administration, and with compensation comparisons.
Estimations of peers’ pay were significantly related to pay satisfaction with compensation
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amount and compensation administration. There were no other significant relationships
associated with pay estimations and pay satisfaction. However, managers who correctly
estimated their peers’ pay experienced the highest pay dissatisfaction across all of the pay
satisfaction measures.
Contrary to Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) results, managers who
underestimated their peers’ pay were more likely to experience greater pay satisfaction
than those who overestimated or accurately estimated their peers’ compensation. In fact,
contrary to Lawler’s (1967) findings, managers who correctly estimated their peers’ pay
had a higher propensity to be dissatisfied with their pay than managers who inaccurately
estimated their peer’s pay. However, the effect on pay satisfaction was opposite for
estimating subordinates’ pay, in that the managers who accurately estimated their
subordinates’ pay experienced greater pay satisfaction while the greater pay
dissatisfaction was felt by those who underestimated their subordinates’ pay. This
contradicts Milkovich and Anderson’s (1972) results since they found the managers who
expressed the highest dissatisfaction with their pay were the ones who made accurate
estimations for others’ pay. In regards to superiors’ pay estimations, managers who
misestimated their superiors’ pay was more likely to be satisfied (at about an equal extent
for under- and overestimations) than those who accurately estimated their superiors’ pay.
Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) performed additional tests on the relationships
between the adjacent managerial levels and pay estimations. The first test was comprised
of regression for each of the pay satisfaction measures with the three perceived pay
ratios: selfisubordinate, peer/self, superior/self pay. As expected, the peer/self pay ratio
was negatively significant for all three pay satisfaction measures and the self/subordinate
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pay ratio was positively significant for all three pay satisfaction measures. However,
since pay estimations explained only a small amount of the variance in pay satisfaction in
most of the instances, there is little support for the relationship of pay secrecy causing
pay misestimations which lead to pay dissatisfaction. Additionally, the superior/self pay
ratio was not significant for any of the pay satisfaction measures. The second test was
similar to the first except actual pay (taken from data supplied by the organization) for
the three pay ratios were used. Contrary to Lawler’s (1967) arguments, the observed pay
satisfaction levels were significantly greater than the estimated pay satisfaction levels
across all three pay satisfaction measures. This result suggests that a pay openness
practice would result in more pay dissatisfaction.

Lawler’s (1971) Pav Satisfaction Model and Analysis. Based on his previous
results (Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1966,1967), Lawler (1971) further developed his research
by building a model that explains the pay perceptions—pay satisfaction relationship. This
model of pay satisfaction utilized several theories (equity theory, social comparison
theoiy, and discrepancy theory). The pay satisfaction model was proposed to be a
function of two perceptions: the amount of pay an employee receives and the amount of
pay an employee believes he/she should receive. Essentially, Lawler (1971) defined pay
satisfaction as the difference between an employees’ perception of the amount of pay
he/she should receive and the amount of pay he/she actually receive. Additionally,
Lawler (1971) proposed that the second function would be influenced by the employees’
perceptions of five factors: personal job inputs (such as skill, education, seniority,
performance); job characteristics (such as complexity of tasks and amount of autonomy
or responsibility); non-monetary outcomes (such as job security or status); pay history;
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inputs and outcomes of referent others. However, since the overall model is based to
some extent on social comparisons, the fifth factor (inputs and outcomes of referent
others) has been argued to be redundant and should be excluded as a factor (Schwab and
Wallace 1974).
Dyer and Theriault (1976) empirically tested a portion of Lawler’s (1971) pay
satisfaction model as it excluded non-monetary outcomes, income and output of referent
others, and pay history factors. Additionally, the employees’ perception of pay system
administration was added as a determinant of pay satisfaction. This added factor
represents the employees’ perception of the different policies and procedures (such as pay
secrecy practices) used to determine pay. The sample was comprised of three groups of
managers: United States (US), French-Canadian (FC), and English-Canadian (EC). All
three groups consisted of managers across multiple levels (except first-level managers)
from several different organizations. The results partially supported the portion of
Lawler’s (1971) model tested. Once the administrative-type variables were added to the
model the amount of variance explained in pay satisfaction was significantly greater than
that explained by Lawler’s (1971) model. Also, the addition of the perceived pay system
administration variable caused some of the previous results to faintly change in that pay
satisfaction was significantly negatively related to performance level for the US group
only (the FC and EC groups were not significantly related to any personal job inputs) and
perceived job difficulty and responsibility for the EC group only (the US and FC groups
were not significantly related to job characteristics).
Weiner (1980) also empirically tested Lawler’s (1971) pay satisfaction model and
Dyer and Theriault’s (1976) addition of the perceived pay system administration variable.
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However, Weiner (1980) claimed ‘equitable pay’ was a better term for Lawler’s (1971)
definition of pay satisfaction. Pay satisfaction (referred to as relative equitable pay) is the
difference between what the employee should be paid and actually is paid relative to
his/hers salary. The sample consisted of various employees (not only managers)
employed in one organization. The explanatory power for each pay satisfaction scale
(e.g., Lawler’s (1971) and Dyer and Theriault’s (1976) relative equitable pay) was
compared against the University of Minnesota Satisfaction Question (MSQ) and tested
for predictive abilities in work outcomes. Relative equitable pay accounted for more of
the variance (27%) in pay satisfaction (MSQ scale) than Lawler’s (1971) model (17 %).
Dyer and Theriault’s (1976) model accounted for more than twice the variance (67%) in
pay satisfaction (MSQ scale) than Lawler’s (1971) model (27%). Additionally, Dyer and
Theriault’s (1976) model had the most accurate predictions for turnover and retention,
while Lawler’s (1971) model was the least predictive. The MSQ scale was the only
measure predictive of absenteeism. Attitude toward unionization was predicted positively
by Lawler’s (1971) model and predicted negatively by the MSQ scale. Overall, Dyer and
Theriault’s (1976) model (with the inclusion of the pay system administration factor) was
strongly supported as an explanation for pay satisfaction and as a predictor for work
outcomes.
Pav Satisfaction
Even though several authors (e.g., Lawler 1967; Mahoney and Weitzel 1978)
evaluated pay satisfaction as an outcome of the pay secrecy—inaccurate pay estimation
relationship, pay satisfaction has also been analyzed to be directly related to pay secrecy
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(e.g., Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Thompson and Pronsky 1975). For an overview of the
following pay satisfaction studies refer to Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 Prior Research Involving the Pay Satisfaction Outcome
Study

Sample

Pay Communication
Practice

Main Findings

Thompson Employees
One organization
in two
and
used a complete pay
Pronsky
organizations secrecy practice; one
used a partial pay
(1975)
openness practice;
both sales
departments used a
complete pay
openness practice
Futrell
and
Jenkins
(1978)

Employees
in one
organization

Cappelli
and
Sherer
(1988)

Employees
in one
organization

Pay secrecy negatively related
to pay satisfaction; those in
complete pay openness or
partial pay openness groups
were more likely to exclusively
make internal pay
comparisons; those in complete
pay secrecy group were more
likely to make external or
combination pay comparisons
Change to pay openness
Originally used a
form of a pay secrecy increased job performance, pay
practice; changed to a satisfaction, and satisfaction
with promotional policies,
complete pay
openness practice
superiors, and work but
decreased superior satisfaction,
and did not affect peer
satisfaction
Used a form of a pay Those in the second tier were
more satisfied with pay than
openness practice;
used a two-tier plan those in the first tier
where those in the 2'nd
tier received about
25% less than those
in the 1st tier
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Table 2.4 (Continued)
Martin and
Lee (1992)

Employees in
multiple
stores of one
organization

Mulvey and Employees
Colleagues’ and
(2002)
managers in

Used a form of a pay
openness practice;
used a two-tier plan
where those in the 2'nd
tier received less pay
than those in the 1st
tier

Prior pay knowledge was
positively related to pay
satisfaction and pay fairness;
current pay knowledge was
negatively related to pay
satisfaction and pay fairness;
those in the 2nd tier who had
low prior pay knowledge were
more likely to have negative
pay attitudes than those who
had high prior pay knowledge;
those in the 1st tier (whether
low or high prior pay
knowledge) were more likely
to have positive pay attitudes

Measured with seven Pay knowledge positively
items
related to pay satisfaction and
organizational effectiveness

multiple

Day (2006)

organizations
Graduate
Measured with five
students
items

Cloutier and Employees
Vilhuber
in one
(2008)
organization

Measured with two
items

Pay communication practice did
not impact any of the pay
satisfaction dimensions or the
referent choice; referent choice
did not impact pay satisfaction;
those in a pay openness
environment were more likely
to perceive pay inequity
Pay openness did not impact
pay equity, pay satisfaction, or
job satisfaction

Thompson and Pronskv’s (1975) Comparative Study. Following the news of an
organizations’ bad experience with the adoption of a pay openness practice, Thompson
and Pronsky (1975) conducted a study to investigate the direct impact open pay practices
have on pay satisfaction, pay comparisons, and employee motivation. The sample
consisted of employees from two organizations similar in every aspect except pay
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policies. One company utilized a complete pay secrecy practice, while the second
company used a partial (extreme) open pay practice where only individual pay
information was hidden. Additionally, both organizations’ sales departments utilized a
complete pay openness practice where employees were aware of everyone’s pay.
Therefore, three different pay system practices (complete pay secrecy, complete pay
openness, and partial pay openness) were available for analysis.
The analysis showed a direct negative relationship between pay secrecy and pay
satisfaction. As pay information became more unavailable or secret, employees’
satisfaction with pay decreased. For instance, almost half of the complete pay openness
group (42%) and a third of the partial pay openness group were satisfied with their pay;
whereas, a considerably smaller percentage of the total pay secrecy group (12%)
experienced pay satisfaction.
The results also revealed that more than half of the complete pay openness and
partial pay openness groups (52% and 50% respectfully) were more likely to exclusively
make internal pay comparisons (as opposed to only external pay comparisons or a
combination of the two); whereas, the majority of the complete pay secrecy group was
more likely to make only external pay comparisons or a combination of internal and
external pay comparisons (34% exclusively made internal pay comparisons).
Additionally, the majority of the complete pay openness group was more likely to
recognize a relationship between performance and reward (85%) and expect a pay
increase for extra effort expended (79%). Contrary to expectations, the complete pay
secrecy group was more likely than the partial pay openness group to identify the
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performance-reward relationship (57% vs. 39%) and expect more pay when effort was
increased (59% vs. 43%).
Based on these findings, Thompson and Pronsky (1975) concluded that the best
pay communication approach was not pay openness or pay secrecy, but a moderately
open pay communication approach that was a mixture of pay secrecy and pay openness.
Thompson and Pronsky (1975) also argued that there were four factors that would assist
in determining the proper pay system approach: individual performance measures (pay
openness approach needs objective measures); employee or job interdependence (pay
openness approach requires low interdependence among jobs or employees); availability
of inclusive performance measures (pay openness approach should involve performance
measures for all primary job characteristics); input-output relationship (pay openness
approach should entail a clear relationship with results occurring relatively quickly).

Futrell and Jenkins’ (1978) Longitudinal Study. Based on the concluding remarks
of Thompson and Pronsky (1975) and Schuster and Colletti (1973) in regards to
organizations needing to delay efforts to change their pay communication system from
pay secrecy to pay openness until the effects that more pay information would have on
employees (such as performance, pay and job satisfaction) are identified, prompted
Futrell and Jenkins (1978) to analyze the effects that increased pay information would
have on employees. An experiment with a pre-post test design with a control group was
utilized. The sample consisted of sales employees from one organization with multiple
branches. Although the organization’s original pay communication approach (perhaps
complete or moderate pay secrecy) before the experiment is not explicitly described, the
experimental group experienced a change to complete pay openness where some pay
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information was automatically provided to all participants (such as individual low, high,
and average pay levels for the different organizational tenure groups and pay raises) and
all pay information could be obtained upon request (such as individual pay levels and
individual performance evaluations). Both groups were surveyed a month before the
change in pay communication occurred and a year after the change was implemented in
the experimental group.
The analyses showed that there were statistically significant differences between
the participants in the experimental group and control group for pay satisfaction, job
performance, and several facets of job satisfaction (such as with superiors and work
characteristics). Specifically, the participants in the experimental group experienced
higher levels of pay satisfaction, promotional policies satisfaction, superior satisfaction,
work satisfaction, and five factors of job performance (product knowledge, coverage of
territory, human relations ability, activity reporting, overall job performance) when the
pay openness approach was implemented. However, superior satisfaction (or satisfaction
with bosses) decreased after the implementation of the pay openness practice.
Additionally, co-worker (peer) satisfaction was not influenced by the change to a pay
openness system as there was no significant difference between the experimental and
control group. The results suggest that pay secrecy hampers employee motivation,
performance, pay satisfaction and various facets of job satisfaction. Additionally, the
results support Lawler’s (1966) supposition that a pay openness practice will provide a
high pay-for-performance link which, in turn, will increase employee motivation, job
performance, and pay satisfaction.
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Cappelli and Sherer’s (1988) Two-Tier Study. After the airline industry
underwent a period of restructuring for employment conditions, Cappelli and Sherer
(1988) surveyed employees of a unionized airline about pay and job satisfaction. Pay
levels for each occupation (such as pilot or flight attendant) were available since
unionization was present for each one, thereby representing a pay openness system
throughout the organization. The organization’s reformation entailed all occupations
enduring wage concessions. Specifically a two-tier plan was implemented with the
second tier employees (newer hires) receiving about 25 percent less than those in the first
tier (those hired before a certain date) and after a certain period of time (five to fifteen
years, depending on the agreement) the second tier employees would receive pay equality
with those in the first tier.
Surprisingly, the employees in the second tier were significantly more satisfied
with their pay and job than those in the first tier. The authors argued that pay satisfaction
may have been higher for those in the second tier because they were relatively new to the
industry and therefore, did not classify themselves as being as experienced as those in the
first tier. Additionally, Cappelli and Sherer (1988) argued that the differences in job
satisfaction may be due to the employees in the two tiers having different work standards
(such as those in the second tier may have lower standards than those in the first tier) or
referents used for comparisons (such as those in the second tier may use external
referents for comparisons). These results demonstrate how pay inequities may, to some
extent, not only be tolerable under pay openness conditions, but also beneficial to
enhance different facets of satisfaction (such as pay and job) in employees. Furthermore,
this contradicts some organization’s justification for utilizing pay secrecy practices in that
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pay inequities are hidden (whether intentional or not) and conflict and jealousies among
employees are avoidable (Bierman and Gely 2004).

Martin and Lee’s (19921 Extended Two-Tier Study. Following the work of
Cappelli and Sherer (1988), Martin and Lee (1992) extended the two-tier research by
including two pay knowledge variables (prior pay knowledge and current pay
knowledge) to assist in predicting pay attitudes and multiple pay referents (such as social
and self-referents). The participants were employed in five stores of a retail food
organization. The organization had implemented a two-tier wage system where the
employees who were hired after the implementation date were placed in the lower tier.
Additionally, there was a job-duty tier, which when combined with the wage tier created
four tier groups. Pay raises were given until those in the lower tier reached the higher tier.
Therefore, several tier groups were available for analysis. Since the employees were
unionized, a pay openness approach was being employed.
There was a significantly positive relationship between prior pay knowledge and
the pay attitudes (pay satisfaction and pay fairness). However, there was a significantly
negative relationship between current pay knowledge and pay attitudes (pay satisfaction
and pay fairness). Martin and Lee (1992) argued that the negative relationship between
current pay knowledge and pay attitudes was due to the employees basing their current
pay knowledge on mainly internal referents. Additionally, those in the lower tier groups
who had low prior pay knowledge were more likely to have negative pay attitudes than
those who had high prior pay knowledge. Those in the high tier groups who had low and
high prior pay knowledge were related to positive pay attitudes. Therefore, low prior pay
knowledge was more likely to be related to negative pay attitudes (such as pay

satisfaction) for those in the low tier groups than in the high tier groups. These findings
suggest that prior pay knowledge was more important in explaining pay attitudes, such as
pay satisfaction and pay fairness, instead of current pay knowledge.

Mulvev and Colleagues’ (2002) Pay Knowledge Study. Based on organizations
adopting different compensation plans in an attempt to increase employee productivity
and overall organizational performance, Mulvey et al. (2002) analyzed the impact that
pay knowledge had on organizational effectiveness and pay satisfaction. Knowledge of
pay involved total pay amount (base pay knowledge and pay raise knowledge) and total
pay process (knowledge of pay determination and pay structure determination) and was
measured with seven items (e.g., “I understand the basis for periodic adjustments made to
base pay ranges” and “I understand how my pay range is determined”). Organizational
effectiveness involved employee engagement and was measured by organizational
commitment, trust in management, employee retention, employee referrals, and
perceptions of pay-for-performance. The participants were employees and managers of
multiple U.S. and Canadian organizations across various industries.
The results showed that the participants were more satisfied with pay amounts
than pay processes. This may have been due to the participants indicating they did not
understand the pay process very well. Additionally, pay knowledge positively influenced
pay satisfaction and organizational effectiveness. Furthermore, the findings indicated that
organizations paying less than competitors attained higher levels of organizational
effectiveness by providing more pay information, and those organizations paying more
than competitors increased employee perceptions of organizational worth by providing
more pay information. Mulvey et al. (2002) concluded that providing pay information
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was beneficial for organizations despite paying above or below the market and thus, a
pay openness practice should be utilized.

Day’s (2006) Referent Study. Following previous research regarding pay secrecy
and pay satisfaction (e.g., Thompson and Pronsky 1975), Day (2006) further developed
the relationship by arguing that referent choice partially mediates the relationship
between pay communication and pay attitudes. The sample consisted of graduate students
that provided a variety of organizations and ranges of pay communication practices were
included in the sample. A measure of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness)
was developed specifically for this study since no such scale existed previously. The
scale consisted of five items which concentrated on the pay level and structure. Only one
item focused on the employee’s perception of communication about the lowest and
highest pay level for his/her pay grade. The other four items focused on the employee’s
perception of communication about how pay levels are determined.
The analyses showed that none of the pay satisfaction dimensions (pay level,
benefits, raises, and pay administration) were significantly influenced by pay
communication practices. Therefore, pay communication (pay secrecy or pay openness)
practices had no to little impact on pay satisfaction. Also, pay communication practices
did not affect the referent choice in that those who received more pay information (or in a
pay openness environment) appeared to choose the same referents as those who received
less pay information (or in a pay secrecy environment).Therefore, all of the participants,
whether in a pay secrecy or pay openness environment, used the same referents in
making pay comparisons. Additionally, referent choice did not significantly predict pay
satisfaction. Thus, referent choice did not mediate the relationship between pay
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communication practices and pay satisfaction. However, participants who indicated they
were provided with higher levels of pay information (or who worked in a pay openness
environment) were more likely to perceive pay inequity. Overall, these results suggest
that increased pay information (or pay openness environment) may have negative effects
on employee perceptions, such as pay equity.

Cloutier and Vilhuber’s (2008) Procedural Justice Study. Following the work of
Leventhal and colleagues (Leventhal 1980; Leventhal et al. 1980), Cloutier and Vilhuber
(2008) expanded the procedural justice construct to the context of salary determination.
Cloutier and Vilhuber (2008) proposed that there are four dimensions in the salary
determination context: system transparency (open pay systems), appeal procedures, and
the perceived characteristics of allocation procedures and decision makers. System
transparency was tested by developing a scale specifically for the study. The system
transparency scale consisted of two items referring to job evaluations and procedure
compliance. The participants were Canadian employees of an administrative unit in an
energy and natural resource organization. Following the Quebec Pay Equity Act of 1997,
which mandated organizations to adopt new job evaluation procedures and methods that
produce more equitable pay structures, the organization had recently executed the
required procedures for compliance.
All of the dimensions in the salary determination context of procedural justice
were significantly correlated with procedural justice. However, the appeal procedures
dimension was removed as a distinct dimension since it had weak factor loadings.
Additionally, the system transparency dimension (pay openness) did not significantly
predict the perception of pay equity (distributive justice), pay satisfaction, or job
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satisfaction. Further, the dimension of system transparency demonstrated problems as it
provided no unique contribution once the other two dimensions were controlled for. This
suggests that the system transparency dimension (pay openness) only affects the
perception of procedural justice indirectly through the other two dimensions. Thus, the
system transparency dimension (pay openness) provides no independent contribution to
the procedural justice concept in the salary determination context and does not
significantly predict employee attitudes, such as satisfaction and pay equity.
Individual and Organizational Preferences
Another topic briefly examined in the pay communication literature involves
employees’ and organizations’ preferences for the utilization of pay secrecy or pay
openness practices (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1990; Schuster and Colletti 1973).
Additionally, pay system preferences of employees experiencing certain pay
communication conditions (such as pay openness practices) has been analyzed (Beer and
Gery 1972). For an overview of these findings refer to Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 Prior Research Involving the Preference Outcome
Study

Sample

Employees
Beer and
Gery (1972) in one
organization
Schuster and Employees
Colletti
in one
(1973)
organization

Pay Communication
Practice
Measured with six
items

Main Findings

Pay openness related to a
greater preference for a merit
system and a lower preference
for a security system
Measured by whether Those with a graduate degree
participants agreed, opposed pay secrecy, while
disagreed, or
those without a degree or with a
undecided with pay
bachelor’s degree favored pay
being kept secret
secrecy; feelings of pay fairness
were marginally related to
favoring pay secrecy
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Table 2.5 (Continued)
Balkin and Employees
Measured by which
Gomezin multiple
orgs used a pay
Mejia (1990) organizations openness or pay
secrecy

Organizational strategy was
related to pay system
strategies; pay openness was
related to organizations with a
single-product strategy or
dynamic growth strategy or
organic patterns; pay secrecy
was related to organizations
with a related-product strategy
or rationalization/maintenance
strategy or mechanistic pattern;
organizations with a dominantproduct strategy were related
with moderate pay secrecy

Beer and Gerv’s (1972) Pay System Preference Study. Since an organization’s
pay system is an important and influential part of an organization that evolves over time,
Beer and Gery (1972) examined employee attitudes and behaviors towards a new pay
system. Several factors were analyzed to determine what influenced employee’s
preference for a pay system. One of these factors was the openness of the organizational
culture or the amount of knowledge of the current pay system. The organizational culture
(pay openness environment) was measured with six items created specifically for this
study. The six items represented communication about the pay system and addressed
knowledge of the employees’ pay range (minimum and maximum), pay grade
classification, and types, size, and frequency of pay raises available. The sample
consisted of employees from a single organization in the manufacturing industry.
The results show that organizational culture (pay openness) was related to pay
system preference. Specifically, the employees with more pay knowledge had a greater
preference for a merit system (performance-based system) and a lower preference for a
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security system (a system with annual pay increase based on cost-of-living rather than
performance). Additionally, Beer and Gery (1972) argued that this relationship between
organizational culture (pay openness) and pay system preference may have effects on
employee motivation and satisfaction in that a change to a merit system may increase
employee’s motivation and satisfaction.

Schuster and Colletti’s (1973) Individual Preference Study. Based on the
continuing utilization of pay secrecy practices in organizations and managements’ strong
preference for pay secrecy, Schuster and Colletti (1973) conducted a study identifying
different employee characteristics that favor and oppose pay secrecy. Preference for pay
secrecy was addressed by the participants responding to whether they agreed, disagreed,
or were undecided with base salary pay information being kept secret. There were five

characteristics examined: age, education, occupation, pay level, and job performance
(rated by superior). The participants were non-managerial employees working in the
same organization.
The findings show education to be the only characteristic to demonstrate a
statistically significant difference between preferences for pay secrecy. Specifically,
participants with a graduate degree (60%) opposed pay secrecy (and favored pay
openness), while those without a degree (50%) or with a bachelor’s degree (46%) favored
pay secrecy. Additionally, there was a positive relationship between pay and performance
in that the higher-performers received larger raises than those who were poor-performers.
Age, occupation, and pay level had no substantial differences in preference for pay
secrecy in that the participants were almost equally divided to favoring and opposing pay
secrecy. Additional performance-related perceptions of pay were analyzed for pay
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secrecy preferences. Feelings of pay fairness were marginally related to favoring pay
secrecy. However, self-rated performance levels (effort, productivity, and work quality)
showed no significant difference for pay secrecy preference. Participants who identified a
pay-for-performance relationship (pay based on effort, productivity, and work quality)
were compared with those who identified a non-performance relationship with pay (pay
based on education, experience, training, and responsibility); however, there were no
significant differences within the two groups in that both groups were nearly equal in
those favoring and opposing pay secrecy. Overall, the results demonstrated that there
was nearly an equal preference for pay secrecy.

Balkin and Gomez-Mejia’s (19901 Organizational Strategy Study. Following the
research advocating pay systems be linked to organizational strategies (e.g., Balkin and
Gomez-Mejia 1987; Carroll 1987; Lawler 1981), Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990)
analyzed the impact of organizational strategies (at the corporate and business unit level)
on pay system strategies (pay communication practices such as a pay secrecy policy).
Corporate strategy referred to the extent to which the organization was diversified. There
were three corporate strategies used for analyses: single-product, dominant-product, and
related-product (unrelated product was deleted from analysis due to lack of participants in
this strategy). Business unit (SBU) strategy referred to the organizations products and
market segment. There were two SBUs used for analyses: dynamic growth and
rationalization/maintenance (due to lack of participants in the other SBUs several did not
qualify for analysis). The participants were employed across 600 business units from
different manufacturing organizations.
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Organizations with a single-product strategy (not diversified) were associated
with low levels of pay secrecy. However, those with a related-product strategy (most
diversified) were associated with high levels of pay secrecy. Additionally, those with a
dominant-product strategy (semi diversified) experienced moderate levels of pay secrecy
which were between the other two corporate strategies. For SBUs, organizations with a
dynamic growth strategy were associated with low levels of pay secrecy, whereas those
with a rationalization/maintenance strategy were associated with high levels of pay
secrecy. Overall, the findings demonstrate that organizational strategy (corporate and
business unit) does determine pay system strategies, such as pay secrecy. Organizations
with a mechanistic pattern (related-product and rationalization/maintenance strategies)
are more likely to employ and benefit from pay secrecy practices. However,
organizations with an organic pattern (single-product and dynamic/growth strategies)
tend to employ and benefit from pay openness practices.
Reward Allocations
Another variable that has been analyzed to be affected by pay communication
conditions involves allocating pay (such as pay raises) to employees (e.g., Kidder,
Bellettirie, and Cohn 1977; Leventhal et al. 1972; Trahan, Lane, and Dobbins 1991). The
argument contends that under conditions of pay secrecy, pay allocators (or managers) are
more likely to appropriately and widely distribute rewards (pay raises) based on
individual performance and effort since they will not have to justify their reasoning to
lower-performing (and thus, those receiving smaller pay allocations) employees
(Burroughs 1982). Furthermore, under pay openness conditions pay allocators are less
likely to link pay to performance and reward all employees with similar or slightly
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distinct pay allocations to avoid conflict and inquiring of their decisions. For an overview
of these findings refer to Table 2.6.

Table 2.6 Prior Research Involving the Reward Allocation Outcome
Study

Sample

Pay Communication
Practice

Main Findings

Leventhal and Undergraduate Experiment; no pay
Colleagues’ students
communication
(1972)
practice mentioned
Study 1

Worst performers allocations
was increased at the best
performers expense; best
performers given a slightly
higher pay allocation than the
worst performers

Leventhal and Undergraduate Experiment; complete
Colleagues’ students
pay secrecy and
(1972)
complete pay
Study 2
openness conditions

Under both conditions,
majority of allocators
dispersed more to the best
performers; the difference of
pay allocations between the
best and worst performers was
greater under pay secrecy
conditions than the pay
openness condition; under the
pay openness condition, the
smaller difference in pay
allocations was at the best
performers expense

Kidder and
Colleagues’
(1977)

Under pay openness conditions,
women distributed allocations
equally, men distributed
allocations equitably and
allocated more to themselves;
under pay secrecy conditions,
women distributed allocations
equitably and allocated more to
themselves, men distributed
allocations equally

Undergraduate Experiment; complete
pay secrecy and
students
complete pay
openness conditions
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Table 2.6 (Continued)
Reis and
Gruzen
(1976)

Trahan and
Colleagues’
(1991)
Study 1
Trahan and
Colleagues’
(1991)
Study 2

Undergraduate Experiment;
experimenter
students
aware/unaware
conditions; other
participant’s
aware/unaware
conditions

When the experimenter was
aware the pay allocations
tended to be based on equity
than when the experimenter
was unaware; when the peers
were aware the pay
allocations tended to be
based on equality than when
peers were unaware; smallest
allocation differences was
when peers were aware and
the experimenter was
unaware; largest allocation
differences was when the
experimenter was aware and
peers were unaware;
participants gave themselves
bigger pay allocations when
everyone was unaware
Undergraduate Experiment; complete Pay openness did not impact
students
pay secrecy and
pay allocation distributions
complete pay
openness conditions
Graduate
students

Experiment; complete
pay secrecy and
complete pay
openness conditions

Pay openness did impact pay
allocation decisions in that there
was a greater distinction in the
allocations between high and
low performers than under the
pay secrecy condition; worst
performers received larger
allocations under pay secrecy
conditions than under pay
openness conditions

Leventhal and Colleagues’ (19721 Pay Allocation Study. Based on previous
research showing that pay allocation decisions are influenced by different desires of the
pay allocator (such as to decrease power threats; (Leventhal and Bergman 1969)),
Leventhal et al. (1972) examined the pay allocators’ desire to prevent conflict between
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employees and between themselves and employees. Two studies were conducted with the
method for data collection involving an experiment for both studies. Participants from
both studies were undergraduate students.
Study 1 analyzed the participant’s (pay allocator’s) desire to prevent conflict
without a pay communication condition mentioned. The results showed that the
participants increased the worst performer’s allocations at the best performer’s expense
even though the best performers were usually given a (slightly) higher pay allocation than
the worst performers. This suggests that participants believed that by giving low
performers a low reward (although most likely deserved), a bigger conflict formed than
high performers receiving lower allocations (although most likely not deserved).
Additionally, it appears as though participants presumed that pay openness conditions
existed (even though no mention of a specific pay communication practice was
mentioned) and attempted to maintain equity in order to reduce conflict.
Study 2 analyzed the impact pay secrecy and pay openness had on the
participants’ distribution of pay allocations. The participants dispersed pay allocations
twice, once under the condition of complete pay secrecy and once under the condition of
complete pay openness. The findings show that under both pay secrecy and pay openness
conditions, a majority of the participants (42 of 44 and 34 of 44, respectfully) gave the
best performers higher pay allocations than the worst performers. Therefore, participants
maintained pay equity under both conditions. However, the difference between the pay
allocations of the best and worst performers was greater under the pay secrecy condition
than in the pay openness condition. As expected, under the pay openness condition, the
smaller difference between the pay allocations of the best and worst performers was from
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a decrease in the best performer’s allocation and an increase in the worst performer’s
allocation. Additionally, the difference between the intermediate performer’s pay
allocations was significantly greater under the pay secrecy condition than in the pay
openness condition. However, there were insignificant findings in identifying whether the
intermediate performers with high effort and low performance were given bigger pay
allocations than the intermediate performers with low effort and high performance. These
findings suggest that under pay secrecy conditions pay allocators are able to distribute
pay allocations more equitably without fear of conflict. Overall, both studies show that
pay allocator’s will attempt to maintain equity with pay allocations. However, pay
secrecy conditions offer the pay allocator an opportunity to better disperse pay allocations
in proportion to performance while also reducing interpersonal conflict.

Reis and Gruzen’s (19761 Equity Versus Equality Study. Following the work of
Leventhal et al. (1972), Reis and Gruzen (1976) expanded their research by analyzing
pay equality (versus pay equity) under pay openness conditions and the amount of pay
allocations when the allocator was included in the distribution. The study was conducted
using an experiment with four different forms of pay communication practices:
experimenter aware/unaware conditions and other participant’s aware/unaware
conditions. The participants were undergraduate students who were required to disperse a
payment amongst their group including themselves.
The results showed that when participants knew the experimenter was aware of
the pay allocation distributions, pay allocations tended to be based more on equity (input
factors) than when the experimenter was unaware of the pay allocation distributions.
However, when peers (other group participants) were expected to be aware of the pay
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allocation distributions, pay allocations tended to be based more on equality (all
recipients receiving similar portions) than when peers were not aware of the pay
allocation distributions. Therefore, the smallest pay allocation difference occurred when
the peers were aware and the experimenter was unaware of the distributions, while the
largest difference in the pay allocations occurred when the experimenter was aware and
the peers were unaware of the distributions. Additionally, participants were found to give
themselves bigger pay allocations under complete pay secrecy conditions (when the
experimenter and peers were unaware). These findings are similar to those found in
Leventhal et al.’s (1972) study in that pay communication practices influenced how pay
allocations were distributed.

Kidder and Colleagues’ (19771 Gender Disparity Study. Following prior research
on gender differences in pay allocations (e.g., Leventhal, Popp, and Sawyer 1973),
Kidder et al. (1977) extended the research by examining pay allocation differences with
men and women under different pay communication conditions (pay secrecy and pay
openness). The pay openness condition entailed the experimenter and other group
member being aware of the pay allocation distributions, while the pay secrecy condition
involved full anonymity in distributing pay allocations. The participants for all three
studies were undergraduate students.
The two studies pertaining to the pay allocations under different pay
communication conditions both showed that women distributed pay allocations equally in
pay openness conditions and equitably in pay secrecy conditions, while men did the exact
opposite and allocated pay equitably in pay openness conditions and equally in pay
secrecy conditions. Additionally, women allocated more to themselves under pay secrecy
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conditions, while men allotted themselves more in the pay openness conditions. The
gender of the other group member did not affect pay allocation distributions in that they
were the same whether the other person was the same gender or not. Overall, these
findings further demonstrate how pay openness conditions influence pay allocation
distributions.

Bartol and Martin’s (1989) Dependence and Dependency Threat Study.
Following previous research showing under pay openness conditions pay allocators
distribute pay more evenly (e.g., Leventhal et al. 1972), Bartol and Martin (1989)
extended this research by examining the dependence (increase cooperation of
subordinates) and dependency threats (many alternative job opportunities) of pay
allocations under pay secrecy and pay openness conditions. The research was conducted
using an experiment. The pay secrecy condition was implicated in the instructions by
stating a security system and information system were installed on the computer which
provided privacy protection for employees as well as compliance with the pay secrecy
policy. The pay openness condition was also implicated in the instructions by stating
there were security problems with the computer systems and all pay-related decisions
should be made under the assumption that they would be known to subordinates. The
participants for both studies were middle-level bank managers enrolled in a banking
school.
Study 1 did not reach significance in the three-way interaction of dependence,
dependency threat, and pay secrecy. However, the data suggested there were higher pay
allocations when dependence and dependency threat were both high in the pay secrecy
condition. Even though the two-way interactions of dependence and dependency threats
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were not significantly associated with pay secrecy at an alpha level of .05, they were
significant at an alpha level of .07. Therefore, a second study was conducted which
provided a little more information about a valuable subordinate and his preference for
pay equity. Study 2 had the two-way interaction between dependence and pay secrecy
and the three-way interaction reach significance. However, the two-way interaction
between dependency threats and pay secrecy did not reach significance. The two-way
interaction between dependence and pay secrecy showed the only significant difference
between pay allocations was under the pay openness condition with higher pay
allocations being allotted to the focal person when dependence was high than when
dependence was low. Additionally, the focal person was allotted a significantly higher
pay allocation in the high dependence and pay openness condition when dependency
threat was high than when it was low. Contrary to expectations, the focal person was
allotted a higher pay allocation in the high dependence and high dependency threat
condition under pay openness than under pay secrecy. Therefore, participants were more
generous in pay allocations under high dependence and high dependency threat
conditions only under pay openness. Thus, these findings further support the notion that
pay allocations are influenced by pay secrecy and pay openness conditions.

Trahan and Colleagues’ (1991) Pay Allocation Study. Based on Freedman and
Montanari’s (1980) model which proposes several influences (such as organizational,
managerial, subordinate, and environmental with each one having sub-categories) on pay
allocation decisions, Trahan et al. (1991) tested three of the proposed organizational
determinants (such as pay communication conditions such as pay openness and pay
secrecy) of pay allocation decisions. The pay secrecy and pay openness conditions were

80
identified in the instructions by a statement regarding the policy about pay disclosure.
This research was conducted using experiments. The first study consisted of
undergraduate students, while the participants in the second study were graduate students.
Contrary to expectations, pay openness did not influence the pay allocation
decisions in study 1. Consequently, Trahan et al. (1991) argued that a lack of work
experience among the participants may have contributed to the nonsignificance of pay
openness on pay allocation decisions and thus, conducted a second study using graduate
students who would be more likely to have work experience. The results of study 2
showed the pay openness condition did impact pay allocations in that there was a greater
distinction in the allocations between high and low performers than under the pay secrecy
condition. Additionally, the employees who were rated low on both performance ratings
received larger allocations under pay secrecy conditions than under pay openness
conditions. Therefore, when pay openness conditions were utilized, the participants made
greater distinctions in pay allocations between high and low performers. The results are
consistent with previous findings of pay allocations being based on equity under pay
openness conditions. However, the results of study 2 conflict with those of Leventhal et
al. (1972) in that their study showed a greater distinction in pay allocation between high
and low performers under the pay secrecy condition. The authors argue that the type of
participants (undergraduate versus graduate students) may explain this opposition.
Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis
The fair wage-effort hypothesis is another topic that has been explored in the pay
secrecy research. Based on equity theory (Adams 1965) and social exchange theory (Blau
1964), Akerlof and Yellen (1990) proposed the fair wage-effort hypothesis to explain
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employee behavior. According to the hypothesis, employees have a notion of what
constitutes a fair wage and base their level of effort (or performance) on how their actual
wage compares to the fair wage. When employee’s actual wage exceeds the fair wage,
full effort will be exerted. However, when employee’s actual wage is below the fair wage
they will balance inputs and outputs by withdrawing effort proportionately to correspond
with the actual wage. The authors concluded that wage compression was an optimal
solution to employee concerns with pay equity.

Danziger and Katz’s (1997) Pay Secrecy Convention Extension Article. The fair
wage-effort hypothesis was extended to justify the utilization of pay secrecy practices.
Danziger and Katz (1997) argued that pay secrecy practices prevented employees from
discussing pay information such as their pay level, whether they had received higher pay
offers from other employers, and had their current employer matched these offers.
Therefore, pay secrecy practices affect organizational performance by effectively
reducing labor mobility since employees are unable to identify higher paying
organizations. Additionally, this reduction in mobility to some extent embeds or binds
employees to their current employer and increases the viability of risk-shifting contracts.
Danziger and Katz (1997) analyzed and compared three different labor market
arrangements: pay secrecy convention, binding convention, and a spot market. A binding
convention requires employees to stay employed with the organization while the
organization pays the employees a specific amount. A pay secrecy convention requires
employees to not discuss pay information with other employees. It also requires
organizations to pay employees a specific amount, while allowing employees to accept
employment elsewhere, but it does hinder employees’ ability to identify higher paying
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organizations or pay offers that their current employer matched for other employees. A
spot market has no conventions preventing labor mobility, utilizes pay openness
practices, and employees are able to accept employment at a higher paying organization.
The authors argue that a pay secrecy convention is preferable to a binding convention
since higher levels of utility are expected from employees with a pay secrecy convention.
However, a binding convention is preferable to a pay secrecy convention when the
organization encounters aggregate shocks (but not relative shocks) due to risk aversion
since a pay secrecy convention is expected to yield lower levels of utility from employees
than a binding convention. Also, a pay secrecy convention is preferable to a spot market
convention since the pay secrecy convention always produces efficient organizational
production and provides some insurance. Therefore, a pay secrecy convention is
suggested to be the most beneficial convention of the three compared.

Gan’s 12002) Extended Model. Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) fair wage-effort
hypothesis was expanded by Gan (2002) with the addition of uncertainty to the model
and its application to pay secrecy. Gan’s (2002) uncertain fair wage-effort hypothesis
assumes only the employee knows the fair wage and the employing organization does
not; whereas, Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) model assumes that employees and the
employing organization know the fair wage. Additionally, Gan (2002) argues that the fair
wage varies amongst employees because they differ in their reference groups and the
importance of these reference groups in configuring their fair wage. These fair wage
variations make it difficult for an organization to identify the fair wage, causing it to be a
random variable. Therefore, the organization encounters uncertainty with the employee’s
fair wage. Gan’s (2002) model also assumes the employing organization’s set pay (or
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wages) is higher than employees’ reservation pay and employees adjust effort according
to the offered pay. This differs from Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) model since pay is not
obtained but speculated as the weighted average of the reference group and the marketclearing wages.
Gan (2002) argued that a lower mean of the uncertain fair wage is likely to result
from pay secrecy. Additionally, Gan (2002) argues that the actual wage is probably
smaller than the mean of the uncertain fair wage under pay secrecy conditions.
Furthermore, the uncertain fair wage is likely to have a larger variance under pay secrecy
conditions. Therefore, Gan (2002) claims that pay secrecy is better than pay openness
conditions since it is more likely to produce higher profits for employers.
There are two effects of pay secrecy taken into consideration in this model. The
misperception effect entails the employee’s tendency to overestimate the pay of their
peers and underestimate the pay of their superiors. The uncertainty effect involves the
employees being uncertain of the reference groups’ pay and therefore, placing less weight
on it. Additionally, if the reference group consists of the employees’ peers, the mean of
the uncertain fair wage is probably higher under pay secrecy conditions. Therefore, pay
openness conditions should be employed when the reference group is the employees’
peers. However, if the reference group is the employees’ superiors, the mean of the
uncertain fair wage is probably lower under pay secrecy conditions.

Chamess and Kuhn’s (2007) Empirical Fair Waee-Effort Study. Based on the fair
wage-effort hypothesis, its assumptions (such as perceptions of receiving an unfair wage
leading employees to withhold effort and fairness perceptions depending on other
employees’ pay (Akerlof and Yellen 1990)), and its previous utilization to explain wage
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compression (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen 1990) and pay secrecy (Gan 2002; Lawler 1990),
Chamess and Kuhn (2007) conducted an experiment to determine if pay secrecy is the
optimal organizational practice for the efficiency wage model. Pay secrecy was employed
by only allowing participants to know their own personal pay when determining their
effort level. Pay openness was employed by allowing participants to know their wages
and the wages of the other worker (or participant) before deciding their effort level. The
participants consisted of students.
The results show all of the fifteen wage-offer pairs were chosen under pay secrecy
conditions. However, under the pay openness condition all of the pairs were chosen
except for the pair offering the highest pay to the low-performing employee and the
lowest pay to the high-performing employee. Additionally, the employee’s personal pay
had a strong and statistically significant effect on effort under both pay secrecy and pay
openness conditions. The other employee’s pay did not have strong effect on effort under
pay secrecy or pay openness conditions. This finding was expected under the pay secrecy
condition since the participants were unaware of the other participants’ offered pay, but it
was not expected under the pay openness condition. Therefore, the argument for pay
secrecy being a profit-maximizing policy because it hinders employee’s ability to identify
others’ pay and consequently, reduces effort under pay unfairness perceptions, is not
supported.
Additional Outcomes
There have been several more recent studies analyzing pay communication’s
influence on additional employee attitudes and behaviors (such as trust in management
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(Noy 2007)) and organizational outcomes (such as performance (Tremblay and
Chenevert 2008)). An overview of these findings can be found in Table 2.7.

Table 2.7 Prior Research Involving Additional Outcomes

Study
Noy (2007)

Sample
Employees
and managers
in multiple
organizations

Tremblay and Managers
Chenevert
in multiple
(2008)
organizations

Pay
Communication
Practice

Main Findings

Measured pay
secrecy with
fourteen items

Developed POPS scale; POPS was
not related to management trust,
distributive justice, procedural
integrity, or interpersonal justice but
was negatively related to
informational justice and was
positively related to procedural voice
and only managerial trust for non
managers

Measured pay
communication
by six items

High-technology orgs are less likely
to use a pay openness approach than
low-technology organizations; pay
openness was not related to higher
organizational performance in hightechnology organizations; pay
openness was negatively related
employees’ discretionary efforts and
market performance and positively
related to work climate

Undergraduate Experiment;
Bamberger
and
students
complete pay
Belogolovsky
secrecy and
(2010)
extreme pay
openness
conditions

Pay secrecy not related to employee
task performance; inequity tolerance
moderated the relationship between
pay secrecy and employee task
performance, pay secrecy and
perceptions of instrumentality, and
the pay secrecy-instrumentality
perceptions-employee task
performance relationship for those
with a lower tolerance of inequity
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Nov’s (2007) Organizational Justice and Trust Study. Following Burrough’s
(1982) proposal of a pay secrecy continuum, Noy (2007) conceptualized pay secrecy into
two separate dimensions: individual and organizational pay secrecy. Organizational pay
secrecy (OPS) originates and is upheld by the organization and its strategies and
structure. Individual pay secrecy (IPS) is initiated and sustained by the employees and
their norms, intentions, and motives. As part of his dissertation requirements, Noy (2007)
developed a perceived OPS (POPS) measure and analyzed its relationship with
organizational justice dimensions (such as distributive and procedural justice) and trust.
Participants were employees and managers of multiple U.S. organizations across various
industries.
The POPS scale consisted of three sub-dimensions: policy and rules, enforcement,
and organizational norms. The entire scale was comprised of fourteen items (such as “my
company has rules against discussing employee pay with others” and “discussing pay at
my company is something you can be reprimanded for”). A confirmatory factor analysis
was conducted on the POPS measure using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The
results showed all of the measurement models for the three sub-dimensions and the
overall measurement model for POPS fit well according to the values of the fit indices.
Additionally, each of the sub-dimensions significantly predicted POPS. The Cronbach’s
alpha coefficients for the overall POPS scale and the three sub-dimensions signified good
reliability (all were above .88). Although the perceived IPS (PIPS) measure was not
analyzed as part of his dissertation, Noy (2007) did anticipate two sub-dimensions (social
norms and personal preference) and generated fourteen items for the overall scale.
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The analyses revealed that POPS was not related to management trust, distributive
justice, interpersonal justice, or procedural integrity (a sub-dimension of procedural
justice). However, POPS was significantly negatively related to informational justice.
Contrary to expectations, POPS was significantly positively related to procedural voice (a
sub-dimension of procedural justice). Noy (2007) suggested several explanations for the
positive relationship between POPS and procedural voice, such as privacy needs, fear of
identifying employees who are paid more, and previous involvement with pay secrecy
practices yielding a growing personal expectation of such a practice being presently
employed. Although not significantly related to managerial trust, POPS was significantly
positively related to managerial trust for employees who had no managerial
responsibilities but not for employees who had managerial responsibilities. Therefore, the
positive relationship between POPS and managerial trust is significantly stronger for non
managers, while the relationship between POPS and managerial trust is insignificant
(near zero) for managers.

Tremblay and Chenevert’s (2008) Organizational Performance Study. Following
previous studies examining the compensation systems correspondence with
organizational strategies in high-technology organizations, Tremblay and Chenevert
(2008) extended this research by analyzing the relationship between prior disregarded
dimensions of compensation systems (pay openness and pay secrecy) and organizational
performance (such as productivity and market performance). Pay information
transparency analyzed the pay secrecy dimensions and was measured by six items
specifically generated for this study (such as “we try to discourage nonmanagement
employees from disclosing their pay to coworkers,” and “Managers are really well
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informed about wage policies”). The longitudinal study consisted of human resource
managers employed across various industries in Canada.
The results showed that high-technology organizations are less likely to utilize a
pay openness approach to compensation systems than low-technology organizations.
Additionally, a pay openness approach was not related to higher organizational
performance in high-technology organizations. Contrary to expectations, a pay openness
approach negatively influenced employee’s discretionary efforts and market
performance, while it positively impacted work climate (relationship between employees
and other employees or management). These findings demonstrate that pay openness may
not be beneficial for organizations, even though employee relations are increased, since
employees appear to reduce their discretionary effort and organizational performance is
decreased.

Bamberger and Beloeolovsky’s (20101 Employee Performance Study. Based on
Colella et al.’s (2007) proposal of pay secrecy having a negative impact on employee
motivation and ultimately their performance, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010)
analyzed the relationship between pay secrecy and employee task performance.
Following additional suggestions by Colella et al. (2007), the researchers examined
several variables (such as instrumentality, procedural and informational justice) that may
assist in explaining the relationship between pay secrecy and employee task performance.
Additionally, tolerance for inequity was analyzed to moderate the relationships between
pay secrecy and task performance and the mediating variables (such as instrumentality,
procedural and informational justice). The study was conducted using an experiment
involving undergraduate students. The pay secrecy condition entailed the participants
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receiving only their own personal performance level and pay. The pay openness
condition involved the participants receiving the same information as the pay secrecy
condition as well as the pay of their other group members.
The results show that although the relationship between pay secrecy and
employee task performance was nonsignificant, it was in the predicted negative direction.
Thus, tests of mediation for this relationship were not performed. However, tolerance for
inequity did moderate the relationship between pay secrecy and employee task
performance in that the relationship was more negative for the participants with a lower
tolerance for inequity. Additionally, the relationship between pay secrecy and perceptions
of instrumentality was moderated by tolerance for inequity in that the relationship was
more negative for those with a lower tolerance for inequity. The pay secrecyinstrumentality perceptions-employee task performance relationship was also moderated
by tolerance for inequity in that the mediated relationship was intensified for those with a
lower tolerance for inequity. These findings showed that instrumentality perceptions
mediate the negative relationship between pay secrecy and employee task performance
for those with a lower tolerance for inequity. Overall, the results demonstrate the
unfavorable outcomes (such as reduced employee performance) pay secrecy has for
employees with a low inequity tolerance and the organizations that employ them.

Discussion
Although limited, the previous pay communication research has shed some light
on the effects of pay secrecy and pay openness practices. The scant literature
demonstrates how pay secrecy practices may harm or benefit employees and
organizations. For instance, the research shows that pay secrecy practices do negatively
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impact the accuracy of pay estimations (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1967; Milkovich and
Anderson 1972). Overall, pay secrecy practices influenced pay estimations such that
employees (including managers) overestimated subordinates’ and peers’ pay while
underestimating superiors’ pay (except in Mahoney and Weitzel 1978). These inaccurate
pay estimations were manifested at two levels away (e.g. Lawler 1967). Additionally, the
accuracy of pay estimations was associated with higher levels of pay dissatisfaction (e.g.,
Milkovich and Anderson 1972). Even though the research shows a mediated relationship
between pay secrecy, pay estimations, and pay dissatisfaction, the direct relationship
between pay secrecy and pay satisfaction/ dissatisfaction is inconclusive due to
contradicting results in that studies have shown a negative relationship between pay
secrecy and pay satisfaction (Thompson and Pronsky 1975) and a positive relationship
between pay information (pay openness practices) and pay satisfaction (e.g., Futrell and
Jenkins 1978; Mulvey et al. 1992), while others have found no relationship to exist (e.g.,
Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Day 2006). The stream of research examining the impact
pay communication practices have on pay allocation distributions is also inconclusive
and conflicting with some studies showing pay secrecy conditions to elicit a better payfor-performance distribution (e.g., Leventhal et al. 1972) and other studies showing pay
openness conditions to elicit an equity-based distribution (e.g., Trahan et al. 1991).

Conclusion
The pay communication literature is scarce and underdeveloped. Over the past
fifty years, pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices have only been studied in relation
to a few outcomes. More recently there have been additional outcomes examined,
however, there have only been a select few and each has only been tested once. Even
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though this lack of research is a limitation of the pay communication literature, it does
offer ample opportunities for future research.
Future Research
There are many directions the pay communication literature can extend into to
make worthwhile contributions. First, a definitive pay communication (pay secrecy and
pay openness) scale needs to be developed in order to elicit research. The majority of past
research has either conducted their study in a specific organizational setting where the
type of pay communication approach utilized by the organization is the one studied or by
utilizing an experiment where the pay communication approach is manipulated. A
validated measure of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) will allow the
results to extend to all levels of pay secrecy or pay openness on the continuum, rather
than just one or two specific levels of pay communication. Several scholars have created
a measure of pay communication specifically for their studies (e.g., Day 2006; Cloutier
and Vilhuber 2008); however, most of them have not been properly validated or extended
to additional studies. Noy’s (2007) POPS scale is the only pay secrecy and pay openness
measure that has undergone the appropriate steps of development, but it has not been
extended beyond the original dependent variables of Noy’s study (organizational justice
and trust). Additionally, Noy’s (2007) POPS scale may require refinement due to its sub
dimensions possibly causing confliction within the scale itself. For instance, due to the
Enforcement sub-dimension, if the organization does not actually enforce the rule of not
discussing pay with other employees then the overall pay secrecy level is lowered even
though the organization may practice complete pay secrecy by not providing any pay
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information. Therefore, a more refined measure of pay communication (pay secrecy and
pay openness) is needed to advance the literature.
Another future direction is to analyze additional dependent variables that pay
secrecy or pay openness practices may impact. For instance, some organizational
outcomes that may potentially be influenced by pay communication practices are
organizational commitment, workplace deviance, and organizational citizenship
behaviors. Additionally, some previously examined organizational outcomes that were
found to not be significantly impacted by pay secrecy or pay openness practices may
deserve another examination using different methods. For instance, trust in management,
the organizational justice dimensions (such as distributive and procedural justice), and
employee and organizational performance should definitely be reanalyzed. Also, the
previous streams of pay communication research involving pay estimations, pay
satisfaction, and pay allocation outcomes may need to be reexamined since the majority
of those studies were conducted several decades ago.

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENT OF A PAY COMMUNICATION
(PAY SECRECY AND PAY OPENNESS)
MEASURE

Employees have indicated that their compensation is an important job factor
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003; Opsahi and Dunnette 1966). Compensation represents many
different things to employees, such as achievement or recognition (Ackley 1993;
Goodman 1974; Lawler 1966, 1971; Lawler and Porter 1967), and organizational value
(Lawler 1966,1971), among other things. Additionally, compensation has the ability to
influence employee behavior which, in turn, can affect organizational effectiveness (Beer
and Gery 1972; deCarufel 1986; Lawler 1981). Despite its importance, compensation is a
sensitive issue and discussions regarding it are typically avoided altogether, whether the
communication is between the organization and employees or amongst employees.
Pay communication, an aspect of an organization’s compensation system, refers
to the organizational practice that determines when, how, and which pay information
(such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay levels, and/or the entire pay
structure) is distributed and communicated to employees and possibly outsiders. Pay
communication practices function to support organizations in their attainment of their
compensation systems’ goal and objectives (Gely and Bierman 2003), such as attracting
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more qualified applicants or increasing organizational performance. Therefore, the needs
of the organization determine the pay communication practices.
Pay communication is an important concept that unfortunately has a limited and
underdeveloped literature. The scarce literature may be due to the lack of a valid and
comprehensive pay communication scale. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to
develop a pay communication scale that is inclusive by encompassing all practices. Three
multistage studies accomplish this goal, yielding a 22-item Pay Communication scale
comprised of four sub-dimensions: Pay Policy Existence, Pay Structure, Organizational
Norms, and Employee Norms.

Literature Review
Pay communication is the compensation practice that determines when, how, and
which pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay
levels, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees
(and possibly outsiders) and whether discussions involving pay information are permitted
amongst employees (and possibly with outsiders). The purpose of pay communication
practices are to support organizations in achieving their compensation systems’ goals and
objectives (Gely and Bierman 2003), such as increased performance.
Pay communication practices differ among organizations as the degree of these
practices vary by the amount and type of pay information provided or withheld to
employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Milkovich and Newman 2005). Therefore,
pay communication practices exist along a continuum and appear in a variety of forms
(Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1981; Lawler and Jenkins 1992; Patten
1978). The two anchors (or commonly acknowledged practices) of the pay
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communication continuum are pay secrecy and pay openness. The extent to which a pay
secrecy or pay openness practice is utilized depends on the needs and strategic goals of
the organization.
Pay openness is the organizational practice that allows employees to discuss their
personal pay information with other organizational members (and possibly outsiders).
Additionally, pay openness practices may involve the organization distributing most, if
not all, pay information to employees on a regular basis (usually at specific time intervals
such as yearly) or upon request. Consequently, pay secrecy is the organizational practice
that prohibits the organization (and management) from distributing and communicating
most, if not all, pay information to employees (Bamburger and Belogolovsky 2010;
Colella et al. 2007; deCarufel 1986). Pay secrecy practices may also involve the adoption
of an organizational policy (usually referred to as a pay secrecy policy but also labeled as
pay confidentiality rules; (Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely and Bierman 2003)) that
discourages or forbids employees to discuss their personal pay information with other
organizational members and possibly with outsiders (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010;
Bierman and Gely 2004; Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003;
Thompson and Pronsky 1975). A pay secrecy policy practice is usually the most
detectable pay communication practice among employees and is expressed either in
writing (such as in employee manuals) or verbally (such as during an employee
orientation or employee meeting). Organizations may attempt to obtain compliance of a
pay secrecy policy practice by compelling employees to sign a pledge stating they will
not discuss pay information with other organizational members (and possibly outsiders)
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or by having policy violators suffer disciplinary consequences (such as termination;
(Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992)).
A variety of pay communication practices (such as mild pay secrecy or moderate
pay openness) reside along the continuum between the complete pay secrecy anchor and
complete pay openness anchor. For instance, a mild pay secrecy practice may involve
employees being provided with only their personal pay information, and pay range and
pay average for their personal pay level, but no more information being freely given.
Additionally, there may be no existence of a formal pay secrecy policy with a mild pay
secrecy practice; whereas, a moderate pay openness practice may involve employees
being supplied with their personal pay information, and pay ranges and pay averages for
their pay level and adjacent pay levels in the pay structure.
Legal Issues
Pay secrecy (opposed to pay openness) practices appear to be the preferred pay
communication practice for organizations (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1985; HRnext.com
Survey 2001; Lawler 1981; Scott et al. 2003), managers and employees (Futrell and
Jenkins 1978; HRnext.com Survey 2001; Markels and Berton 1996; Schuster and Colletti
1973). However, pay secrecy policy practices have consistently been found to be
unlawful by the NLRB and the federal court system for violating the NLRA (specifically,
Sections 7 & 8) since these policy practices prohibit employees from discussing certain
employment conditions (such as pay information) with other employees (Bierman and
Gely 2004; Estlund 2011; Gely and Bierman 2003; King 2003). Regardless of whether
pay secrecy policy practices are actually enforced by the organization, their existence is
considered unlawful except in two instances. Pay secrecy policy practices are not in
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violation of the NLRA when they specifically pertain to managers or are worded to be
understood as protecting an organizations’ confidential information (such as trade secrets
or customer information) by prohibiting its’ disclosure to unauthorized individuals
(including other employees) or entities (King 2003). Even though pay secrecy policy
practices are illegal, organizations may use different methods, other than a written pay
secrecy policy, that are not as concrete and/or harder to confirm exist, such as verbally
expressing a policy practice (such as during an employee orientation or employee
meeting) or by engaging in other pay secrecy practices (such as not providing employees
with certain pay information).
Prior Research
Despite the pay communication research beginning over fifty years ago, the
literature is limited and underdeveloped. Most of the literature has analyzed pay secrecy
and/or pay openness practices’ impact on only a few outcomes, such as pay estimations
(e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1967), reward allocations (e.g., Bartol and Martin 1989; Leventhal et
al. 1972), and pay satisfaction (e.g., Cloutier and Vilhuber, 2008; Day 2006). More
recently, pay communication practices (specifically, pay secrecy practices) have been
examined to influence other outcomes, such as employee task performance (Bamberger
and Belogolovsky 2010), organizational justice and trust in management (Noy 2007).
Although the literature has expanded within the last few years, there are still only a
handful of variables that have been considered to be impacted by pay secrecy and/or pay
openness practices. Additionally, the pay communication research has provided
somewhat conflicting results (e.g., Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Thompson and Pronsky
1975), leading to confusions about pay secrecy’s overall efficiency and common practice
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in the workplace. Nonetheless, the scant literature implies that pay secrecy practices are
detrimental for both employees and organizations and thus, should not be utilized (e.g.,
Bartol and Martin 1989; Lawler 1965a, 1967).
These conflicting and confusing results could mainly be due to the various
methodological techniques utilized in these research studies. For instance, the majority of
the research conducted in the first several decades involved either collecting data in one
or two specific organizations (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1967) or via a laboratory (scenario)
experiment (e.g., Bartol and Martin 1989; Leventhal et al. 1972) where only one or two
specific levels of pay communication (e.g., complete pay secrecy and complete pay
openness) practices were manipulated. Additionally, those studies conducted in one or
two specific organizational environments (which were all of the pay estimation outcome
and most of the pay satisfaction outcome studies) occasionally failed to use an
organization with the same (or nearly similar) type of pay communication practice as
previous studies to properly replicate and/or extend the research. Therefore, the
conflicting findings may be due to one study analyzing a complete pay secrecy practice
and a second study analyzing a moderate pay secrecy or mild pay openness practice (e.g.,
Lawler 1967; Milkovich and Anderson 1972). Also, the studies involving one or two
specific organizations had a tendency to unsuccessfully indicate or properly describe in
detail the exact type of pay communication practice utilized in the organization (e.g.,
Lawler 1967,1972), which prevented other scholars from being able to replicate the pay
communication practice.
In regards to the studies that conducted an experiment (which were all of the pay
allocation outcome studies and the employee task performance outcome study), the
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majority of them described using complete pay secrecy and complete pay communication
manipulations. However, many of these experimental studies did not explicitly describe
the conditions that established their complete pay secrecy and complete pay openness.
Therefore, one of these experimental studies may have used complete pay secrecy and
complete pay openness conditions, while another study used complete pay secrecy and
moderate pay openness conditions. Also, these studies did not acknowledge any other
forms of pay communication practices, such as moderate pay secrecy or mild pay
openness.
Another problem encountered throughout the pay communication literature
involves each study having fairly dissimilar samples. Specifically, the pay estimation
outcome studies used participants with several different managerial levels. The
participants in these studies were classified as lower to middle-level managers (e.g.,
Lawler 1965a), lower-level managers to top management (e.g., Lawler 1967), or had no
specific managerial level indicated (e.g., Lawler 1972). The pay allocation studies,
mainly used samples consisting of undergraduate students (e.g., Leventhal et al. 1972);
however, some of these studies did use samples comprised of graduate students (e.g.,
Trahan et al. 1991) or managers (e.g., Bartol and Martin 1989). The pay satisfaction
outcome studies mainly used samples of employees (e.g., Thompson and Pronsky 1975);
however, managers (e.g., Mulvey et al. 2002) and graduate students (e.g., Day 2006)
were also used in several studies. Although under most exploratory research
circumstances, different samples are desired for generalizability (or external validity) and
research advancement, the pay communication research is still very underdeveloped and
some of the samples that have been used are possibly inappropriate or unbefitting for the
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pay communication research. For instance, samples consisting of managers may be
inappropriate since they are not protected under the NLRA and therefore, probably only
encounter complete or extreme pay secrecy practices.
Additionally, the student samples (primarily the undergraduate students) are
unsuitable because the students most likely have limited work experience which affects
the probability of them enduring pay secrecy or pay openness practice effects directly;
therefore, they may not have knowingly encountered or properly understood pay secrecy
or pay openness practices, or attribute the same importance to their pay as regular
employees (Noy 2007; Trahan et al. 1991). For instance, Trahan et al. (1991) argued that
their first study’s lack of significant results (in that pay communication practices did not
influence pay allocation decisions) may have been due to their sample being comprised
of undergraduate students who were deficient in work experience. Accordingly, Trahan
et al. (1991) conducted a second study using graduate students, who would most likely
have work experience, and found pay communication practices did impact pay allocation
decisions. However, the findings of the second study conflicted with previous research
(e.g., Leventhal et al. 1972). Trahan et al. (1991) again argued that the difference in the
samples caused this inconsistency in the findings in that Leventhal et al.’s (1972) study
used undergraduate students. Thus, samples comprised of undergraduate students and
managers are inappropriate and may potentially bias or corrupt the analyses.
These methodological issues in the literature may be alleviated by a definitive and
valid measure of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices. An
inclusive pay communication scale will eliminate the issue of observing only one or two
levels of pay secrecy and/or pay openness practices by allowing multiple levels of these
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practices on the continuum to be measured. The ability to measure multiple levels of pay
communication practices may also resolve the issue of previous studies having
conflicting or confusing results. Additionally, a pay communication measure may help
further develop the current research while also possibly enticing scholars to extend and
advance the pay communication literature.
There is only one pay communication assessment that has been properly
developed, Noy’s (2007) Perceived Organizational Pay Secrecy (POPS) scale. However,
the POPS scale (Noy 2007) was not evaluated for convergent or discriminant validity
during its development process. Additionally, the POPS scale has yet to be extended to
additional research other than the original variables it was used to analyze (e.g.,
organizational justice and trust dimensions). There have also been several additional
measures of pay communication created for specific studies and analyses (e.g., Cloutier
and Vilhuber 2008; Day 2006). However, none of these measures were properly
developed and validated nor extended to additional studies outside their original purpose.
A thorough evaluation of each of these measures is provided to additionally support the
argument of a needed definitive pay communication scale.
Validated Measures
Noy (2007) proposed the pay secrecy concept to be comprised of two separate
constructs: organizational and individual pay secrecy. The two types of pay secrecy
mainly differ by the manner in which they are created and maintained. Perceived
organizational pay secrecy (POPS) is created and upheld by the organization and its
structure, strategies, and policies (such as a pay secrecy policy); whereas, perceived
individual pay secrecy (PIPS) is formed and sustained by employees through different
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social and cultural norms (Noy 2007). A three-factor model of POPS was developed,
with the three aspects portraying perceptions of (1) policies and rules, (2) enforcement,
and (3) organizational norms. Noy’s (2007) POPS scale was comprised of fourteen items
and all of the measurement models (sub-dimensions and overall POPS models) fit well
and had suitable Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (refer to Appendix A for a description of
the scale and items). The IPS scale, on the other hand, has not yet been substantiated even
though Noy (2007) generated fourteen items for its development. Therefore, discriminant
validity between the two types of pay secrecy has not been established.
Although Noy (2007) properly substantiated the POPS scale, it may have internal
problems and confliction. For example, the Enforcement sub-dimension comprises a third
of the total scale items (five items) and focuses on the repercussions employees
experience when discussing pay information. However, if the organization does not
actually enforce the pay secrecy policy practice by reprimanding employees (such as by
terminating employment) for discussing pay with other organizational members then the
overall score is reduced. This is a problem since the degree of pay secrecy may be
extreme but due to the organization not punishing violations of a pay secrecy policy
(given that one exists) the overall score will be minimized and the level of pay secrecy
may appear to be moderate, if not low. Additionally, the Enforcement sub-dimension
could be argued to be a separate construct, needing to be measured independently from a
pay communication scale. For instance, if an organization practices extreme pay secrecy
but does not have a formal (written) or informal (verbally expressed) pay secrecy policy
prohibiting the discussion of pay then enforcement of obeying a pay secrecy policy is
inconsequential. Therefore, the Enforcement sub-dimension may cause the overall pay

103
secrecy score to be reduced and should be considered to be a separate construct requiring
its own measurement.
The Policies & Rules sub-dimension has the most items contributing to the overall
scale (six items) and focuses on formal (written) and perhaps informal (verbally
expressed) pay secrecy policy practices. Even though the existence of a pay secrecy
policy is important in a pay communication scale, it should not have such a heavy weight
for several reasons. First, an organization may practice extreme pay secrecy but not
express a pay secrecy policy due to its unlawfulness and thereby, this dimension causes
the overall score to be reduced and the level of pay secrecy practice to appear moderate,
if not low. Additionally, organizations having previously encountered court issues, such
as NLRB grievances and/or employee lawsuits pertaining to pay secrecy policy practices
(such as for wrongful termination due to violating a pay secrecy policy), would most
likely not formally or unofficially express a pay secrecy policy but may continue to
practice pay secrecy by not providing employees with various pay information.
Therefore, items pertaining to other specific practices of pay communication may be
better alternatives than pay secrecy policy existence items. Furthermore, some of the
items do not specifically identify who represents ‘others’ in their wording or whom
exactly the employees cannot discuss their pay information with. This is a problem as
organizations may have a pay secrecy policy practice regarding employees not disclosing
their pay information with ‘other’ employees and/or ‘other’ people outside of the
organization.
The Organizational Norms sub-dimension consists of three items and focuses on
pay secrecy practices and informal (verbally expressed) pay secrecy policy practices. As
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previously argued the items pertaining to specific pay communication practices (such as
organization withholds certain pay information from employees) are important and
should probably have a heavier weight in the overall pay communication measure.
However, these items make up less than a fourth of the overall scale. Additionally, the
specific practice items need to address certain types of practices used in organizations,
such as type of pay information (e.g., pay ranges and pay averages) provided to or
withheld from employees; however, these practice-oriented items only pertain to whether
the employing organization is secretive in regards to pay.
Non-Validated Measures
The additional assessments of pay communication were not properly substantiated
and they were designed (and worded) specifically for certain studies. Consequently, these
measures have not been extended to additional studies outside of their original purpose,
most likely due to their specificity and inability to apply to multiple occupations and/or
organizations. For a description of these pay communication measures and items refer to
Appendix B.
Beer and Gery (1972) were the first scholars to measure pay communication
practices with specific items. They used an ‘organizational culture’ measure which
analyzed the openness of the culture in regards to the organization providing or
withholding certain pay information. The six items focused on specific pay
communication practices by analyzing the employee’s knowledge of certain pay
information (such as pay range and pay raises). The items were analyzed individually,
rather than collectively as a scale. Consequently, a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was not
provided.
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Mulvey et al. (2002) created a seven-item measure to represent knowledge of pay.
The measure specifically focused on pay communication practices by analyzing the
employee’s knowledge of certain pay information. Specifically, the items referred to pay
grades, pay raises, pay ranges, and the processes used to determine their pay. Even
though the items were collectively combined to produce an overall pay knowledge scale,
a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was not provided.
Day (2006) generated a five-item measure of pay communication with higher
levels representing pay openness practices rather than pay secrecy practices. The items
focused on the employee’s perception of communication concerning pay level
determination and pay range information. The items were analyzed against other
variables collectively as a scale and produced a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .75.
However, almost half (41%) of the variance was accounted for by one item. Additionally,
Day (2006) asserted that the pay communication scale she created may not adequately
measure “the breadth and depth of issues” a pay communication scale should identify and
assess (p. 757).
Cloutier and Vilhuber (2008) created a two-item measure of system transparency.
The items pertained to pay openness practices and focused solely on whether procedures
used to determine pay levels and pay raises were followed. This measure produced a
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .80.
Tremblay and Chenevert (2008) generated a six-item measure of pay information
transparency. The items pertained to pay openness practices and focused on employee’s
knowledge of the pay process, pay policies, and disclosure of pay information. However,
only half of the questions were concerned with employees, while the other half referred
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to managers. In fact, there were only three completely different items and each item was
reworded to pertain to employees in one and managers in the other. Additionally, four of
the items were reverse-coded. The measure produced a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of
.84.
All of these non-validated pay communication assessments evaluate important
aspects of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness). However, most of these
measures only include one or two of these essential pay communication aspects. An
inclusive pay communication assessment needs to encompass these practices but also
other specific practices. Therefore, a measure with a broader scope of pay communication
(pay secrecy and pay openness) practices is needed for a high-quality research and
knowledge advancement.
Based on the above arguments and descriptions of the current pay communication
scales, a more comprehensive assessment of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay
openness) practices is needed in the management literature to further develop the
research. Although these assessments offer a good starting point, a more refined and
definitive measure of pay communication is urgently needed. Therefore, the purpose of
this paper is to produce a pay communication scale that includes all of the important
aspects of pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices.
Three multistage studies were conducted to properly develop and validate a pay
communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) scale. The scale development process
was adapted from the procedures and stages proposed by Hinkin (1995) and Schwab
(1980). Each study was individually approved by Louisiana Tech University’s Internal
Review Board (refer to Appendix C for a copy of the approval letters). The first study
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consisted of generating a pool of 79 items pertaining to pay communication practices and
having a panel of experts review and assess these items, resulting in 42 items. Study 2
involved further refining the items by analyzing the inter-item correlations, variances,
and factor loadings of each item in an exploratory factor analysis, which resulted in 22
items loading on four distinct factors. In the third study, the proposed scale and
dimensionality (four sub-dimensions) of the remaining 22 items was confirmed by using
confirmatory factor analysis. Additionally, construct validation was determined for the
Pay Communication scale by providing evidence of convergent and discriminant validity.

Study 1: Instrument Development
Stage 1: Item Generation
The purpose of this stage was to create a large, inclusive pool of items about pay
communication practices, so that together they meet the description of pay
communication (pay secrecy and/or pay openness) and encompass the entire domain of
pay communication practices.

Procedure 1. Participants were active members of the Society of Human
Resource Management (SHRM). Specifically, members of the Northeast Louisiana
(Monroe #0207), Central Louisiana (Alexandria #0367), and Imperial Calcasieu Human
Resource Management Association (Lake Charles #0402) SHRM chapters participated in
this study. An email was sent to each chapter’s current President requesting to survey
their current members (refer to Appendix D). Once the survey was approved by the
Chapter Presidents and their Board of Directors, an introductory email was sent to the
potential respondents (SHRM Chapter members) explaining the purpose of the study and
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inviting them to participate in the study (refer to Appendix E). Participants were given
ten to fourteen days to access and complete the survey. A reminder email was sent to the
potential respondents (SHRM Chapter members) five days after the introductory email
was delivered (refer to Appendix F).
The introductory and reminder emails were delivered to 360 potential
participants. Twenty-four currently active SHRM members participated in the survey,
yielding a 6.67% response rate. The majority of the participants were female (54.2%),
Caucasian (83.3%), working full-time (91.7%), and employed in their organization’s
human resources department (62.5%). The participants’ ages ranged from 27 to 67 with
half of the participants being in their forties. The mean age was forty-five. Most of the
participants had been with their current employer for one to five years (45.8%). All of the
participants who provided a response for the education category possessed at least a
bachelor’s degree (95.8%). Refer to Table 3.1 for a complete overview of the descriptive
statistics for the sample.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Sample (Stage 1 of Study 1)
N

%

Cumulative %

Louisiana SHRM Chapters:
Alexandria Chapter (Central Louisiana)
Lake Charles Chapter (ICHRMA)
Monroe Chapter (Northeast Louisiana)

5
10
9

20.8
41.7
37.5

20.8
62.5
100.0

Gender:
Female
Male
Not Given

13
10
1

54.2
41.7
4.2

54.2
95.9
100.0

Age:
20’s
30’s
40’s

2
3
12

8.3
12.5
50.0

8.3
20.8
70.8
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
50’s
60’s
Not Given

3
2
2

12.5
8.3
8.3

83.3
91.6
100.0

Ethnicity:
African American
American Indian
Asian/Pacific Islander
Caucasian
Latino/Hispanic
Middle Eastern
Native American
Other
Not Given

1
0
1
20
1
0
0
0
1

4.2
0.0
4.2
83.3
4.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.2

4.2
4.2
8.4
91.7
95.9
95.9
95.9
95.9
100.0

Tenure:
Less than 1 year
1 to 5 years
6 to 15 years
16 to 25 years
Not Given

2
11
8
2
1

8.3
45.8
33.3
8.3
4.2

8.3
54.1
87.4
95.7
100.0

Hours Per Week:
Less than 10 hours
10 to 20 hours
21 to 30 hours (part-time)
30 (full-time) to 40 hours
More than 40 hours
Not Given

0
0
1
7
15
1

0.0
0.0
4.2
29.2
62.5
4.2

0.0
0.0
4.2
33.4
95.9
100.0

Education:
Did not complete high school
High school diploma or GED
Some college
Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS)
Technical college or Trade school
Associate’s degree (e.g., AA, AS)
Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (e.g., MD)
Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA)
Doctorate degree (e.g., PhD, DBA, EdD)
Not Given

0
0
0
15
0
0
2
6
0
1

0.0
0.0
0.0
62.5
0.0
0.0
8.3
25.0
0.0
4.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
62.5
0.0
0.0
70.8
95.8
95.8
100.0
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
Industry:
Agriculture, Mining
Communications, Utilities
Construction
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Government
Health Care
Internet
Manufacturing
Retail, Wholesale
Services
Transportation
Nonprofit
Other (e.g., Banking, Legal, Education)
Not Given
Managerial/Departmental Level:
Employee (no managerial duties)
Lower-level management
Middle-level management
Higher-level (top) management
Human Resources department
Professional (e.g., Instructor, Law Firm Partner)

0
2
2
2
1
6
0
3
0
2
1
1
3
1

0.0
8.3
8.3
8.3
4.2
25.0
0.0
12.5
0.0
8.3
4.2
4.2
12.5
4.2

0.0
8.3
16.6
24.9
29.1
54.1
54.1
66.6
66.6
74.9
79.1
83.3
95.8
100.0

3
0
6
7
15
2

12.5
0.0
25.0
29.2
62.5
8.3

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the
Internal Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a
box (refer to Appendix G). Additionally, participants were given the researchers’ current
description of pay communication (which was based on the management literature),
instructions, and requested to openly respond to several five open-ended research
questions and eight demographic questions (refer to Appendix H). A deductive approach
was used to generate the items. Two research questions requested participants provide
and describe at least two examples of practices that their current employer and another
organization (such as former employer or spouse’s employer) currently utilize or does not
utilize pay communication practices in the workplace. Three research questions requested
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participants identify what pay secrecy means to them personally, to their current
employer, and to their current co-workers (such as peers, subordinates, superiors). This
procedure generated 142 items.

Procedure 2. The researcher independently edited poorly-written items and
eliminated duplicate items. Additionally, the researcher produced 22 distinct items based
on the previously published pay communication literature. This created a total of 79 items
(refer to Appendix I for an overview of the items).
Stage 2: Item Refinement
The purpose of this stage was to create a manageable representation of pay
communication practices by systematically reducing the number of items generated in
Stage 1.

Sample. Participants (or judges) were Ph.D. academics and doctoral students in
the management discipline with the majority having an emphasis in human resource
management and/or organizational behavior. All of the judges were personally known to
the researcher. The majority of the participants were male (54.5%), Caucasian (63.6%),
and possessed a doctoral degree (54.5%). The participants’ ages ranged from 28 to 53
with most of the participants (those who provided a response) being in their thirties
(55.6%).The mean age was thirty-eight. Most of the participants have been with their
current employer for one to five years (63.6%). Refer to Table 3.2 for an overview of the
descriptive statistics for the sample.
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Sample (Stage 2 of Study 1)
N

%

Cumulative %

Gender:
Male
Female

6
5

54.5
45.5

54.2
100.0

Age:
20’s
30’s
40’s
50’s
Not Given

1
5
2
1
2

9.1
45.4
18.2
9.1
18.2

9.1
54.5
72.7
81.8
100.0

Ethnicity:
African American
American Indian
Asian/Pacific Islander
Caucasian
Latino/Hispanic
Middle Eastern
Native American
Other

1
0
2
7
0
0
0
1

9.1
0.0
18.2
63.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
9.1

9.1
9.1
27.3
90.9
90.9
90.9
90.9
100.0

Tenure:
Less than 1 year
1 to 5 years
6 to 15 years

1
7
3

9.1
63.6
27.3

9.1
72.7
100.0

Education:
Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA)
Doctorate degree (e.g., PhD, DBA, EdD)

5
6

45.5
54.5

45.5
100.0

Position:
Dissertation Committee Member
Doctoral Student/Candidate of Management
Management Professor at Louisiana Tech University
Management Professor at Other University

3
5
3
4

27.3
45.5
27.3
36.4

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Procedure. Potential judges were requested to participate in the study by email.
Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the Internal
Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a box on
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the first page of the electronic survey (refer to Appendix G). The eleven judges rated and
reviewed each of the 79 items based on several criteria: (the degree to which each item
has): consistency with the pay communication description (either pay secrecy or pay
openness), generalizability to a wide variety of organizations and occupations, and clarity
and conciseness (editing of items was allowed). The items were investigated based on the
three criteria using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree or not at
all) to 5 (strongly agree or highly). The judges were also given the opportunity to modify
items or request an item be eliminated from further analyses. Additionally, five
demographic questions were included at the end of the survey (refer to Appendix J for an
overview of the review survey).
Items that received a mean score of 3.0 or less on any of the three rating criteria
were eliminated from further analyses. The majority of the items (all but one item) that
were suggested to be deleted due to their complexity or difficulty were also eliminated.
The one item that was not eliminated was modified. Items that were requested for
modification were altered following the judges’ comments. This process yielded 42 items
for further analysis (refer to Appendix K for an overview of the items).

Study 2: Scale Evaluation
Sample
Seventy-nine participants volunteered to participate after being recruited from a
social networking website (e.g., Facebook) and 227 were recruited from an online survey
panel (e.g., Qualtrics) which rewarded those who completed the survey with points that
could be used for merchandise or money. There were a total of 306 participants. The
majority of the participants were male (66.7%), Caucasian (85.9%), working full-time
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(96.4%), had no labor union involvement for their job or any jobs in their organization
(67.3%), and possessed at least a bachelor’s degree (59.8%). The participants’ ages
ranged from 19 to 69 with a third of the participants (33.3%) being in their thirties. The
mean age was forty-one. Most of the participants had been with their current employer
for one to five years (33.3%) and were classified as an ‘employee’ with no managerial
duties (44.1%). Refer to Table 3.3 for a complete overview of the descriptive statistics for
the sample.

Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Sample (Study 2)
N

%

Cumulative %

Gender:
Female
Male
Not Given

100
204
2

32.7
66.7
.7

32.7
99.3
100.0

Age:
19 to 29
30’s
40’s
50’s
60’s
Not Given

49
102
67
65
21
2

16.0
33.3
21.9
21.2
6.9
.7

16.0
49.3
71.2
92.4
99.3
100.0

Ethnicity:
African American
American Indian
Asian/Pacific Islander
Caucasian
Latino/Hispanic
Middle Eastern
Native American
Not Given

14
0
13
263
12
1
2
4

4.6
0.0
4.2
85.9
3.9
.3
.7
1.3

4.6
4.6
8.8
94.7
95.9
98.4
98.7
100.0

Union Status:
Yes, job is unionized but not all jobs in organization
Yes, entire organization is unionized
No, but other jobs in the organization are unionized
No, no job in the entire organization is unionized

24
27
47
206

7.8
8.8
15.4
67.3

7.8
16.7
32.0
99.3
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Table 3.3 (Continued)
Not Given

2

.7

100.0

Tenure:
Less than 1 year
1 to 5 years
6 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years
21 to 25 years
26 years or more
Not Given

30
101
79
46
18
16
14
2

9.8
33.0
25.8
15.0
5.9
5.2
4.6
.7

9.8
42.8
68.6
83.7
89.5
94.8
99.3
100.0

Hours Per Week:
Less than 10 hours
10 to 20 hours
21 to 30 hours (part-time)
30 (full-time) to 40 hours
More than 40 hours
Not Given

2
2
5
159
136
2

.7
.7
1.6
52.0
44.4
.7

0.7
1.3
2.9
54.9
99.3
100.0

1
45
77
97
15
22
6
31
10
2

0.3
14.7
25.2
31.7
4.9
7.2
2.0
10.1
3.3
.7

0.3
15.0
40.2
71.9
76.8
84.0
85.9
96.1
99.3
100.0

135
52
73
24
7
15
3

44.1
7.0
23.9
7.8
2.3
4.9
1.0

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Education:
Did not complete high school
High school diploma or GED
Some college
Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS)
Technical college or Trade school
Associate’s degree (e.g., AA, AS)
Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (e.g., MD)
Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA)
Doctorate degree (e.g., PhD, DBA, EdD)
Not Given
Managerial/Departmental Level:
Employee (no managerial duties)
Lower-level management
Middle-level management
Higher-level (top) management
Human Resources department
Professional (e.g., Instructor, Law Firm Partner)
Not Given
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Table 3.3 (Continued)
Industry:
Agriculture, Mining
Communications, Utilities
Construction
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Government
Health Care
Internet
Manufacturing
Retail, Wholesale
Services
Transportation
Nonprofit
Other (e.g., Engineering)
Not Given

S
13
19
14
53
31
11
40
45
45
11
8
6
2

2.6
4.2
6.2
4.6
17.3
10.1
3.6
13.1
14.7
14.7
3.6
2.6
2.0
.7

2.6
6.9
13.1
17.6
35.0
45.1
48.7
61.8
76.5
91.2
94.8
97.4
99.3
100.0

Organizational Size:
10 employees or less
11 to 50 employees
51 to 100 employees
101 to 500 employees
501 to 1,000 employees
1,001 to 5,000 employees
5,001 to 25,000 employees
25,001 to 50,000 employees
50,001 to 100,000 employees
100,001 employees or more
Not Given

28
49
26
63
30
51
20
12
9
16
2

9.2
16.0
8.5
20.6
9.8
16.7
6.5
3.9
2.9
5.2
0.7

9.2
25.2
33.7
54.2
64.1
80.7
87.3
91.2
94.1
99.3
100.0

Income
$13,500 or less
$13,501 to $20,000
$20,001 to $30,000
$30,001 to $40,000
$40,001 to $50,000
$50,001 to $60,000
$60,001 to $70,000
$70,001 to $80,000
$80,001 to $90,000
$90,001 to $100,000
$100,001 or more
Not Given

9
18
37
52
55
46
21
18
12
8
28
2

2.9
5.9
12.1
17.0
18.0
15.0
6.9
5.9
3.9
2.6
9.2
.7

2.9
8.8
20.9
37.9
55.9
70.9
77.8
83.7
87.6
90.2
99.3
100.0
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Table 3.3 (Continued)

State:
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Do not live in the U.S. (e.g., Canada)
Not Given

N

%

Cumulative %

5
1
8
1
1
1
10
3
3
4
4
2
46
1
5
4
3
2
1
1
1
4
4
6
10
2
8
2
6
8
3
1
1
1
1
3
133

1.6
.3
2.6
.3
.3
.3
3.3
1.0
1.0
1.3
1.3
.7
15.0
.3
1.6
1.3
1.0
.7
.3
.3
.3
1.3
1.3
2.0
3.3
.7
2.6
.7
2.0
2.6
1.0
.3
.3
.3
.3
1.0
43.5

1.6
2.0
4.6
4.9
5.2
5.6
8.8
9.8
10.8
12.1
13.4
14.1
31.0
31.4
33.0
34.3
35.3
35.9
36.3
36.6
36.9
38.2
39.5
41.5
44.8
45.4
48.0
48.7
50.7
53.3
54.2
54.6
54.9
55.2
55.6
56.5
100.0
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Procedure
Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the
Internal Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a
box (refer to Appendix G). Additionally, participants were given a description of pay
communication including depictions for pay secrecy and pay openness, instructions, and
requested to respond to the 42 prospective items that endured Study 1’s analyses and 12
demographic questions (refer to Appendix L). Specifically, the participants indicated the
extent to which their current employing organization engaged in certain pay
communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices on a 7-point Likert-type scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Negatively worded items were recoded to match the scale anchors (e.g., pay
secrecy representing the high extreme and pay openness representing the low extreme).
This analysis yielded 22 items (refer to Appendix M for an overview of the items).
Stage 1: Item Selection Process
Items were evaluated based on item-total correlations and variances. Items
demonstrating high inter-item correlations with other items in the same sub-category
were selected to be included in the sub-dimensions since a scale should consist of highly
interrelated items (DeVellis 2012). Additionally, items with low variances (below 1.5)
were eliminated since they do not allow differences between the participants to be
established (DeVellis 2012). This process resulted in the elimination of 4 items, yielding
38 items. The means and standard deviations for the remaining 38 items are presented in
Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 Means and Standard Deviations of Items (Stage 1 of Study 2)
Item
1. All individual pay information is only known to a select few
staff members, such as the HR hiring manager, accountant, and/or
CEO.
2. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my
organization.
3. An employees’ individual pay is strictly confidential at my
organization.
4. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone.
5. Employees are well informed about pay policies at my
organization.
6. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’
(gossip) at my organization.
7. Even though employees at my organization are not supposed to
discuss their personal pay information they do.
8 .1 am provided information only about my individual pay level.
9 .1 am provided the pay average for every job in my organization.
10.1 am provided my job’s pay range.
11.1 know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of
pay increases presently available.
12.1 know whether my pay is above, below, or equal to the average
pay for my job.
13. Management openly discusses all employees’ individual pay.
14. My organization distributes pay ranges for every job in the
organization.
15. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own
pay with coworkers.
16. My organization does not have a policy, procedure, or unwritten
standard on discussing pay information.
17. My organization does not provide employees with any
coworkers’ individual pay.
18. My organization does not provide employees with the
procedures used to establish pay.
19. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees
from discussing their pay with each other.
20. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from
discussing pay information with coworkers.
21. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with
other employees.
22. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I
understand.
23. My organization is secretive when it comes to employee pay.
24. My organization is very strict in regards to employees not
talking about pay.

M

SD

5.20

1.88

4.03

2.07

4.87

2.04

5.49
3.08

1.94
1.75

4.35

1.85

4.35

1.75

5.17
4.41
3.31
3.60

1.84
2.06
2.00
1.93

3.33

1.83

5.52
4.30

1.74
2.05

4.24

1.94

4.25

1.95

5.54

1.73

3.94

1.86

3.64

1.87

3.97

2.04

4.28

2.00

3.67

1.87

4.62
3.80

1.85
1.91
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
25. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential.
4.91
1.90
26. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my
1.88
3.45
job.
27. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed
4.05
1.97
under any circumstances.
28. My organization makes the entire pay structure/model available. 4.29
2.00
29. My organization provides employees with information with
3.64
1.87
information about how pay is determined.
30. My organization requires employees to sign a contractual
2.89
1.97
agreement stating they will comply with the pay secrecy policy by
not discussing their individual pay information with coworkers.
31. My organization shows its’ concern for employees’
4.80
1.83
privacy/confidentiality by not releasing everyone’s individual pay
level.
32. My organization suggests individual pay information should be
4.89
1.76
kept private.
33. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule
3.95
1.95
with employees.
34. My organization withholds my job’s pay average from me.
3.41
1.74
35. No pay information, other than personal pay level, is disclosed
1.88
4.46
to employees at my organization.
1.90
36. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my
4.96
organization.
37. There are no negative consequences for discussing pay at my
3.95
1.88
organization.
2.04
3.85
38. There is a statement in my organization’s employee
handbook/manual stating employees should not discuss their pay
with coworkers.
Note: Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). N - 306.

Stage 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis
Items were evaluated on their interrelationships (factor weight and factor
loadings) using a principal axis factor analysis with direct oblique rotation. A principal
axis factor analysis was used because this type of factor analysis is primarily concerned
with the common variance and identifying the underlying dimensions. Additionally, a
direct oblique rotation was utilized since the items were expected to be correlated. A
factor weight of .40 was used as the minimum cutoff. Additionally, items were only
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allowed to load on one factor. Therefore, the minimum difference between weights for an
item on different factors was more than. 10. Items not meeting the criteria were
eliminated. This process resulted in 16 items being removed due to not meeting the
minimum requirements, yielding 22 items. Additionally, the 22 items loaded on four
separate factors, resulting in a potential four-factor model. As shown in Table 3.5, these
four factors appear to represent different aspects of pay communication practices. These
sub-dimensions were labeled Pay Policy Existence, Pay Structure, Organizational Norms,
and Employee Norms.

Table 3.5 Principal Axis Factor Analysis, Oblimin Rotation (Stage 2 of Study 2)

Item
1. An employee could be fired for
discussing pay information at my
organization.
2. At my organization, all pay
information is available to
anyone.
3. Employees discover
coworkers’ pay through the
‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my
organization.
4. Even though employees at my
organization are not supposed to
discuss their personal pay
information they do.
5 .1 am provided my job’s pay
range.
6 .1 know about the different
types, sizes, and/or frequencies of
pay increases presently available.
7. My organization does not allow
employees to discuss their own
pay with coworkers.

Pay Policy
Existence
.76

Factor Loadings
Pay
Organizational
Norms
Structure
.49

.44

Employee
Norms

.74

.76

.74

.70
.74

.84

.58

122
Table 3.5 (Continued)
8. My organization enforces the
.81
.43
policy/rule that forbids employees
from discussing their pay with
each other.
9. My organization has a policy
.86
.45
forbidding employees from
discussing pay information with
coworkers.
10. My organization has a rule to
.86
.56
not share pay information with
other employees.
11. My organization has a solid
.85
pay structure/model that I
understand.
12. My organization is very strict
.89
.51
in regards to employees not
talking about pay.
13. My organization keeps all pay
.65
.82
information strictly confidential.
14. My organization makes it
.84
clear how pay is determined for
my job.
15. My organization makes it
.92
.59
clear that pay should not be
discussed under any
circumstances.
16. My organization makes the
.75
.42
entire pay structure/model
available.
17. My organization provides
.82
employees with information about
how pay is determined.
18. My organization shows its’
.42
.72
concern for employee’s
privacy/confidentiality by not
releasing everyone’s individual
pay level.
19. My organization suggests
.62
.77
.47
individual pay information should
be kept private.
20. My organization verbally
.81
.61
expresses a pay secrecy
policy/rule with employees.______________________________________________
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Table 3.5 (Continued)
21. Only a few employees have
.49
access to pay information at my
organization.
22. There is a statement in my
.78
organization’s employee
handbook/manual stating
employees should not discuss
their pay with coworkers.
Note: Numbers in boldface indicate dominant factor loadings.

.75

.53

Study 3: Scale Validation
Sample
Participants were recruited using a third party online survey organization (e.g.
Mechanical Turk). Those who completed the anonymous survey were compensated one
dollar directly by the online survey organization. The respondents were completely
anonymous to the researcher. The number of participants was 611. The majority of the
participants were female (57.9%), Caucasian (73.6%), working full-time (81.5%), had no
labor union involvement for their job or any jobs in their organization (73.3%), and
possessed at least a bachelor’s degree (70.5%). The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to
68 with over 40% of the participants being in their twenties and a third (33.4%) being in
their thirties. The mean age was thirty-four. Most of the participants had been with their
current employer for one to five years (55%) and were classified as an ‘employee’ with
no managerial duties (62.2%). Refer to Table 3.6 for a complete overview of the
descriptive statistics for the sample.
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Table 3.6 Descriptive Statistics for Sample (Study 3)
N

%

Cumulative %

Gender:
Female
Male

354
257

57.9
42.1

57.9
100.0

Age:
18 and 19
20’s
30’s
40’s
50’s
60’s

2
252
204
78
48
27

.3
41.2
33.4
12.8
7.9
4.4

.3
41.6
75.0
87.7
95.6
100.0

Ethnicity:
African American
American Indian
Asian/Pacific Islander
Caucasian
Latino/Hispanic
Middle Eastern
Native American

33
28
62
450
21
4
11

5.4
4.6
10.1
73.6
3.4
.7
1.8

5.4
10.0
20.1
94.1
97.5
98.2
100.0

Tenure:
Less than 1 year
1 to 5 years
6 to 10 years
11 to 15 years
16 to 20 years
21 to 25 years
26 years or more

88
336
117
45
15
4
6

14.4
55.0
19.1
7.4
2.5
.7
1.0

14.4
69.4
88.5
95.9
98.4
99.0
100.0

Hours Per Week:
Less than 10 hours
10 to 20 hours
21 to 30 hours (part-time)
30 (full-time) to 40 hours
More than 40 hours

8
24
81
291
207

1.3
3.9
13.3
47.6
33.9

1.3
5.2
18.5
66.1
100.0

Education:
Did not complete high school
High school diploma or GED
Some college
Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS)
Technical college or Trade school

8
35
137
253
10

1.3
5.7
22.4
41.4
1.6

1.3
7.0
29.5
70.9
72.5
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Table 3.6 (Continued)
Associate’s degree (e.g., AA, AS)
Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (e.g., MD)
Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA)
Doctorate degree (e.g., PhD, DBA, EdD)

60
14
88
6

9.8
2.3
14.4
1.0

82.3
84.6
99.0
100.0

Industry:
Agriculture, Mining
Communications, Utilities
Construction
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Government
Health Care
Internet
Manufacturing
Retail, Wholesale
Services
Transportation
Nonprofit
Other

13
22
14
47
101
76
31
34
84
151
15
22
1

2.1
3.6
2.3
7.7
16.5
12.4
5.1
5.6
13.7
24.7
2.5
3.6
0.2

2.1
5.7
8.0
15.7
32.2
44.7
49.8
55.3
69.1
93.8
96.2
99.8
100.0

Organizational Size:
10 employees or less
11 to 50 employees
51 to 100 employees
101 to 500 employees
501 to 1,000 employees
1,001 to 5,000 employees
5,001 to 25,000 employees
25,001 to 50,000 employees
50,001 to 100,000 employees
100,001 employees or more

65
112
72
115
59
71
51
16
14
36

10.6
18.3
11.8
18.8
9.7
11.6
8.3
2.6
2.3
5.9

10.6
29.0
40.8
59.6
69.2
80.9
89.2
91.8
94.1
100.0

Union Status:
Yes, job is unionized but not all jobs in organization
Yes, entire organization is unionized
No, but other jobs in the organization are unionized
No, no job in the entire organization is unionized

45
48
70
448

7.4
7.9
11.5
73.3

7.4
15.2
26.7
100.0

Managerial/Departmental Level:
Employee (no managerial duties)
Lower-level management
Middle-level management
Higher-level (top) management
Human Resources department

380
102
103
11
20

62.2
16.7
16.9
1.8
3.3

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
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Table 3.6 (Continued)
Professional (e.g., Medical Doctor)
Income
$13,500 or less
$13,501 to $20,000
$20,001 to $30,000
$30,001 to $40,000
$40,001 to $50,000
$50,001 to $60,000
$60,001 to $70,000
$70,001 to $80,000
$80,001 to $90,000
$90,001 to $100,000
$100,001 or more
State:
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

9

1.5

n/a

96
73
124
99
74
47
31
26
13
6
22

15.7
11.9
20.3
16.2
12.1
7.7
5.1
4.3
2.1
1.0
3.6

15.7
27.7
48.0
64.2
76.3
84.0
89.0
93.3
95.4
96.4
100.0

8
17
8
52
14
6
1
31
21
4
5
22
15
2
5
12
15
9
9
15
4
5
5
2
17
4
38
23

1.3
2.8
1.3
8.5
2.3
1.0
.2
5.1
3.4
.7
.8
3.6
2.5
.3
.8
2.0
2.5
1.5
1.5
2.5
.7
.8
.8
.3
2.8
.7
6.2
3.8

1.3
4.1
5.4
13.9
16.2
17.2
17.3
22.4
25.9
26.5
27.3
30.9
33.4
39.3
40.1
42.1
44.5
46.0
47.5
49.9
50.6
51.4
52.2
52.5
55.3
56.0
62.2
66.0
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Table 3.6 (Continued)
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Other (e.g., Washington, D.C.)

30
7
7
21
3
13
2
14
51
4
20
15
4
15
1
1

4.9
1.1
1.1
3.4
.5
2.1
.3
2.3
8.3
.7
3.3
2.5
.7
2.5
.2
.2

70.9
72.0
73.2
76.6
77.1
79.2
79.5
81.8
90.2
90.8
94.1
96.6
97.2
99.7
99.8
100.0

Procedure
Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the
Internal Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a
box (refer to Appendix G). The participants could not proceed with the survey until they
had marked the box and pressed next. Participants were given instructions and requested
to respond to the 22 prospective items that endured Study 2’s analyses and 12
demographic questions (refer to Appendix N for an overview of the survey). Specifically,
the participants indicated the extent to which their current employing organization
engaged in certain pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices on a 7point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Additionally, participants responded to other pay communication scales (e.g., Day 2006;
Mulvey et al. 2002; Noy 2007) and a High Performance Work Practices measure (e.g.,
Huselid 1995) for construct validation.
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Negatively worded items were recoded to match the scale anchors (e.g., pay
secrecy representing the high extreme and pay openness representing the low extreme).
Stage 1: Dimensionality
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using Amos 20 was conducted to evaluate
the fit of the measurement model (e.g., the relationship between the items and the factors)
and to cross-validate the dimensionality of the scale. A CFA was performed on each sub
factor (or first-order latent variables) of the Pay Communication model as proposed in the
EFA solution. Additionally, a second-order CFA using all four extracted pay
communication dimensions was conducted to examine whether all four identified
dimensions actually refer to a superordinate pay communication construct. The fit of the
four-factor model was also compared to the fits of 1-factor, 2-factor, and 3-factor models.
First, the four sub-factors of the Pay Communication model were analyzed
independently using several Model Fit indices (e.g., RMSEA) and Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient (Cronbach 1951). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Normative Fit Index
(NFI), and Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA), and x2 indices were used to evaluate the fit of each sub-factor. The CFI, NFI,
and GFI indicate a well-fitting model when values are closer to 1.0; whereas, the Root
Mean Square Error of Approximation indicates a well-fitting model when values are
below .08 (Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson 2010). The results of the independent sub
factor indices are presented in Table 3.7. Each sub-factor demonstrated reliability by
having suitable Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of above .70 (Hair et al. 2010). The fit
indices for each sub-factor measurement model (except for the Employee Norms sub
factor) indicated that each sub-factor demonstrated a moderate or well fit. The Employee
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Norms sub-factor was unable to be analyzed independently because it only consists of
two measured items and therefore, is an underidentified model.

Table 3.7 Pay Communication Model Fit Indices from Amos (Study 3)

Measurement Model
Pay Policy Existence
sub-factor
Pay Structure sub
factor
Organizational
Norms sub-factor
Employee Norms
sub-factor
1-factor model
2-factor model
3-factor model
4-factor model

x2
311.76

Cronbach’s
df CFI NFI GFI RMSEA AVE
a
27 .95 .95 .89
.13
74%
.96

70.32

9

.98

.97

.96

.11

66%

.92

13.77

5

.99

.99

.99

.05

57%

.87

-

-

-

-

-

-

59%

.74

4000.54
1878.10
1669.67
1143.85

209
208
206
205

.67
.86
.87
.92

.66
.84
.86
.90

.51
.74
.76
.85

.17
.12
.11
.09

67%
67%
67%
67%

.98
.98
.98
.98

Note: N = 6 \ l .

Convergent validity, the extent to which the items of a construct share a high
proportion of variance in common, for each sub-factor was determined. Three methods
were used to establish convergent validity: item or factor loadings (at least .5 or higher),
Average Variance Extracted (AVE; at least 50% or higher), and reliability by means of
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (at least .70 or above). Each sub-factor’s item loadings are
shown in Figure 3.1, while the AVE’s and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are shown in
Table 3.7. Each sub-factor had significant item loadings of .65 or higher with only two
items loading below .70. Additionally, the AVE for the sub-factors ranged from .57 to .74
and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranged from .74 to .96. Therefore, each sub-factor
exhibits convergent validity.
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Figure 3.1 Sub-Factor Correlations and Factor Loadings from Amos (Study 3)
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A second-order CFA was conducted to determine whether the Pay
Communication construct was better represented by the 4-factor model, 3-factor model,
2-factor model or 1-factor model (where pay communication is a first-order latent
variable). The fit of each measurement model was evaluated using the same Model Fit
indices (e.g., CFI, NFI, GFI, RMSEA, y?) used for analyzing each sub-factor
independently. As shown in Table 3.7, the 4-factor model demonstrates a better fit for the
second-order latent variable pay communication than the 3-factor model, 2-factor model,
and 1-factor model. Additionally, each of the four sub-factors (first-order latent variables)
have a significant (p<0.001) and positive loading on the second-order latent variable,
ranging from .45 to .88 (refer to Figure 3.2). Furthermore, all of the sub-factors have
significant (p<0.001) correlations with each other (refer to Figure 3.1). Therefore, the
four sub-factors demonstrate a convergence on a common underlying construct (Lages,
Lages, and Lages 2005), which further suggests a second-order model accounts for the
data better than a first-order model (or 1-factor model). Based on these results (e.g., the
overall fit indices, the first-order latent variables factor loadings, and the sub-factors
correlations), the 4-factor model displays the better fit.
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Figure 3.2 Second-Order 4-Factor Model of Pay Communication from Amos (Study 3)
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Stage 2: Convergent and Discriminant
Validity
Convergent validity exists when a measure covaries with other measures alleging
to assess the same or similar construct in that scores on the pay communication scale
developed in this paper should be relatively highly correlated with scores on other pay
communication, pay secrecy, and pay openness measures. Convergent validity was
analyzed by comparing the Pay Communication scale developed in this paper with Noy’s
(2007) POPS scale, Mulvey et al.’s (2002) Pay Knowledge scale, and Day’s (2006) Pay
Communication scale.
Specifically, it is expected for each comparison pay communication scale to
statistically correlate with the pay communication measure developed in this paper.
Additionally, it is predicted that both Day’s (2006) and Mulvey et al.’s (2002) scales will
have higher correlations with the Pay Structure sub-factor since both of these earlier
scales and this scales sub-factor focus on the amount of pay information employees are
provided and their understanding of that information. However, the significant
correlations between Day’s (2006) and Mulvey et al.’s (2002) scales with the Pay
Communication scale and its sub-factors are expected to be negative since both Day and
Mulvey et al’s scales have pay openness representing the larger numbered anchors (the
opposite of the Pay Communication scale). Also, Noy’s (2007) Organizational Norms
sub-dimension is predicted to have a higher correlation with the Organizational Norms
sub-factor; whereas, both the Enforcement and Policies and Rules sub-dimensions are
expected to have a higher correlation with the Pay Policy Existence sub-factor. An
overview of the correlation comparisons are presented in Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8 Correlations between Pay Communication, Similar Measures, and Dissimilar
Measures (Study 3)
Observed Correlations
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Results for Convergent Validity. Consistent with expectations, both Day’s (2006)
and Mulvey et al’s (2002) scales are significantly negatively correlated (p < .01) with the
Pay Communication scale and all four of the sub-factors. Additionally, both Day’s (2006)
and Mulvey et al’s (2002) scales have the highest correlation with the Pay Structure sub
factor as expected.
As predicted, Noy’s (2007) POPS scale and each of its sub-dimensions are
significantly positively correlated (p < .01) with the Pay Communication scale and each
of its sub-factors. Furthermore and as expected, both the Enforcement and Policies and
Rules sub-dimensions have the highest correlation with the Pay Policy Existence sub
factor. Contrary to expectations, Noy’s (2007) Organizational Norms sub-dimension has
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the highest correlation with the overall Pay Communication scale, with the next highest
correlation being the Organizational Norms sub-factor. Thus, evidence of convergent
validity is provided for the Pay Communication scale.
Discriminant validity exists when the measure does not covary with other
measures alleged to assess different constructs in that scores on a particular scale should
either not be related or only slightly correlated with scores on other construct measures.
Discriminant validity was analyzed by comparing the Pay Communication scale
developed in this paper with a modified adaptation of Huselid’s (1995) High Performance
Work Practices (HPWP) measure, which consists of two sub-dimensions. The first sub
dimension is referred to as Employee Skills and Organizational Structures and the second
is labeled Employee Motivation. This measure was utilized for discriminant validity
because it analyzes organizational work practices that are dissimilar from pay
communication practices. Therefore, Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale is expected to have
low, yet most likely still significant (due to the both scales encompassing organizational
practices), correlations with the Pay Communication scale.
Although the correlation comparison method is a common approach in
determining discriminant validity, it does not provide strong evidence of discriminant
validity as two distinct constructs may be related (e.g., have a high correlation) due to
some underlying theoretical reasoning (Hair et al. 2010). Therefore, discriminant validity
was also analyzed by comparing the shared variance (e.g., the square of the correlation)
among the Pay Communication scale and Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale to each of the
scales’ AVE. The logic of this notion is that a construct (e.g., Pay Communication or
HPWP) should not explain more of the variance it shares with another construct than the
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average variance extracted from its own scale items. Thus, discriminant validity is
demonstrated when the squared correlation estimate of two constructs is less than the
AVE of each of those constructs (Fomell and Larcker 1981; Hair et al. 2010).
Results for Discriminant Validity. The results of the correlation comparison
between the Pay Communication scale and Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale show that the
overall HPWP scale and its two sub-dimensions do significantly correlate with the Pay
Communication scale and most of its sub-factors (refer to Table 3.8). Specifically, the
overall HPWP scale and the Employee Skills and Organizational Structures sub
dimension significantly negatively correlate with the overall Pay Communication scale (p
< .01), the Pay Structure sub-factor (p < .01), the Employee Norms sub-factor (p < .01),
and the Pay Policy Existence sub-factor (p < .05 and p < .01, respectively). The
Employee Motivation sub-dimension significantly negatively correlates with the overall
Pay Communication scale (p < .01) and the Pay Structure sub-factor (p < .01), and has a
significant positive correlation with the Employee Norms sub-factor (p < .01). Neither the
overall HPWP scale nor its two sub-dimensions significantly correlate with the
Organizational Norms sub-factor. Although the HPWP scale and its sub-dimensions
significantly correlate with the Pay Communication scale and most of its sub-dimensions,
the correlations are smaller (except for those regarding the Pay Structure sub-factor) than
the correlations the Pay Communication scale has with other pay communication
measures (e.g., Noy 2007). The larger correlations between the HPWP scale and its sub
dimensions with the Pay Structure sub-factor are not surprising since both the sub-factor
and the HPWP scale measure different organizational practices.
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The comparison of the shared variance (e.g., the square of the correlation) among
the Pay Communication scale and Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale to each of the scales’
AVE was also analyzed. As shown in Table 3.9, the squared correlation of each pair (the
Pay Communication scale or a sub-factor and the HPWP scale or a sub-dimension) was
lower than the AVE for each of the constructs involved. Thus, evidence of discriminate
validity is provided for the Pay Communication scale.

Table 3.9 Squared Correlations and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for Pay
Communication and Dissimilar Measures (Study 3)
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to develop a Pay Communication scale that
evaluated all aspects of pay communication practices involving pay secrecy and pay
openness. This objective was achieved as the scale development and validation process
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was followed precisely and the Pay Communication scale and its sub-dimensions
demonstrated construct validity.
The stage development and validation process encompassed three multistage
studies. Study 1 consisted of two stages. The first stage involved having Human Resource
practitioners that were members of the Society of Human Resource Management
generate items pertaining to all aspects of pay communication practices (pay secrecy and
pay openness). This stage generated 79 items that covered multiple aspects of pay
communication practices. The second stage entailed having a panel of experts (both
Ph.D.’s and doctoral students) evaluate the items generated in the first stage on three
criteria to reduce the items into a manageable representation of pay communication. The
evaluations of the generated items were on the extent to which each item was consistent
with the pay communication description (either pay secrecy or pay openness), its
generalizability to a wide variety of organizations and occupations, and its clarity and
conciseness with editing of the items being allowed. This process resulted in 42 items.
Study 2 involved further refining the items over two stages. The first stage
analyzed the inter-item correlations and variances of the items. This process resulted in
the removal of 4 items, yielding 38 items. The second stage examined the
interrelationships (factor weight and factor loadings) of the items in an exploratory factor
analysis. A principal axis factor analysis with a direct oblimon rotation was used to
evaluate the items. This process yielded 22 items loading on four distinct factors, which
were labeled Pay Policy Existence, Pay Structure, Organizational Norms, and Employee
Norms.

139
Study 3 analyzed and confirmed the proposed scale and its dimensionality over
two stages. The first stage involved conducting a confirmatory factor analysis of the
proposed scale and each sub-dimension. Additionally, the 4-factor model was compared
to a 3-factor model, a 2-factor model, and a 1-factor model. This process confirmed that
the overall Pay Communication scale along with each sub-dimension demonstrated a
good fit and reliability. The 4-factor model was identified as having a better fit than the
3-factor model, the 2-factor model, and the 1-factor model. The second stage entailed the
final evaluation of construct validation by providing evidence that the Pay
Communication scale has convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity was
successfully determined by comparing the correlations between the Pay Communication
scale and other pay communication scales (e.g., Day 2006; Mulvey et al. 2002; Noy
2007). Evidence of discriminant validity was provided by analyzing the correlations
between the Pay Communication scale and a High Performance Work Practice scale
(Huselid, 1995). Thus, the Pay Communication scale developed in this paper
demonstrated construct validity.
The development of this Pay Communication scale contributes to the literature by
providing researchers with an inclusive measure that has the ability to accurately measure
many different aspects of pay secrecy and pay openness practices. This scale
encompasses all of the aspects that previous pay communication measures have included,
even though some of the facets are not represented by many items. Additionally, this
scale has a potentially important function in the pay communication research by helping
future researchers build on the limited and sometimes conflicting earlier findings of
studies of pay communication. A possible reason for the underdevelopment and
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inconsistency in the existing research may be due to the lack of an inclusive pay
communication measure, which this paper hopes to resolve by providing a
comprehensive pay communication scale.
Limitations
Although tremendous efforts were taken to strengthen this study’s scale
development methodology, there are some limitations that need to be discussed. First, the
pay communication items generated in Study 1 were produced by members of a
Louisiana SHRM chapter. Therefore, microcultural differences may lead to a discrepancy
in the terminology, comprehension, and participants’ perceptions and reactions to pay
communication practices (e.g. pay secrecy and pay openness approaches). Additionally,
all of this study’s participants worked in their employer’s Human Resources department
and possessed at least a Bachelor’s degree. Therefore, there is a possibility that the
phrasing of some items are more complex than someone possessing less education or HR
experience would comprehend. For instance, the understanding of certain key words,
such as pay structure or model, may be difficult for less educated individuals or those
outside of the Human Resources department.
Another limitation may be that the items are based on self-report and the
participant’s perceptions rather than the actuality of the employing organization’s pay
communication practices. However, some participants may not have knowledge of
certain pay communication practices (such as the existence of a pay secrecy policy or
availability of pay information) or a concern for such practices; therefore, reliance on
participant’s perceptions is considered more necessary and important than gathering
actual pay communication practices information from participant’s employers.
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The possibility that all aspects of pay communication may not be included in the
final scale may also be a limitation. For instance, the availability of a job’s pay average or
median, all of the organizational jobs’ pay ranges, and all of the organizational jobs’ pay
averages are not represented in the final scale. However, the more common forms are
presented in the scale.
The fact that the Employee Norms sub-dimension consists of only two items is
another limitation. However, the researcher is confident that future studies could exclude
this sub-dimension if desired without any problems or difficulties in regards to the
models fit or ability to accurately assess pay communication practices. Additionally,
future research may further develop this sub-dimension by adding additional items.
The generalizability of this scale to countries outside of the U.S. is also a
limitation. Since all of the participants in Study 1 and Study 3 and the majority of the
participants in Study 2 were U.S. residents the scale may not have the ability to properly
and accurately measure pay communication practices of organizations residing in other
countries.
A final limitation is the data collection methods used in this research was
completely online. Therefore, this research has an underrepresentation of employees
lacking internet access. Nonetheless, the researcher believes this did not affect or bias the
scale development process in any manner.
Future Research
Despite these limitations, there are many future directions for the pay
communication literature. First, the utilization of this Pay Communication scale should
aid the pay communication literature in its further expansion. By having this validated
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pay communication scale, the literature should flourish and prosper since it will be easier
to gather information about pay communication practices. Additionally, this scale should
assist in fiirther developing the pay communication literature as it allows researchers to
analyze multiple levels of pay communication practices in one study.
Another future avenue involves the comparison between the overall Pay
Communication scale and the scale without the presence of the Employee Norms sub
dimension by analyzing both measures’ model fit and ability to accurately and
successfully predict employee’s attitudes and behaviors.
Reanalyzing prior conflicting findings in the pay communication literature, such
as those involving the job satisfaction outcome, is also a future route for research
utilizing this scale. Since some of the previous studies conflict with one another, this
scale could help identify whether pay secrecy has a significantly negative or positive
impact on those employee attitudes or behaviors.
The generalizability of this scale to other countries is a final future path that will
be discussed. This scale should be tested in multiple countries to identify its usefulness
and ability to successfully predict non-U.S. employee outcomes. However, the Pay
Communication scale may need to be modified since labor laws differ across countries.

CHAPTER 4

PAY COMMUNICATION AND WORKPLACE DEVIANCE:
THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF AN UNLAWFUL
ORGANIZATIONAL PAY PRACTICE

Organizations vary in the pay communication practices they utilize, with the
majority of U.S. organizations favoring the pay secrecy approach rather than the pay
openness approach (Balkin and Gomz-Mejia 1985; Hmext.com Survey 2001; Lawler
1981; Scott et al. 2003). However, Lawler (e.g., 1965a, 2003) and other researchers (e.g.,
Colella et al. 2007) have spent decades attempting to demonstrate the negative effects of
pay secrecy by showing how it causes misestimations of others’ pay (e.g., Lawler 1965a,
1966), pay dissatisfaction (e.g., Lawler 1967), and reduced performance (e.g., Bamburger
and Belogolovsky 2010), among other things.
This objective of this paper is to further demonstrate the negative effects of pay
secrecy practices by analyzing the relationship pay secrecy has with workplace deviance.
Specifically, pay secrecy is expected to be positively related to workplace deviance.
Additionally, the four sub-dimensions of organizational justice (e.g., distributive and
procedural justice) along with two forms of trust (e.g., organizational and managerial
trust) are anticipated to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace
deviance. Continuance commitment (measured as lack of perceived job alternatives) is
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predicted to have an interaction effect on the pay secrecy-workplace deviance
relationship.
Hypotheses are presented and analyzed using moderated hierarchical regression,
yielding support for the direct relationship and mediating relationships. Additionally,
partial support was found for the moderating relationship. Limitations and future
directions are discussed.

Literature Review
Pay communication is the compensation practice that determines when, how, and
which pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay
levels, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees and
possibly outsiders (termed organizational restrictions) and whether discussions involving
pay information are permitted amongst employees and possibly with outsiders (termed
employee restrictions). The goal of pay communication practices are to support
organizations in achieving their compensation systems’ goals and objectives (Gely and
Bierman 2003), such as increased performance.
Pay communication practices differ among organizations as the degree of these
practices vary by the amount and type of pay information provided or withheld to
employees (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Milkovich and Newman 2005). Therefore,
pay communication practices exist along a continuum and appear in a variety of forms
(Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1981; Lawler and Jenkins 1992; Patten
1978). The two anchors (or commonly acknowledged practices) of the pay
communication continuum are pay secrecy and pay openness. The extent to which a pay
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secrecy or pay openness practice is utilized depends on the needs and strategic goals of
the organization.
Both pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) practices consist of two
aspects. Pay openness is an organizational practice that generally involves (1) the
organization distributing most, if not all, pay information to employees on a regular basis
(usually at specific time intervals such as yearly) or upon request, and (2) employees
being allowed to discuss their personal pay information with other organizational
members (and possibly with outsiders).
Consequently, pay secrecy is an organizational practice that generally (1)
prohibits the organization (and management) from distributing and communicating most,
if not all, pay information to employees (Bamburger and Belogolovsky 2010; Colella et
al. 2007; deCarufel 1986), and (2) involves the adoption of an organizational policy
(usually referred to as a pay secrecy policy but also labeled as pay confidentiality rules;
(Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely and Bierman 2003)) that discourages or forbids
employees to discuss their personal pay information with other organizational members
and possibly with outsiders (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; Bierman and Gely
2004; Burroughs 1982; Colella et al. 2007; Gely and Bierman 2003; Thompson and
Pronsky 1975). A pay secrecy policy practice is usually the most detectable pay
communication practice among employees and is expressed either in writing (such as in
employee manuals) or verbally (such as during an employee orientation or employee
meeting). Organizations may attempt to obtain compliance with a pay secrecy policy
practice by compelling employees to sign a pledge stating they will not discuss pay
information with other organizational members (and possibly with outsiders) or by

146
having policy violators suffer disciplinary consequences (such as termination; (GomezMejia and Balkin 1992)). The pay secrecy policy aspect intensifies as the policy becomes
more concrete or the violation repercussions become more severe.
A variety of pay communication practices (such as mild pay secrecy or moderate
pay openness) reside along the continuum between the complete pay secrecy anchor and
complete pay openness anchor. For instance, a mild pay secrecy practice may involve
employees being provided with only their personal pay information, and pay range and
pay average for their personal pay level, and no existence of a pay secrecy policy;
whereas, a moderate pay openness practice may involve employees being supplied with
their personal pay information, and pay ranges and pay averages for their pay level and
adjacent pay levels in the pay structure.
Despite pay secrecy usually being considered a valuable organizational practice,
the NLRB and the federal court system have consistently ruled pay secrecy policy
practices to be in violation of the NLRA and thus, illegal (Bierman and Gely 2004; Gely
and Bierman 2003). Specifically, a pay secrecy policy practice violates sections 7 and 8
(aXl) of the NLRA since it prohibits employees from discussing their employment
conditions (such as pay information) with other organizational members (King 2003).
However, a pay secrecy policy practice does not violate the NLRA when it only pertains
to managers or is worded to be understood as protecting an organizations’ confidential
information (such as trade secrets or customer information) by prohibiting its disclosure
to unauthorized individuals or entities.
Pay secrecy has been associated with several undesirable attitudinal and
behavioral outcomes, such as lowered pay satisfaction (e.g., Thompson and Pronsky
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1975), and reduced motivation (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1967) and performance (e.g.,
Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; Futrell and Jenkins 1978). These findings should
come as no surprise since the organization is utilizing an unlawful labor practice and
hence demonstrating a disregard for their employees’ rights. These organizations are
setting a bad example for employees and therefore, they cannot expect their employees to
behave ethically and desirably when they are themselves disobeying the rules and
behaving selfishly. Therefore, pay secrecy practices may result in undesirable employee
behaviors, such as workplace deviance. Deviant behaviors, such as employee theft or
withholding effort, may result from employers’ modeling of disregard for rules and lack
of concern for employees’ rights. Workplace deviance has not, to this point, been linked
with pay communication practices (specifically, pay secrecy practices). This study
attempts to fill that void.

Hypotheses Development
Workplace deviance is defined as purposeful, norm-violating behaviors which
have the potential to harm the organization and/or its members (Robinson and Bennett
1995). There are two main types of workplace deviance: interpersonal deviance (deviant
acts directed toward organizational members) and organizational deviance (deviant acts
directed toward the organization; (Bennett and Robinson 2000; Robinson and Bennett
1995,1997)). Some examples of interpersonal deviance are blaming colleagues and
verbal abuse; whereas, some organizational deviance examples are leaving work early
and stealing merchandise or equipment (Bennett and Robinson 2000; Robinson and
Bennett 1995). Workplace deviance is an important organizational concept since it is
estimated to cost organizations millions, if not billions, of dollars annually (Case 2000;
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Harris and Ogbonna 2006). Additionally, prior research suggests that a majority of
employees have participated in some form of workplace deviance (Harper 1990; Harris
and Ogbonna 2002; Slora 1991), with nearly all organizations having suffered from one
of the most costly deviant acts, employee theft (Case 2000; Coffin 2003). For these
reasons, identifying the causes of workplace deviance is imperative for organizations and
their success.
Pay secrecy is expected to be related to workplace deviance for several reasons.
First, human instincts tell us that the connotation of a “secret” is that something is wrong
or bad and consequently, should have detriments. Therefore, pay secrecy leads to the
belief that something is wrong in regards to the compensation system, in that if the
compensation system was fair then why is pay information being hidden? According to
equity theory (Adams 1965), employees continuously compare their ratios of inputs (such
as education, skills, and effort) to outputs (such as pay, benefits, and security) with the
perceived ratios of referent others to determine the fairness of their pay. Additionally,
equity theory claims that employees are more concerned with the relative value rather
than the absolute value of their outcomes (such as pay; (Gerhart and Rynes 2003)).
However, pay secrecy interferes with an employees’ ability to make accurate pay
comparisons since it prohibits the needed pay information from being known.
Consequently, pay secrecy causes employees to play a guessing game in where they and
others are positioned within the pay structure. An underlying assumption of this pay
estimation guessing game is the presence of unfairness due to the possibility of pay
discrimination, bias, and/or blatant mistakes (Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971,1990).
This unfair assumption arises from thoughts such as “if pay is fair and there is no bias,

149
discrimination, or errors then why am I not provided the information?” Therefore, pay
secrecy is likely to cause perceptions of pay unfairness or injustice, particularly under
reward inequity where the employees’ ratio is less than (or smaller) than the referent
others’ ratio. Additionally, employees are more inclined to generate inaccurate
estimations of others’ pay under pay secrecy conditions due to the required information
needed to generate accurate pay estimations being unavailable, hidden, or otherwise
unknown (Domstein 1989; Lawler 1965a, 1965b). For instance, prior research has found
that under pay secrecy conditions employees tend to overestimate their subordinates’ and
peers’ pay (Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1967,1972; Mahoney and Weitzel 1978; Milkovich
and Anderson 1972); thus, escalating the sense of unfairness and pay injustice,
specifically inciting perceptions of an under-reward inequity. Equity theory argues that
unfairness perceptions (specifically, under-reward inequity) create feelings of tension and
anger within employees (Homans 1961; Jaques 1961), which in turn, cause employees to
attempt to reduce the dissonance and to restore justice (and equity) by engaging in a
variety of cognitive and/or behavioral methods (such as modifying or distorting inputs
and outcomes). Feelings of relative deprivation and anger may cause employees to
engage in selfish and uncooperative behaviors (such as workplace deviance) in order to
restore equity and compensate for the under-reward inequity. Additionally, prior research
has demonstrated that employees have a propensity to engage in deviant behaviors when
they are reacting to perceptions of unfairness or injustice (e.g., Ambrose, Seabright, and
Schminke 2002; Aquino and Douglas 2003; Aquino, Galperin, and Bennett 2004;
Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield 1999; Greenberg 1990a, 1993; Harder 1992; Skarlicki and
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Folger 1997; Thau, Crossley, Bennett, and Sczesny 2007; Zoghbi-manrigue-de-lara
2010). Therefore, pay secrecy is expected to be related to workplace deviance.
Another reason for the expected relationship between pay secrecy and workplace
deviance is due to feelings of uncertainty. A “secret” creates uncertainty for individuals
with whom the information is withheld. Therefore, pay secrecy creates uncertainty for
(uninformed) employees since they are unaware of their personal organizational value in
comparison to other organizational members. According to uncertainty management
theory (Lind and van den Bos 2002; van den Bos and Lind 2002), employees have a
natural predisposition to manage or decrease uncertainty by engaging in certain coping
mechanisms, such as relying on fairness information and perceptions. These fairness
perceptions assist employees in managing the uncertainty because it relieves employee’s
fears of being taken advantage of in a social exchange with the organization by giving
employees confidence that they will obtain desired outcomes (Lind and van den Bos
2002; Thau, Aquino, and Wittek 2007). However, as previously argued, perceptions of
pay fairness are likely to be negative, specifically creating an under-reward inequity,
under pay secrecy conditions. Additionally, uncertainty management theory asserts that
when uncertainty is accompanied with unfairness perceptions, employees will attempt to
reduce the uncertainty by taking control of their own future and outcomes through
participation in selfish and possibly harmful behaviors and acts (Lind and van den Bos
2002). Therefore, one way employees may react to the enhanced sense of injustice
brought on by uncertainty is to engage in workplace deviance (Colella et al. 2007; Lind
and van den Bos 2002).Supporting uncertainty management theory, previous research has
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shown that uncertainty joined with unfairness perceptions increase workplace deviance
(e.g., Thau, Aquino, et al. 2007).
Finally, employees (in the U.S.) believe they have the right to free speech (due to
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution), such as deciding who they discuss their
employment conditions (such as pay information) with, and take any intrusion on this
privilege personally and find it threatening. Pay secrecy challenges and intrudes on the
employee’s freedom and privileges (or what they believe their rights to be) by prohibiting
employees from discussing their personal pay information with other organizational
members (and possibly with outsiders) and thereby, creating a sense of powerlessness.
Reactance theory (Brehm 1966) argues that when the employee’s autonomy or freedom
to engage in a certain behavior (such as discuss pay information) is threatened, reduced,
or eliminated, the behavior becomes more enticing. Additionally, reactance theory argues
that employees will become motivated to restore their power and freedom, and
consequently, engage in a “reactance” (Brehm 1966). Moreover, reactance theory
suggests that employees who feel constrained and incapable of improving their powerless
situation may become frustrated which, in turn, causes a negative and destructive form of
“reactance” to occur, such as workplace deviance (Allen and Greenberger 1980; Mitchell,
Vogel, Bennett, and Crossley 2011; Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder 1982; Spector 1978).
Previous research has demonstrated that perceptions of powerlessness are associated with
increases in workplace deviance (e.g., Bennett 1998).
Based on the above arguments, pay secrecy is expected to be associated with
higher levels of workplace deviance since employees are attempting to offset negative
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emotions (such as uncertainty, powerlessness, or anger) or retaliate for perceived
injustices. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 1: Pay secrecy is positively related to workplace deviance.

Being that the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance is to
some extent based on fairness perceptions, organizational justice dimensions (such as
distributive and procedural justice) may serve as possible mediators.
Mediators
Organizational justice (Greenberg 1987) is a multidimensional construct that
attempts to use fairness judgments or perceptions about the organizations’ treatment
toward the employee (such as pay outcomes or pay process explanations) to explain the
employee’s engagement in certain organizational attitudes and behavior (Cloutier and
Vilhuber 2007; Colquitt 2001; Greenberg 1990b), such as workplace deviance (CohenCharash and Spector 2001; Johns 2001). Organizational justice principles suggest that
employee attitudes and behaviors are typically exhibited in a reciprocative and
complementary manner to that of the organizations’ treatment. Therefore, positive
judgments or perceptions of fairness suggest a social exchange relationship and are
expected to produce cooperative and organizationally beneficial attitudes and behaviors
(such as organizational commitment and trust; (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001;
DeConinck 2010)); whereas, negative judgments or perceptions of injustice propose an
economical exchange relationship (Organ 1990) and are inclined to incite uncooperative,
selfish and potentially harmful attitudes and behaviors (such as workplace deviance;
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(Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Johns 2001)). There are four distinct organizational
justice dimensions (Colquitt 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001): distributive justice (Adams
1965), procedural justice (Leventhal 1980; Leventhal et al. 1980; Thibaut and Walker
1975), and interactional justice (Bies and Moag 1986) which is comprised of
informational and interpersonal justice (Greenberg 1990a, 1993). All of the dimensions
are expected to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.
Distributive justice refers to the fairness perceptions associated with the outcomes
(such as pay) distributed (Colquitt 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001; Greenberg 1990a).
Distributive justice (or injustice) is determined in the same manner as previously
described for equity theory, where employees compare their personal outcomes to the
outcomes of referent others. However, pay secrecy prevents employees from knowing the
outcomes (or pay) of other organizational members. Thus, pay outcome inferences are
based on a guessing game where pay estimations are mainly derived from innuendo and
gossip (deCarufel 1986). As previously mentioned, employees have a tendency to make
inaccurate pay estimations (such as overestimate peers’ and subordinates’ pay) under pay
secrecy conditions (e.g., Lawler 1965a, 1965b, 1967,1972; Mahoney and Weitzel 1978;
Milkovich and Anderson 1972), which lead to negative pay comparisons and perceptions
of unfairness and injustice.
As previously mentioned, equity theory (Adams 1965) states that employees
continuously compare their ratios of inputs (such as education, skills, and effort) to
outputs (such as pay, benefits, and security) with the perceived ratios of referent others
(such as peers or subordinates) to determine the fairness of their pay. However,
employees are unable to generate accurate pay comparisons under pay secrecy conditions
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due to certain pay information about referent others being concealed. Therefore, pay
secrecy is likely to generate inaccurate pay comparisons, particularly an under-reward
inequity, causing negative perceptions of distributive justice. Additionally, equity theory
(Adams 1965) argues that perceptions of injustice (or an under-reward inequity) will
cause employees to feel anger, tension, and relative deprivation (Homans 1961; Jaques
1961) which, in turn, leads employees to engage in a variety of cognitive and/or
behavioral methods to reduce these negative feelings and restore fairness. These different
techniques used to counteract or compensate for the perceived inequity or unfairness are
likely to be selfish, deviant, and possibly harmful behaviors, such as workplace deviance
(e.g., Ambrose et al. 2002; Aquino and Douglas 2003; Aquino et al. 2004; Aquino et al.
1999; Greenberg 1990a, 1993; Harder 1992; Skarlieki and Folger 1997; Thau, Crossley et
al. 2007; Zoghbi-manrigue-de-lara 2010). Therefore, distributive justice is expected to
mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Thus, the
following hypothesis is presented:

Hypothesis 2a: Perceptions o f distributive justice mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.

Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness associated with the process and
procedures used to determine outcome distribution (Colquitt 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001;
Greenberg 1990a). There are several criteria (or standards) that a process should possess
in order for the process to be perceived as fair or justified: accuracy, consistency, bias
suppression or neutrality, representation of all entities affected, comprehensiveness,
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social morality, and opportunity to correct mistakes (Folger and Konovsky 1989;
Leventhal 1980; Leventhal et al. 1980). However, perceptions of procedural justice are
likely to be affected by pay secrecy since the existence of the criteria (such as accurate
and unbiased) cannot be verified due to a lack of pay information (Noy 2007). Pay
secrecy hinders an employees’ ability to ensure pay processes use only accurate and all
pertinent information and that the same procedures are used for all organizational
members (Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010; Greenberg 1990b). Further, pay secrecy
implies that the pay process suffers from bias, errors, or discrimination because pay
information is hidden and employees are unable to undoubtedly know the process is free
from such blunders (Andersson-Straberg et al. 2007; Bamberger and Belogolovsky 2010;
Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008; Colella et al. 2007; Lawler 1971,1990). Therefore,
perceptions of procedural injustice are likely to prevail under pay secrecy conditions
since employees cannot determine that the procedures used to determine their outcomes
reflect reality and were accurate, unbiased, and consistent with other employees’
procedures (e.g., Noy 2007).
Informational justice refers to the amount, quality, and timing of information
provided to employees that explain the procedures used to determine outcomes (Bies et
al. 1993; Greenberg 1993). Perceptions of informational justice (rather than injustice) are
likely to prevail when the information is accurate, complete, and given in a timely
manner. Pay secrecy is clearly expected to negatively affect informational justice since it
restricts the amount of pay information given to employees. Additionally, informational
unfairness perceptions are likely to emerge when the available pay information has flaws
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(such as inaccuracy, incompleteness, or contains errors) or is given in an untimely
manner (such as six months after pay decisions are made).
Interpersonal justice refers to the extent to which employees are treated with
politeness, dignity, and respect from the organization (usually from their immediate boss
or superiors) when procedures used to determine their outcomes are executed (Greenberg
1990b, 1993). Employees receiving considerate and courteous treatment when being
provided pay information are likely to experience positive perceptions of interpersonal
justice. Pay secrecy is likely to lead to perceptions of interpersonal injustice since
superiors are not allowed to supply pay information which may cause them to appear
rude, insensible, or disrespectftd to employees and their feelings.
Since pay secrecy practices may have implications for procedural, informational,
and interpersonal justice, fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001) explains how these
judgments may play a role in the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship. Fairness
heuristic theory (Lind 2001) claims that an employees’ overall perception of specific
organizational fairness judgments (such as overall procedural, informational, or
interpersonal justice not necessarily pertaining to pay) will assist employees in making
inferences about more specific fairness judgments (such as pay process, pay information,
and treatment when receiving pay information) when there is a lack of information
regarding these specific judgments. Therefore, employees will use their judgments about
other organizational factors (such as procedures, information, and treatment regarding
other organizational matters) to create inferences about the pay processes, pay
information, and treatment when receiving pay information (such as procedural,
informational, and interpersonal justice in regards to pay). Consequently, employees may
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use fairness perceptions involving promotion or disciplinary processes to generate
procedural justice perceptions (in regards to pay). Additionally, informational justice
perceptions (in regards to pay) may be created by the employees’ perception of available
information about promotion opportunities, while treatment during employee meetings
may generate interpersonal justice perceptions (in regards to pay).
Furthermore, fairness heuristic theory (Lind 2001) argues that when other
organizational factors (such as procedures, information, and treatment regarding other
organizational matters) cannot assist in generating inferences about fairness then other
justice (dimension) perceptions (such as distributive justice) will assist in making
inferences, even when these other justice perceptions do not pertain or relate to the
missing fairness judgment. Therefore, when distributive justice is viewed as being unfair
(or fair) then procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice will also appear as being
unfair (or fair). As previously argued, distributive justice is expected to be negative (or
unfair) since pay secrecy is likely to generate inaccurate pay comparisons (such as under
reward inequity). Therefore, the expected perceptions of distributive injustice may lead
perceptions of procedural, informational, and interpersonal justice to be negative,
resulting in feelings of injustices. Perceptions of injustice are likely to cause employees to
feel anger and tension (Homans 1961) which, in turn, may lead employees to engage in
deviant behaviors to restore justice. Thus, procedural, informational, and interpersonal
justice may mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and employee deviance. Thus,
the following hypotheses are presented:
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Hypothesis 2b: Perceptions ofprocedural justice mediate the relationship
between p a y secrecy and workplace deviance.

Hypothesis 2c: Perceptions o f interpersonaljustice mediate the relationship
between p a y secrecy and workplace deviance.

Hypothesis 2d: Perceptions o f informational justice mediate the relationship
between p a y secrecy and workplace deviance.

Along with these fairness perceptions, trust in the organizational setting may also
play a role in the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship. Trust is defined as the
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor,
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party (Mayer, Davis, and
Schoorman 1995, p.712). The definition of trust involves two parties: the trustor (the
trusting party such as the employee) and the trustee (the party to be trusted such as
management and the employing organization; (Driscoll 1978; Mayer et al. 1995; Scott
1980)). A trustee needs to be perceived as being “trustworthy” to gain the trustors’
confidence (or trust). Trustworthiness is best explained by three characteristics: ability
(the skills that gives the trustee influence to achieve the trustors’ objective), benevolence
(the degree to which the trustee wants to help, instead of just profit from the trustor), and
integrity (the trustors’ approval regarding the set of principles that the trustee follows;
(Mayer et al. 1995)). A trustee is considered “trustworthy” when high levels of all three

159
characteristics are possessed. However, when a trustee is not perceived as “trustworthy,”
the trustor distrusts the trustee. Trust ranges on a continuum with complete trust and
absolute distrust being the opposing extremes on the continuum (Schoorman, Mayer, and
Davis 2007). Additionally, trust can be acquired or proffered by individuals, groups, and
organizations (Schoorman et al. 2007). Managerial trust refers to the amount of trust an
employee has in his/her immediate boss and/or superiors. Organizational trust refers to
the amount of trust an employee has in his/her employing organization.
An employees’ level of trust is based on past organizational treatment and the
likelihood of future treatment being fairly similar (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Deutsch
1958). Social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005) argues that a
source’s attitudes and behaviors will be similarly reproduced to those exhibited from the
original source during interactions. Therefore, when employees believe that management
(such as their immediate supervisor) or their employing organization trusts (or distrusts)
them, they will in return trust (or distrusts) management or the organization. Higher
levels of (managerial or organizational) trust are likely to motivate employees to partake
in certain attitudes and behaviors that are desired by management and/or the organization
(e.g., cooperative behaviors such as organizational citizenship behaviors) in hopes of
maintaining and further developing the relationship. However, lower levels of
(managerial or organizational) trust (or distrust) are likely to cause employees to engage
in selfish or uncooperative behaviors, such as workplace deviance (Thau, Crossley, et al.
2007). Pay secrecy implies that the organization (and perhaps management) distrusts their
employees since openness (e.g., no secrets) is needed for generating trust (Colella et al.
2007; Lawler 1981; Mayer et al. 1995). Additionally, immediate supervisors may exhibit
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lower levels of employee trust (or distrust) under pay secrecy conditions when they do
not supply employees with additional pay information upon their request When
employees perceive management or the organization to be distrustful due to pay secrecy
practices, employees are more likely to engage in workplace deviance since they cannot
depend on management or the organization to make fair and sensible decisions involving
pay. Therefore, the overall perception of (managerial or organizational) trust is expected
to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Thus, the
following hypotheses are proposed:

Hypothesis 3a: Perceptions o f organizational trust mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance.

Hypothesis 3b: Perceptions o f managerial trust mediate the relationship between
p a y secrecy and workplace deviance.

Along with these mediating variables, the relationship between pay secrecy and
workplace deviance may be moderated by the employee’s continuance commitment. The
overall model is shown in Figure 3.1.
Moderator
Even though prior research has not demonstrated a significant relationship
between continuance commitment and workplace deviance (e.g., Gill, Meyer, Lee, Shin,
and Yoon 2011; Haden, Caruth, and Oyler 2011), continuance commitment may play a
significant moderating role in the pay secrecy and workplace deviance relationship.

Continuance commitment is a component of the organizational commitment
conceptualization and consists of two aspects: (1) lack of perceived job alternatives, and
(2) personal sacrifices or loss of side-bets and investments (Allen and Meyer 1990;
Carson and Carson 2002; Taing, Granger, Groff, Jackson, and Johnson 2011).
Specifically, the former factor is expected to moderate the relationship between pay
secrecy and workplace deviance. The fewer job alternatives perceived by an employee,
the stronger the employees’ level of continuance commitment to their employing
organization. Additionally, employees experiencing higher levels of continuance
commitment tend not to perform beyond what is required to maintain their employment
(Meyer and Allen, 1997). In addition, employees with only a few job alternatives cannot
risk their current employment.

Figure 4.1 Overall Proposed Model

Distributive Justice
Procedural Justice
Interpersonal Justice
Informational Justice
Organizational Trust
Managerial Trust

Pay
Secrecy

Workplace
Deviance

Continuance
Commitment
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Power dependence theoiy (Emerson 1972; Molm 2003) explains how continuance
commitment may interact with the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace
deviance. Power dependence theory argues that in an exchange relationship powerful
employees have very little dependence on their partner (Emerson 1972). Consequently,
employees who have power or many job opportunities will not be reliant on their current
employment and thereby, their willingness to behave cooperatively with their employing
organization will more likely be lower than those who are dependent on their job and
have fewer job alternatives (Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 1999). The implication is
that employees experiencing lower levels of continuance commitment have the option to
leave their job if they want. Additionally, power dependence theory suggests that non
powerful employees (or those who have few job alternatives) will behave rationally and
cooperatively (such as by not participating in workplace deviance) since they do not want
to put their current employment at risk even under pay secrecy conditions. However,
employees experiencing lower levels of continuance commitment under pay secrecy
conditions may not engage in deviant behaviors since, as was previously argued, they
have multiple job opportunities and thereby, have the ability to quit their employment
(and escape the pay secrecy practices) and easily find a different job. Therefore, since
employees with many job alternatives have the ability to find new employment and those
with few job alternatives cannot endanger their current employment, continuance
commitment should mitigate, if not completely eliminate, the relationship between pay
secrecy and workplace deviance. Thus, power dependence theory implies that the
interaction between pay secrecy and continuance commitment will not impact workplace
deviance. Based on this argument, the following hypothesis is proposed:
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Hypothesis 4: Continuance commitment moderates the relationship between pay
secrecy and workplace deviance such that when continuance commitment is low
and pay communication is high (e.g., pay secrecy), workplace deviance will be
higher than when both continuance commitment and pay communication are
high.

Methods
Sample
Participants were recruited using a third party online survey organization (e.g.,
Mechanical Turk). Those who completed the anonymous survey were compensated one
dollar directly by the online survey organization. The respondents were completely
anonymous to the researcher. There were 611 participants. The majority of the
participants were female (57.9%), Caucasian (73.6%), workingfull-time (81.5%), had no
labor union involvement for their job or any jobs in their organization (73.3%), and
possessed at least a bachelor’s degree (70.5%). The participants’ ages ranged from 18 to
68 with over 40% of the participants being in their twenties and a third of the participants
(33.4%) being in their thirties. The mean age was thirty-four. Most of the participants had
been with their current employer for one to five years (55%) and were classified as an
‘employee’ with no managerial duties (62.2%). Refer to table 3.6 for a complete
overview of the descriptive statistics for the sample.
Procedures
Participants were instructed to read an informed consent form approved by the
Internal Review Board at Louisiana Tech University and to provide consent by marking a
box (refer to Appendix G). Additionally, participants were given instructions to answer
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all scale items and twelve demographic questions. Sixteen attentiveness screening items
were also used to ensure participants were paying attention and responding to each
question accurately (e.g., “Mark slightly agree for this item”).
Measures
Refer to Appendix P for the instructions and list of items associated with each
construct’s scale.

Independent Variable. Pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) was
assessed by using the 22-item scale that was developed in the preceding Chapter. This
scale has four sub-dimensions: Pay Policy Existence (PPE), Pay Structure (PS),
Organizational Norms (ON), and Employee Norms (EN). The overall Pay
Communication scale along with each sub-dimension has demonstrated construct validity
and appropriate Cronbach’s alphas of .98 (Pay Communication), .96 (PPE), .92 (PS), .87
(ON), and .74 (EN). The scale was measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher overall scores represent pay
secrecy practices, while lower overall scores represent pay openness practices.

Dependent Variable. Workplace deviance was measured with Bennett and
Robinson’s (2000) scale with additional items from Robinson and Bennett’s (1995)
typology added. This scale was used because previous research has shown it to have
construct validity. There were twenty eight workplace deviance items with eleven
representing interpersonal deviance (ID) items and seventeen representing organizational
deviance (OD). Additionally, Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) workplace deviance scale
had appropriate Cronbach’s alphas of .78 for interpersonal deviance and .81 for
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organizational deviance in the study used for their development. This study produced
Cronbach’s alphas of .91 for workplace deviance, .88 for organizational deviance, and
.87 for interpersonal deviance. All of the workplace deviance items were measured using
a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (never), 1 (once a year), 2 (twice a year), 3 (several times a
year), 4 (monthly), 5 (weekly), and 6 (daily).

Mediating Variables. All of the organizational justice dimensions were measured
with Colquitt’s (2001) organizational justice scale, which subdivided into four scales
analyzing the four separate dimensions of justice. Specifically, distributive justice was
measured with four items which pertain to the degree of fairness employees perceive
about their level of pay. Procedural justice was measured with seven items which pertain
to the degree of fairness employees perceive about the processes used to determine their
pay level. Informational justice was measured with five items which pertain to the
adequacy of pay information communicated to employees, including the explanation of
the pay processes. Interpersonal justice was measured with four items which pertain to
the quality of treatment employees endure during the process of determining pay and/or
communicating pay information. Colquitt’s (2001) measures were used because previous
research has shown each measure to have construct and predictive validity for important
organizational outcomes. Additionally, all of the justice measures had appropriate
Cronbach’s alphas in the developmental research, ranging from .78 to .92 in the study
involving students, and ranging from .90 to .93 in the study involving employees
(Colquitt 2001). In this study, the Cronbach’s alphas range from .85 to .97. Additionally,
all of the justice measures used a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (almost never),
2 (to a small extent), 3 (somewhat), 4 (to a large extent), and 5 (always).
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Managerial trust was measured using Schoorman and Ballinger’s (2006) 7-item
scale because it has displayed construct validity throughout previous research with an
appropriate Cronbach’s alpha of .84 in the developmental research. The items pertain to
the degree of trust employees have for their manager who determines their pay. This
study produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .94. The scale was measured using a 5-point
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (somewhat disagree), 3 (neither
agree nor disagree), 4 (somewhat agree), and 5 (strongly agree).
Organizational trust was measured using Robinson’s (1996) 7-item scale because
it has demonstrated construct validity with the developmental research producing
appropriate Cronbach’s alphas of .82 and .87. The items pertain to the degree of trust
employees have for their employing organization. A Cronbach’s alpha of .94 was
produced for this study. The scale was measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (somewhat disagree), 3 (neither agree nor disagree), 4
(somewhat agree), and 5 (strongly agree).

Moderating Variable. Continuance commitment was measured using Carson and
Carson’s (2002) 4-item Low Alternatives (lack of perceived job alternatives) scale
because it has demonstrated construct validity. Additionally, the development study
produced an appropriate Cronbach’s alpha of .74. In this study, a Cronbach’s alpha of .85
was established. The items pertain to the extent of job alternatives or other job options
employees currently have available. The scale was measured using a 5-point Likert-type
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (somewhat disagree), 3 (neither agree nor
disagree), 4 (somewhat agree), and 5 (strongly agree).
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Additional Measures. Organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) were
included in the data collection to counteract the negative effects that may occur due to the
unusual and potentially off-putting nature of the dependent variable (workplace
deviance). OCBs were measured using an adaptation of Williams and Anderson’s (1991)
14-item scale, which encompassed the two sub-dimensions of OCBs: OCBO (OCBOrganizations or generalized compliance) and OCBI (OCB-Individuals or altruism).
Williams and Anderson’s (1991) scale was used because previous research has shown it
to include both sub-dimensions and have construct validity. Additionally, the Cronbach’s
alphas of the two sub-dimension measures were .88 for OCBI and .75 for OCBO in the
study used for the scales development. The nature of the items was adapted to allow the
participants to self-report the behaviors. Additionally, one of the OCBO items was
reverse-coded. The items were measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale matching that
used for the Workplace Deviance scale ranging from 0 (never), 1 (once a year), 2 (twice a
year), 3 (several times a year), 4 (monthly), 5 (weekly), and 6 (daily).

Control Variables. Several demographic variables were controlled for in the
analyses. Age (measured in categorical years: 1 = 18-19 years, 2 = 20-29 years, 3 = 30-39
years, 4 = 40-49 years, 5 = 50-59 years, 6 = 60-68 years) and gender (female = 2, male =
1) were controlled for since males (Hershcovis et al. 2007) and younger employees
(Berry, Ones, and Sackett 2007; Ng and Feldman 2008) have been found to more likely
participate in deviant behaviors. Job tenure (measured in categorical years: 1 = less than 1
year, 2 = 1-5 years, 3 = 6-10 years, 4=11-15 years, 5 = 16-20 years, 6 = 21-25 years, 7 =
26 years or more) and hours worked per week (measured in categories: 1 = less than 10
hours per week, 2 = 10-20 hours per week, 3 = 21-30 [part-time] hours per week, 4 = 30
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[full-time]-40 hours per week, 5 = more than 40 hours per week) were also control
variables since both may impact employee’s managerial and organizational trust due to
having more time and opportunities to develop it (Gilbert and Tang 1998; More and
Tzafrir 2009; Schoorman et al. 2007).

Results
The proposed hypotheses were tested utilizing hierarchical regression analysis.
The predictor variables (e.g., independent, mediating, and moderating variables) were
centered to reduce the effects of non-essential ill conditioning by having the mean
represent a meaningful zero point for better result interpretation (Cohen, Cohen, West,
and Aiken 2003). Additionally, a confirmatoiy factor analysis (CFA) using Amos 20 was
conducted on each scale independently prior to testing the hypotheses to evaluate the fit
of each scale’s measurement model (e.g., the relationship between the items and the
factors). Several Model Fit indices (e.g., CFI, NFI, GFI, RMSEA, and x2) were used to
evaluate the fit of each measure. The CFI, NFI, and GFI indicate a well-fitting model
when values are closer to 1.0; whereas, the RMSEA indicates a well-fitting model when
values are below .08 (Hair et al. 2010). Additionally, Cronbach’s alphas above .70
demonstrate reliability (Hair et al. 2010). The majority of the scales demonstrated a wellfitting model with a few having a moderately-fitting model (refer to Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Measurement Model Fit Indices from Amos

Measurement Model
Pay Communication
Pay Policy Existence
Pay Structure

df CFI NFI GFI RMSEA AVE
x2
.92 .90 .85
.09
67%
1143.85 205
.95 .95 .89
74%
311.76 27
.13
70.32
9
.98 .97 .96
.11
66%

Cronbach’s
a
.98
.96
.92
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Organizational
Norms
Employee Norms
Distributive Justice
Procedural Justice
Interpersonal Justice
Informational Justice
Organizational Trust
Managerial Trust
Continuance
Commitment
Workplace Deviance
Organizational
Deviance
Interpersonal
Deviance

5

.99

.99

.99

.05

57%

.87

2
14
2
5
14
14
2

1.00
.88
1.00
.99
.95
.86
.95

.99
.87
.99
.99
.95
.84
.95

.99
.89
.99
.99
.91
.93
.95

.00
.16
.09
.07
.14
.12
.21

59%
80%
46%
73%
58%
71%
31%
59%

.74
.79
.86
.91
.87
.95
.74
.85

3185.75 350
972.59 119

.61
.76

.55
.73

.61
.80

.12
.11

29%
31%

.92
.88

.84

.83

.86

.13

43%

.89

13.77
-

-

1.14
225.78
11.93
19.08
186.22
145.37
56.79

520.92

44

Note: N = 611

The summary statistics, bivariate correlations, and Cronbach’s alphas are shown
in Table 4.2. The results of the regression analyses for each hypothesis are shown in
separate tables.

Table 4.2 Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alpha Reliabilities
M

SD

1.58
3.00
2.34
4.09
3.86
3.55
3.82
4.53
4.33
2.46
2.92
3.85
3.20
3.41
3.04

.49
1.13
1.04
.86
1.19
1.76
1.71
1.61
1.71
1.18
.93
1.05
1.02
1.08
.69

1

2

3

4

5

-

.10*
.00
-.19**
.07
.03
14**
-.01
.01
-.18**
-.17’*
-.02
-.11”
-.10*
-.07

.47”
.03
.04
.04
-.01
.06
.01
-.02
-.05
-.03
-.01
-.07
-.02

.22*’
-.05
.03
-.02
.10’
-.10*
.01
.01
-.02
.03
.09*
.11”
.03
.03
.05
-.01
.09*
.09*
.03
-.01
.07
.00

r-~©
r

Variable
1. Gender
2. Age
3. Tenure
4. Hours worked per week
5. Pay Communication
6. Pay Policy Existence
7. Pay Structure
8. Organizational Norms
9. Employee Norms
10. Distributive Justice
11. Procedural Justice
12. Interpersonal Justice
13. Informational Justice
14. Organizational Trust
15. Managerial Trust

(.94}
.89
.67”
.82”
.37"
-.28"
-.34”
-.30”
-.36”
-.38”
-.29’*
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Table 4.2 (Continued)
16. Continuance Commitment 3.13 1.01
.09*
17. Workplace Deviance
.96 .78 -.16**
18. Organizational Deviance
1.12 .87 -.10*
19. Interpersonal Deviance______ .71 .89 -.21**
Variable
6. Pay Policy Existence
7. Pay Structure
8. Organizational Norms
9. Employee Norms
10. Distributive Justice
11. Procedural Justice
12. Interpersonal Justice
13. Informational Justice
14. Organizational Trust
15. Managerial Trust
16. Continuance Commitment
17. Workplace Deviance
18. Organizational Deviance
19. Interpersonal Deviance

.09*
-.23*’
-.20**
-.21**

332
-.04
-.07
-.01

-.10*
.08*
.05
.11**

.21**
.10*
.11**
.05

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

(*96),
.34
.68**
.43’*
-.16”
-.21*’
-.23”
-.23”
-.31”
-.25”
.13”
.10*
.08*
.10’

(.92)
.38**
.34”
-.48”
-.60”
-.46”
-.61”
-.55”
-.39”
.25"
.10’
.14”
.02

(.87)
.35”
-.10*
-.08
-.05
-.09*
-.09*
-.11”
.13”
.05
.07
.01

(.74)
-.29
-.35”
-.29"
-.35”
-.40”
-.33"
.07
.16”
.14”
.15”

(.94)
.75
.51”
.67”
.62”
.46”
-.23”
-.07
-.09’
-.03

(.85)
.70
.82**
.73**
.59”
-.24”
-.12”
-.15"
-.05

(.91)
.78
.66”
.62”
-.16”
-.16”
-.15”
-.14**

14
18
19
15
16
17
Variable
13
(.87)
13. Informational Justice
.71
14. Organizational Trust
<94).
.66
.60”
(.74)
15. Managerial Trust
16. Continuance Commitment -.25” -.26” -.24”
(.85)
.05
-.14” -.19” -.17"
17. Workplace Deviance
(.91),
.07
.93
18. Organizational Deviance
-.13” -.19” -.19”
(.88),
.00
-.11” -.13” -.10*
.82** .54
(.87)
19. Interpersonal Deviance
Note: N = 608. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (reliabilities) are shown on the diagonals
in parentheses. Control variables were measured by self-reports and categorical variables.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Hypotheses Tests
Hypothesis 1 proposed that pay secrecy (represented by higher levels of pay
communication) is positively related to workplace deviance. The correlation between pay
communication and workplace deviance is positive and significant (p < .05), showing that
workplace deviance is related to pay secrecy rather than pay openness. This hypothesis
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was tested utilizing Model 2 of Table 4.3, which shows that pay secrecy is significantly
positively related to workplace deviance (0 = .11, p < .01). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is
supported.

Table 4.3 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 1
Workplace Deviance
Model 1
CO.

Variable
Step 1: Control Variables

Model 2
AR2

P

.07**

Age

- .2 2 * *

-.23**

Gender

-.14**

-.15**

Step 2: Independent Variable

.01**

Pay Communication
Total R2
Total F Value
(d f regression, residual)

.11**
.09
18.97*’
(3, 607)

Note: N = 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR1 is based upon variables

included in each step.
> < .0 5 . * > < .0 1 .

The four dimensions of organizational justice were predicted to mediate the
relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Specifically, hypothesis 2a
predicted distributive justice to mediate the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship,
while hypothesis 2b involved procedural justice, hypothesis 2c entailed interpersonal
justice, and hypothesis 2d anticipated informational justice. The results for these
hypotheses are presented in Model 3 of Tables 4.4,4.5,4.6, and 4.7. As shown in Table
4.4., distributive justice significantly mediates the relationship between pay secrecy and
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workplace deviance (p < .05). However, since the pay secrecy-workplace deviance
relationship is reduced from a p of .11 (shown in Model 2) to .09 (shown in Model 3) but
still significant when distributive justice enters the model, only partial mediation is
demonstrated. Thus, hypothesis 2a is supported.

Table 4.4 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2a
Workplace Deviance
Model 1

Step 1: Control Variables
Age

AR2

p

AR2

p

__*♦

.08

- .2 2 * *

-.14**

Gender

CO.

Variable

Model 3

Model 2

Step 2: Main Effect

-.23**

-.23**

-.15**

-.16**

.11**

.09*

.01**

Pay Communication
Step 3: Mediating Effect

.01*
-.08*

Distributive Justice
.09

Total R2
Total F Value
(d f regression, residual)

615.27**
(4,606)

Note: N —611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR1 is based upon variables

included in each step.
*
**
A
p < . 05. p < .01.
-

173
Table 4.5 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2b
Workplace Deviance
Model 1
p

Model 3
CO.

Step 1: Control Variables

AR2

%

Variable

Model 2

AR2

p

.07**

Age

-.22**

-.23**

-.23**

Gender

-.14**

-.15**

-.17**

.01**

Step 2: Main Effect
Pay Communication

.11**
.02**

Step 3: Mediating Effect

-.14**

Procedural Justice
Total R2
Total F Value
(d f regression, residual)

.07

.10
17.22**
(4, 606)
1______

in i

-

l

1

Note: TV= 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR is based upon variables

included in each step.
> < .0 5 . * > < .0 1 .
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Table 4.6 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2c
Workplace Deviance
Model 1

Step 1: Control Variables

AR2

Model 3
CO.

Variable

Model 2
p

AR2

p

.07**

Age

-.22**

-.23**

-.23**

Gender

-.14**

-.15**

-.14**

Step 2: Main Effect

.01**
.11**

Pay Communication

.02**

Step 3: Mediating Effect

-.15**

Interpersonal Justice
Total R2
Total F Value
(d f regression, residual)

.07

.11
18.20**
(4,606)

Note: N = 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR1 is based upon variables

included in each step.
*p < .05. * > < .0 1 .
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Table 4.7 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 2d
Workplace Deviance
Model 1
Variable
Step 1: Control Variables

AR2

Model 2
p

AR2

Model 3
p

AR2

p

.07**

Age

-.22**

-.23**

-.22**

Gender

-.14**

-.15**

-.16**

.01**

Step 2: Main Effect
Pay Communication

.11**

Step 3: Mediating Effect

.06
.01**
-.13**

Informational Justice
Total R2
Total F Value
(d f regression, residual)

.10
16.79**
(4, 606)

Note: N = 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR2 is based upon variables

included in each step.
> < .0 5 . * > < .0 1 .

Tables 4.5 to 4.7 show that procedural justice, interpersonal justice, and
informational justice significantly mediate the pay secrecy-workplace deviance
relationship (p < .01).Since the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance
becomes nonsignificant once the mediating variable (e.g., procedural, interpersonal, and
informational justice) is included in the model, full mediation is displayed. Thus,
hypothesis 2b, 2c, and 2d are supported.
Two forms of trust were also expected to mediate the pay secrecy-workplace
deviance relationship. Specifically, organizational trust (in hypothesis 3a) and managerial
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trust (in hypothesis 3b) were predicted to mediate the relationship between pay secrecy
and workplace deviance. Job tenure and hours worked per week were initially included in
the hypothesis testing; however, due to their nonsignificance, both were removed and the
hypotheses were tested without them. Model 3 of Tables 4.8 and 4.9 reveal that
organizational trust and managerial trust significantly mediate the pay secrecy-workplace
deviance relationship (p < .01). Additionally, organizational trust and managerial trust
fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance since the
relationship is not statistically significant once the mediating variable (e.g.,
organizational and managerial trust) is added to the model. Thus, hypothesis 3a and 3b
are supported.

Table 4.8 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 3a
Workplace Deviance
Model 1
CO.

Step 1: Control Variables

V

Variable

Model 2
A/?2

Model 3
p

p

AR2

.07**

Age

-.22**

-.23**

-.24**

Gender

-.14**

-.15**

-.16**

Step 2: Main Effect

.01**

Pay Communication
Step 3: Mediating Effect

.03
-.20

Organizational Trust
Total/?2
Total F Value
{d f regression, residual)

.04

.11**

.12
20.64**
(4,606)
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Table 4.8 (Continued)
Note: N = 6 \ \ . Standardized beta coefficients are shown. A/f2 is based upon variables

included in each step.
*p < .05. * * p < . 01.

Table 4.9 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 3b
Workplace Deviance
Model 1
Variable
Step 1: Control Variables

Model 2
P

AR2

A/f2

Model 3
p

A/f2

P

.07**

Age

-.22**

-.23**

-.22**

Gender

-.14**

-.15**

-.15**

.01**

Step 2: Main Effect

.11**

Pay Communication

.06
.02**

Step 3: Mediating Effect

-.16**

Managerial Trust
.11

Total /f2
Total F Value
(d f regression, residual)

18.54**
(4,606)

Note: iV= 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR is based upon variables

included in each step.
p < .0 5 . p < .01.
*

** -

* *

^

„

Hypothesis 4 anticipated continuance commitment moderating the pay secrecyworkplace deviance relationship such that workplace deviance will be higher when
continuance commitment is low and pay communication is high (e.g., pay secrecy) than
when both continuance commitment and pay communication are high. As shown in Table
4.10, the interaction effect is not significant.

178
Table 4.10 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 4
Workplace Deviance
Model 1

P

©
*#

Step 1: Control Variables

A/f2

Model 3
CO.

CO.

Variable

Model 2

Age

-.22**

-.23**

-.23**

Gender

-.14**

-.15**

-.15**

Pay Communication

.10*

.10*

Continuance Commitment

.06

.06

.02**

Step 2: Main Effect

Step 3: Interaction Effect

.00

Pay Communication x
Continuance Commitment
Total R2
Total F Value
( df regression, residual)

-.02
.09
11.91**
(5,605)

Note: N = 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. AR1 is based upon variables

included in each step.
*p < .05. **/?<.01.

However, being that both the pay communication and workplace deviance
constructs are comprised of sub-dimensions, pairs consisting of a pay communication
sub-dimension (e.g., pay policy existence, pay structure, organizational norms, and
employee norms) with the workplace deviance sub-dimensions (e.g., organizational and
interpersonal deviance) were analyzed to identify whether continuance commitment has a
significant interaction effect for a portion of the pay secrecy-workplace deviance
relationship. Continuance commitment was found to significantly moderate only one
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relationship, the pay structure-interpersonal deviance relationship (p < .10). Refer to
Table 4.11. The interaction is plotted in Figure 4.2. Additionally, a simple slope analysis
was conducted to confirm the significance of the interaction effect. The results of the
simple slope of workplace deviance involving high levels of pay structure (e.g., pay
secrecy) and low levels of continuance commitment is significant (simple slope -.102), t
(605) = 3.226, p < .001. The simple slope of workplace deviance when both pay
communication and continuance commitment levels are high is nonsignificant (simple
slope -.032), t (605) = -1.012, p < .312. Thus, there is some support for hypothesis 4.

Table 4.11 Additional Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 4
Interpersonal Deviance
Model 1

Model 2

CO.

Variable

M2

Model 3
p

p

AR2

1
*
»

00
©

Step 1: Control Variables
Age

-.20

Gender

-.20

-.20**

-.20**

-.20**

-.20

Pay Structure

.04

.04

Continuance Commitment

.03

.03

_

^

**
.00

Step 2: Main Effect

.01+

Step 3: Interaction Effect
Pay Structure x Continuance
Commitment
Total R2
Total F Value
(d f regression, residual)

-.07+
.09
11.97**
(5,605)
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Table 4.11 (Continued)
Note: N - 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. A/J2 is based upon variables

included in each step.
^ p <.10. *p <.05. *p<.01.

Figure 4.2 Plot of Interaction Effect between Pay Structure and Workplace Deviance
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Discussion
This study contributes to two different management fields: pay communication
and workplace deviance. These findings contribute much needed empirical data to the
underdeveloped pay communication literature by demonstrating that pay secrecy can
have a negative effect on employee behavior, other than performance (e.g., Bamberger
and Belogolovsky 2010) and attitudes (e.g., satisfaction: Cloutier and Vilhuber 2008).
Additionally, the discovery of the significant mediating effect of the organizational
justice sub-dimensions (e.g., distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational
justice), and organizational and managerial trust on the pay secrecy-workplace deviance
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relationship assists both researchers and organizations in understanding why pay secrecy
practices may lead employees to engage in deviant behaviors. Additionally, the finding of
continuance commitment (or the lack of perceived job alternatives) impacting a portion
of the pay secrecy-workplace deviance relationship (through the pay structure and
interpersonal deviance sub-dimensions) demonstrates that there are factors outside o f the
organizations’ control that can influence the relationship even though the pay
communication practice (e.g., pay secrecy) is within control of the organization.
The findings of this study also contribute to the workplace deviance literature by
showing that a common organizational practice such as pay secrecy can be associated
with higher levels of deviant acts. Interestingly, the participants of this study were rather
honest as 98.5% of the sample (602 of 611 participants) admitted to engaging in some
deviant act within the past six months. This extreme honesty, which is most likely due to
the complete anonymity guaranteed to all participants, helps researchers and
organizations better understand the amount of deviant behaviors occurring in the
workplace.
Limitations
Although tremendous efforts were taken to strengthen the methodology of this
study, there are several limitations. First, the research design is cross-sectional and
therefore, causal inferences are not warranted.
Additionally, the data collection being self-report is another potential limitation.
However, the nature of the constructs being measured (e.g., perceptions of the pay
communication practices utilized by the employing organization, attitudes towards
organizational justice and trust, and participation in deviant behaviors) required the use of
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self-report data since only the employee can accurately respond to items pertaining to
their perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Also, employees tend to keep their
engagement of deviant behaviors secret from other organizational members (Spector,
1992), thereby making self-report data necessary.
Social desirability bias is another potential limitation. However, the guarantee of
anonymity to all participants and the finding of 98.5% of the sample admitting to
engaging in some type of deviant behavior in the past six months shows that social
desirability is unlikely to be an issue in this study.
Another potential limitation is common method variance. However, the guarantee
of anonymity to all participants (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff 2003;
Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira 2010) and the finding of a statistically significant interaction
(Evans 1985) show this study most likely does not suffer from common method variance.
The scale used to measure continuance commitment may be another limitation.
Being that only one aspect of continuance commitment (e.g., lack of perceived job
alternatives) was used to measure the overall construct, additional and/or more significant
findings of continuance commitment moderating the pay secrecy-workplace deviance
relationship may have resulted if the other aspect (e.g., personal sacrifices or loss of sidebets and investments) was included in the measure.
A final limitation of this study is the external validity of the results. The findings
may not be generalizable to countries other than the U.S. since the sample was comprised
of U.S. residents.
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Future Research
There are several directions future research may pursue. First, analyses
determining whether and how each pay communication sub-dimension is significantly
related to workplace deviance and each of its sub-dimensions are warranted. The
relationship of pay secrecy (higher levels of the pay communication sub-dimensions)
being more significantly positively associated with organizational deviance than
interpersonal deviance is expected since pay communication practices are within the
control of the organization; however, it is unknown which pay communication sub
dimension (e.g., Pay Policy Existence versus Pay Structure) will have higher associations
with each workplace deviance sub-dimension.
Another future direction is the inclusion of other moderators impacting the pay
secrecy-workplace deviance relationship. Specifically, moderating variables that are
within the organizations’ control should be investigated to show the organizations that are
utilizing pay secrecy practices how they could potentially minimize workplace deviance.
Also, continuance commitment should be reanalyzed as a moderating variable but with
both aspects of continuance commitment being analyzed.
Finally, generalizing these findings to countries other than the U.S. is another
future path. Even though the labor laws may differ between countries, employee
compensation and the organizational pay practices (e.g., pay communication practices)
used in different countries may resemble that of the U.S, especially in developed
countries. Therefore, it may be beneficial to conduct an international study analyzing the
relationship between pay communication and workplace deviance.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this dissertation was to extend the pay communication
literature through a further understanding of pay secrecy and pay openness practices. This
objective was achieved by successfully developing a pay communication scale that
encompasses all aspects of pay communication and then utilizing the pay communication
scale to determine pay secrecy’s influence on workplace deviance.
Chapter 3 involved the development of a pay communication scale with pay
secrecy and pay openness representing the extremes. Three multistage studies were
conducted to properly develop and validate the pay communication scale. The first stage
of Study 1 involved having human resources practitioners and the researcher generate a
pool of 79 items pertaining to different aspects of pay communication practices. Then a
panel o f experts reviewed and evaluated the generated items on three criteria (e.g.,
consistency with the pay communication description, generalizability to a wide variety of
organizations and occupations, and clarity and conciseness) in the second stage of Study
1. This process resulted in 42 items.
Study 2 consisted of further refining the generated items by analyzing the inter
item correlations, variances, and factor loadings of each item in an exploratory factor
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analysis. These procedures yielded 22 items loadings on four distinct factors: Pay Policy
Existence, Pay Structure, Organizational Norms, and Employee Norms.
The first stage of Study 3 involved conducting a confirmatory factor analysis to
validate the proposed 22-item scale and dimensionality (four sub-dimensions). The 4factor model demonstrated the overall better model fit in comparison to the 1-factor, 2factor, and 3-factor models. The second stage of Study 3 verified construct validation for
the Pay Communication scale by providing evidence of convergent and discriminant
validity. Convergent validity was determined by analyzing the correlations between the
developed Pay Communication scale and other pay communication scales (e.g., Noy
2007). Discriminant validity was established by evaluating the shared variance between
the developed Pay Communication scale and a High Performance Work Practices scale
(e.g., Huselid 1995).
Chapter 4 examined the relationship pay communication has with workplace
deviance. Specifically, pay secrecy is expected to positively influence workplace
deviance. This prediction is based on equity theory (Adams 1965), uncertaintiy
management theory (Lind and van den Bos 2002), and reactance theory (Brehm 1966).
Additionally, the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance is anticipated
to be mediated by distributive justice (based on equity theory; (Adams 1965)), procedural
justice (based on fairness heuristic theory; (Lind 2001)), interpersonal justice (based on
fairness heuristic theory; (Lind 2001)), informational justice (based on fairness heuristic
theory; (Lind 2001)), organizational trust and managerial trust (based on social exchange
theory; (Blau 1964)). Continuance commitment is also predicted to moderate the pay
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secrecy-workplace deviance relationship (based on power dependence theory; (Emerson
1972; Molm 2003)). A summary of the hypotheses and their results are presented below.

Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Hypothesis 1
It is predicted that pay secrecy is positively related to workplace deviance.
Supported, pay secrecy is significantly positively associated with workplace deviance (P

= .ll,p < .0 1 ).
Hypothesis 2a
It is expected that perceptions of distributive justice mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, perceptions of distributive
justice partially mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (P
= -.08, p < .05).
Hypothesis 2b
It is anticipated that perceptions of procedural justice mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, perceptions of procedural
justice fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (P = .14, p < .01).
Hypothesis 2c
It is expected that perceptions of interpersonal justice mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, interpersonal justice fully
mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (p = -.15, p < .01).
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Hypothesis 2d
It is predicted that perceptions of informational justice mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported , perceptions of informational
justice fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (p = .13, p < .01).
Hypothesis 3a
It is anticipated that perceptions of organizational trust mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, perceptions of organizational
trust fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (p = .20, p < .01).
Hypothesis 3b
It is expected that perceptions of managerial trust mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance. Supported, perceptions of managerial trust
fully mediate the relationship between pay secrecy and workplace deviance (P = -.16, p <
.01).

Hypothesis 4
It was predicted that continuance commitment moderates the relationship between
pay secrecy and workplace deviance such that when continuance commitment is low and
pay communication is high (e.g., pay secrecy), workplace deviance will be higher than
when both continuance commitment and pay communication are high. Partially
supported, continuance commitment only had a significant moderating impact on the

relationship between the pay structure sub-dimension and the interpersonal deviance sub
dimension (P = -.07, p < .10).
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Contributions
This research contributes to the human resource management discipline,
specifically the pay communication literature, by providing a validated pay
communication measure that has successfully extended the scarce pay communication
research by demonstrating pay secrecy’s influence on workplace deviance. The
development of an inclusive Pay Communication scale should make it easier for future
researchers to analyze the impact that pay secrecy and/or pay openness has on different
organizational and employee outcomes.
Additionally, the significant findings regarding the relationship between pay
secrecy and workplace deviance expand the employee outcomes (e.g., attitudes and
behaviors) that have been associated with pay communication practices. Despite pay
secrecy’s pervasiveness as an organizational practice, these findings demonstrate the
negative impact pay secrecy has on employee behaviors (e.g. workplace deviance), and
consequently on the organization’s overall well-being

APPENDIX A

VALIDATED MEASURES
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Nov’s (2007) Perceived Organizational Pay Secrecy (POPS) scale
Policies & Rules (a = .963)
1. My company has rules against discussing employee pay with others.
2. This company has a formal policy that employees should not disclose their pay
levels to other employees.
3. My company forbids employees from discussing their pay with others.
4. Employees are not allowed to discuss their pay at my company.
5. The company makes it clear that pay should not be discussed.
6. My organization has a written policy concerning pay secrecy. (For example,
written into the employee manual, offer letter, contract, etc.)
Enforcement (a = .955)
1. You can get in trouble if you get caught discussing your pay with others.
2. This company is very strict about not talking about your pay with other
employees.
3. I would get into trouble if my superiors found out that I had disclosed my pay to
others.
4. This organization enforces the rule that employees not discuss their pay with each
other.
5. Discussing pay at my company is something you can be reprimanded for.
Organizational Norms (a = .890)
1. My company likes to keep employee pay amounts secret.
2. At my company, there is an unwritten rule that pay is not discussed.
3. My company is secretive when it comes to employee pay.
Overall POPS scale (a = .965)
Items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neither agree nor disagree), 4 (agree), and 5 (strongly agree).

APPENDIX B

NON-VALIDATED MEASURES
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Beer and Gery’s (19721 Organizational Culture Items
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

His salary grade classification
His salary range minimum
His salary range maximum
Type of increases presently available
Size of merit increases presently available
Frequency of eligibility for merit increases

No Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was provided in the study.
Items were measured using a 2-point scale with the scale points representing no
knowledge (1) and knowledge (2).

Mulvev. LeBlanc. Heneman. and Mclnemev’s (2002) Pay Knowledge Scale
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I know the grade/band/level of my job.
I understand the basis for periodic adjustments made to base pay ranges.
I know the grades/bands/levels of other jobs in the organization.
I understand the rationale for my job being placed in its grade/band/level.
I know the average annual base pay increase percentage awarded to employees at
my organization.
6. I understand how my base pay increases are determined.
7. I understand how my pay range is determined.

No Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was provided in the study.
Items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale with the scale points representing
strongly disagree (1), somewhat disagree (2), neither agree nor disagree (3), somewhat
agree (4), and strongly agree (5).

Day’s (20061 Pay Communication Scale
1. My organization has held formal educational sessions in which they explain how
pay levels are determined for its jobs.
2. My organization provides employees with written information about how pay
levels are determined.
3. My supervisor has explained to me how pay levels are determined for the jobs in
my organization.
4. I have asked my supervisor to explain how pay levels are determined for the jobs
in my organization.
5. My organization has told me what the minimums and maximums are for the pay
grade my job is in.
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Overall Pay Communication scale (a = .75)
Items were measured using a Likert-type scale ranging from agree to disagree. The
amount of individual scale points were not provided in the study.

Cloutier and Vilhuber’s (2008) System Transparency Scale
1. Because all employees can access the information on salary adjustments, the
members of the committee are forced to correctly evaluate all jobs.
2. Because the information on the procedures used to establish salaries is posted, the
committee members are forced to exactly follow the procedures stipulated by the
law.
Overall System Transparency scale (a = .80)
Items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 5 (strongly agree)

Tremblay and Chenevert’s (2008) Transparency of Pay Scale
1. Our organization does not disclose the administrative procedures on how pay
levels and pay raises are fixed for nonmanagement employees. (R)
2. Our organization does not disclose the administrative procedures on how pay
levels and pay raises are fixed for managers. (R)
3. We try to discourage nonmanagement employees from disclosing their pay to
coworkers. (R)
4. Nonmanagement employees are really well informed about wage policies.
5. We try to discourage managers from disclosing their pay to colleagues. (R)
6. Managers are really well informed about wage policies.
Overall Transparency of Pay scale (a = .84)
Items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (completely
disagree) to 5 (completely agree).
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Internal Review Board Approval Letter - Study 1

LOUISIANA T E C H
U N I V E R S I T Y
MEMORANDUM

OFFICE O F U NIV ERSITY RESEARCH

TO:

Ms. Shelly Marasi and Dr. Rebecca Bennett

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE:

March 27, 2013

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed
study entitled:

“Developm ent o f a Pay Secrecy Scale”
HUC 1076
The proposed study’s rerased procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the
privacy of the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a
critical part o f the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be
sure that informed consent materials arc adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the I luman Use Committee grants approval
o f the involvement of human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval ivas finalized on March 27, 2013 and this
project wilt need to receive a continuation review by the IRB i f the project, including data
analysis, continues beyond March 27, 2014. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that
have been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information
regarding this, contact the Office of University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records of your procedures, data collected, and subjects
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f the study
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion o f the study. If changes occur
in recruiting o f subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be dis’continucd until modifications can be
reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-2292 or 257-5066.
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Internal Review Board Approval Letter - Study 2

L O U IS I A N A T ECH
U N I V E R S I T Y
MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH

TO:

Ms. Shelly Marasi and Dr. Rebecca Bennett

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE:

June 18,2013

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed
study entitled:

“ Development o f a Pay Secrecy Scale”
HUC 1103
The proposed study’s revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the
privacy o f the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a
critical part of the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be
sure that informed consent materials arc adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval
o f the involvement of human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on June IS, 2013 and this
project will need to receive a continuation review by the IRB i f the project, including data
analysis, continues beyond June IS, 2014. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that have
been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information
regarding this, contact the Office o f University Research.
You arc requested to maintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f the study
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion o f the study. If changes occur
in recruiting o f subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be
reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-2292 or 257-5066.

A Mf MI Ul f I T

l '.o . 11U X 3092 • n e s r o v

(li:

t ‘. I V I K M ; , O f

I OI TS I AN A SYSTEM

i . \ : i ; t : • i i t . i i - h o n e i j i s i :5 7 .so 7 s • f a x m s i 257.5079
I ' W I K U N I I V V *.'*v F F S l T f

Internal Review Board Approval Letter - Study 3

LO U ISIANA TEC H
U N I V E R S I T Y
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH

TO:

Ms. Shelly Marasi and Dr. Rebecca Bennett

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE:

August 9,2013

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed
study entitled:
“Development of a Pay Com munication Scale”
HUC 1115
The proposed study’s revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the
privacy o f the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a
critical part o f the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be
sure that informed consent materials are adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval
o f the involvement of human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on September 9, 2013 and
this project will need to receive a continuation review by the IRB i f the project, including data
analysis, continues beyond September 9, 2014. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that
have been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects
involving N1H funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information
regarding this, contact the Office o f University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f the study
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion o f the study. If changes occur
in recruiting of subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office of
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be
reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-2292 or 257-5066.

A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM
P .O . BOX 3092 • K U S T O N , LA 71272 • T ELEPH O N E (318) 257-5075 • FAX (318) 257-5079
A N EQ U A L O PPO R T U N IT Y U N IV ERSITY

APPENDIX D

LETTER SENT TO SHRM CHAPTER PRESIDENTS
(STAGE 1 OF STUDY 1)

198

199
Dear Mr/s. (full name of current President),
Hello. My name is Shelly Marasi and I am a SHRM member in Louisiana. I am also a
doctoral student at Louisiana Tech University pursuing a Doctor of Business
Administration in Management. In order to meet the requirements for my degree, I must
complete a dissertation which includes conducting a research study entitled
“Development of a Pay Communication Scale.” The purpose of this research is to
develop a pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) measure and determine
whether pay secrecy impacts employee behavior. This research is important as it seeks to
fill a gap in the current management literature by advancing the pay secrecy research,
which is quite scarce and underdeveloped. Specifically, the management literature is in
need of a pay communication scale that measures all aspects of the practice. Additionally,
this measure is needed to identify the extent to which pay secrecy influences employee
attitudes and behavior. We both have an interest in ensuring that HR professionals have
the appropriate knowledge to assist organizations in achieving their maximum
effectiveness. Therefore, I am requesting that you assist this research by having your
organizations’ members access a short survey for the purposes of developing a pay
communication scale.
I am seeking to survey individuals who are currently employed in a HR position. I need
your assistance and the help of the members of (name of SHRM Chapter) to conduct this
research. It is vital to this research’s meaningfulness and success that the survey be
completed by HR professionals. Both your and the (name of SHRM Chapter) members
assistance would be greatly appreciated.
Attached is a copy of the survey that I intend to use. A few important points are:
• Participants can be assured of anonymity and confidentiality as neither their
names nor their employer’s names will be collected.
• The survey will be conducted online and should take no longer than 15 minutes to
complete.
• Demographic information is requested only to determine if there are meaningful
differences between groups.
• The survey will be available for 10 days only. Therefore, there is only a small
time frame in which your members will need to be involved. (If your organization
agrees I am hoping to conduct the survey in April 2013)
• The results of the surveys will be published in summary form only, not by
individual responses.
• Once the dissertation is completed the results of the survey may be presented to
your membership, if desired.
Should your organization agree to assist me, there are two options that we may take in
conducting the survey:
1. Your organization may provide me with a list of member email addresses (no names
are necessary). An introductory email will be sent to all listed members asking for their
assistance and providing the web address where they can complete the survey. Five days
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later a reminder email will be sent. The email list will remain confidential and will not
become part of the published dissertation.
2. Your organization may send out both the introductory email and five days later the
reminder email with the web address where they can conduct the survey. If this option is
selected I will need to know how many individuals were on the email list in order to
determine the response rate as this has a great impact on the statistical significance of the
results.
Both the introductory and reminder e-mail that will be presented to your members are a
shorter version of this e-mail.
Please let me know if your organization is willing to participate in my dissertation
research. If you have any questions or concerns, I may be contacted at (cellular phone
number) or (email). My dissertation chair, Dr. Rebecca Bennett, may also be contacted at
(office phone number) or (email). I hope to hear from your soon.
Sincerely,
Shelly Marasi
Doctoral Candidate
Louisiana Tech University

APPENDIX E

INTRODUCTORY LETTER SENT TO POTENTIAL
PARTICIPANTS (STAGE 1 OF STUDY 1)
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Dear (name of SHRM Chapter) member,
Hello. My name is Shelly Marasi. I am a SHRM member in Louisiana and also a doctoral
student at Louisiana Tech University. In order to meet the requirements for my Doctor of
Business Administration in Management degree, I must complete a dissertation which
includes conducting a research study entitled “Development of a Pay Communication
Scale.” The purpose of this research is to develop a pay communication (pay secrecy and
pay openness) measure and determine whether pay secrecy impacts employee behavior.
This research is important as it seeks to fill a gap in the current Management literature by
advancing the pay secrecy research, which is quite scarce and underdeveloped. I am
requesting that you assist this research by participating in a short survey for the purposes
of developing a pay communication scale.
A few important points about the survey are:
• The survey is completely anonymous and confidentiality will be strictly kept.
• The survey should take no longer than 15 minutes to complete.
• The survey is online and available for 10 days.
• The results of the surveys will be published in summary form only, not by
individual responses.
• Once the dissertation is completed the results of the survey will be made available
upon request.
Your assistance in advancing this research is greatly appreciated. Should you choose to
participate in this research, the direct link to the survey is:
« URL link to survey »
If you would like to contact me with questions or concerns, I may be contacted at (email).
My dissertation chair, Dr. Rebecca Bennett, may also be contacted at (email).
Sincerely,
Shelly Marasi
Doctoral Candidate
Louisiana Tech University

APPENDIX F
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Dear (name of SHRM Chapter) member,
As a reminder, I am conducting a dissertation research study entitled “Development of a
Pay Communication Scale” in order to meet the requirements for my Doctor of Business
Administration in Management. The purpose of this research is to develop a pay
communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) measure and determine whether pay
secrecy impacts employee behavior. This research is important as it seeks to fill a gap in
the current Management literature by advancing the pay secrecy research, which is quite
scarce and underdeveloped. I am requesting that you assist this research by participating
in a short survey for the purposes of developing a pay communication scale.
A few important points about the survey are:
• The survey is completely anonymous and confidentiality will be strictly kept.
• The survey should take no longer than 5-15 minutes to complete.
• The survey is online and available for 10 days.
• The results of the surveys will be published in summary form only, not by
individual responses.
• Once the dissertation is completed the results of the survey will be made available
upon request.
Your assistance in advancing this research is greatly appreciated. Should you choose to
participate in this research, the direct link to the survey is:
« URL link to survey »
If you would like to contact me with questions or concerns, I may be contacted at (email).
My dissertation chair, Dr. Rebecca Bennett, may also be contacted at (email).
Sincerely,
Shelly Marasi
Doctoral Candidate
Louisiana Tech University

APPENDIX G

HUMAN SUBJECTS CONSENT FORM
(STUDY 1,2, AND 3)
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The following is a brief summary of the project in which you are asked to participate.
Please read this information before signing the statement below.____________________
TITLE OF PROJECT: Pay Secrecy in the Workplace
PURPOSE OF STUDY/PROJECT: To develop a further understanding of pay secrecy
and create a pay communication (pay secrecy and pay openness) scale
PROCEDURE: Voluntary completion of anonymous survey. Please check the box below
to “sign” the consent form. After “signing” the consent form, read the instructions for
each part and respond to the best of your abilities.
INSTRUMENTS: Survey
RISKS/ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS: The participant understands that Louisiana
Tech is not able to offer financial compensation nor to absorb the costs of medical
treatment should you be injured as a result of participating in this research.
BENEFITS/COMPENSATION: None.111; At the end of the survey participants will enter
their ‘employee’ identification number provided to them by the online organization in
order to receive an online payment of $1J21
SAFEGUARDS OF PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING: This study
involves no treatment or physical contact. All information collected from the survey will
be held strictly confidential. No one will be allowed access to the survey other than the
researchers.
CONTACT INFORMATION: The principal experimenters listed below may be reached
to answer questions about the research, subjects' rights, or related matters.
Shelly Marasi, Doctoral Candidate (main researcher)
sam081@latech.edu
Dr. Rebecca Bennett (Dissertation Chair)
rbennett@,l atech.edu
Members of the Human Use Committee of Louisiana Tech University may also be
contacted if a problem cannot be discussed with the experimenters:
Dr. Les Guice (257-3056)
Dr. Mary M. Livingston (257-2292 or 257-4315)
I attest that I have read and understood the following description of the study. "Pay
Secrecy in the Workplace", and its purpose and methods. I understand that my
participation in this research is strictly voluntary and mv participation or refusal to
participate in this study will not affect mv relationship with Louisiana Tech University or
my employer in any wav. Further, I understand that I may withdraw at any time or refuse
to answer any questions without penalty. Upon completion of the study, I understand that
the results will be freely available to me upon request. I understand that the results of my
survey will be confidential, accessible only to the principal investigators, myself, or a
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legally appointed representative. I have not been requested to waive nor do I waive any
of my rights related to participating in this study.
MARK THE BOX TO PROVIDE CONSENT.
□

I confirm that I have read and understand the consent form regarding this study.
I agree to the terms of the consent form.
I am at least 18 years old and am currently employed.
1 am a member of the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) or one
of SHRM’s affiliate chapters.131
I voluntarily provide consent to participate in the study.

1Phrase or statement was only included in the consent form for Study 1 and Study 2.
2 Phrase or statement was only included in the consent form for Study 3.
3 Phrase or statement was only included in the consent form for Stage 1 o f Study 1.

APPENDIX H
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Part 1
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the description of pay secrecy and answer the following
questions as honestly and open as possible. Each response should be solely based on
YOUR personal opinion, experiences, perceptions, and observations. Keep in mind there
are no right or wrong answers. Please feel free to take as much space as needed.
DESCRIPTION: Pay Secrecy is an organizational practice or policy prohibiting the
distribution and communication of certain pay information to employees and possibly
outsiders.
1. What does Pay Secrecy mean to you? Please describe in detail.
2. What do you believe Pay Secrecy means to your current employer? Please
describe in detail.
3.

If possible, please provide at least two examples of how your current employer
does/doesn’t apply Pay Secrecy in the workplace. Please describe each example in
detail.

4.

If possible, please provide at least two examples of how other organizations (such
as previous employers or spouse’s employer) does/doesn’t apply Pay Secrecy in
the workplace. Please describe each example in detail.

5. What do you believe Pay Secrecy means to your current co-workers (i.e.
subordinates, peers, and/or superiors)? Please describe in detail.
Part 2
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in
order for us to better understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept
strictly confidential and responses will only be analyzed at the group level. Please answer
all questions by marking the appropriate response and/or by filling in the blanks.
1. Gender:
o Male

o Female

2. Age:
3. Ethnicity:
□ African American
□ Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian

years

o American Indian
□ Latino/Hispanic
o Other:

□ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Middle Eastern

4. How long have you been with your current employer?
o less than 1 year
o 1 - 5 years
o 6 - 15 years
o 1 6 -2 5 years
o over 25 years
o not currently employed
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5. On average, how many hours do you work per week?
o less than 10 hours per week
o 1 0 -2 0 hours per week
o 21 - 30 hours per week (part-time)
o 30 - 40 hours per week (full-time)
o more than 40 hours per week
o not currently employed
6. What is your highest grade completed?
o Did not complete high school
o High school diploma or GED
o Some college
o Technical college or Trade school
o Associate’s degree (i.e. AA or AS) o Bachelor’s degree (i.e. BA or BS)
o Master’s degree (i.e. MA, MS, MBA)
o Doctorate degree (i.e. PhD, DBA, EdD)
o Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (i.e. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
7. What is the principal industry of your current employer?
o Agriculture, Mining o Construction
o Communications, Utilities
o Government
o Health Care
o Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
o Internet
o Manufacturing
o Retail, Wholesale
o Nonprofit
o Services
o Transportation
o Other:
onot currently employed
8. What managerial and departmental level best describes your current job position?
(check all that apply)
□ Employee (no managerial duties)
□ Lower-level management
□ Middle-level management
□ Higher-level (top) management
□ Human Resources department
□ Professional:__________________
□ Other:
Confidentiality will be kept for all participants in this study. Thank you again for your
participation.

APPENDIX I
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1.
2.
3.
4.

All pay information is open at my organization.
All pay information is public knowledge at my organization.
An employee will be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
At my organization, employees have to trust that the organization pays them in the
proper pay range.
5. At my organization, pay is only discussed between an employee and the hiring
authority at the time of hire.
6. Employee pay levels are confidential internally and externally at my organization.
7. Employees are well informed about pay policies at my organization.
8. Employees at my organization do not know for sure what others are really being paid.
9. Employees basically know what everyone gets paid at my organization.
10. Employees can get in trouble if they get caught sharing pay information.
11. Employees discover individual pay levels through the grapevine at my organization.
12. Employees do not talk about their personal pay information at my organization.
13. Employees do not understand the overall pay structure at my organization.
14. Even though employees at my organization are not supposed to discuss their personal
pay information they do.
15. Everyone at my organization is aware that all employees receive the same “across the
board” raise at my organization.
16. Everyone at my organization knows that all employees receive a pay raise or bonus at
the end of the year.
17.1 am aware of the current criteria required for receiving pay increases.
18.1 am aware of whether there are standard pay incentives for completion of special
training, certification, and/or education.
19.1 am only provided information about my individual pay level.
20.1 am permitted to freely discuss any of my pay information.
21.1 am provided or could easily obtain everyone’s individual pay level at my
organization.
2 2 .1 am provided with my job’s pay range and/or pay average.
2 3 .1 am unaware of whether my pay level is at the lower, middle, or upper end of the pay
range for my job.
24.1 disclose my pay level to other employees when they ask.
25.1 know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases presently
available.
2 6 .1 know the basis for determining my pay raises and/or bonuses.
2 7 .1 know whether my pay level is above, below, or equal to the average pay for my job.
28.1 recognize that pay levels and/or raises are based on certain things, such as
experience, years of service, education, and/or performance/evaluation scores.
2 9 .1 speak openly with other employees about my pay.
30.1 understand how my pay increases are determined.
31.1 understand how my pay level is determined.
32. If an employee requests any type of pay information the organization releases it.
33. Individual pay levels and/or raises of all employees are only known to a select few
staff members, such as HR hiring manager, accountant, and/or CEO.
34. It is very common for employees to know what everyone is paid at my organization.
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35. My job has been at risk because my employing organization believed I was sharing
pay information.
36. My organization distributes pay ranges and/or pay averages for every job in the
organization.
37. My organization does not allow employees to converse about their own or other
employees’ pay.
38. My organization does not disclose other employees’ individual pay levels.
39. My organization does not disclose/publish the procedures used to establish pay levels
and/or raises.
40. My organization does not have a policy, procedure, or unwritten standard on
discussing pay information.
41. My organization does not make the secrecy of pay information an issue.
42. My organization encourages employees not to share pay information with other
employees.
43. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing their
pay with each other.
44. My organization frowns on conduct involving exchanging pay information.
45. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay information
with coworkers.
46. My organization has a rule to not disclose pay information with other employees.
47. My organization has a very solid pay structure that I understand.
48. My organization has an open culture in regards to pay information.
49. My organization has an unwritten rule that pay is prohibited from being discussed
with other employees or outsiders.
50. My organization has the same pay scale for all non-managerial employees.
51. My organization implies that individual pay information should be kept private.
52. My organization is good at explaining how employee pay levels and/or raises are
calculated.
53. My organization is not concerned with employees discussing pay information.
54. My organization is pretty open about pay information.
55. My organization is secretive when it comes to employee pay.
56. My organization is very strict about not talking about pay information with other
employees.
57. My organization is very worried about employees sharing their personal pay
information with outsiders.
58. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential.
59. My organization likes to keep employee pay amounts secret.
60. My organization makes it clear how pay levels and/or raises are determined for the
jobs in my organization.
61. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be communicated under any
circumstances.
62. My organization openly discusses all employees’ individual pay levels and/or raises.
63. My organization provides employees with information about how pay levels and/or
raises are determined.
64. My organization publishes and/or makes available their entire pay structure.
65. My organization recommends employees keep their pay confidential.
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66. My organization requires employees to sign a contractual agreement stating they will
comply with the pay secrecy policy and not discuss their individual pay information.
67. My organization respects their employee’s confidentiality by not releasing everyone’s
individual pay level.
68. My organization tries to discourage employees from disclosing their pay to
coworkers.
69. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy with employees during
employee meetings or at the time of hire.
70. My organization withholds pay ranges, pay averages, and others’ individual pay
levels from employees.
71. No pay information, other than personal pay level, is disclosed to employees at my
organization.
72. Pay information is only provided on a “need to know” basis at my organization.
73. Pay is the same across the board at my organization.
74. Starting pay ranges are published on job postings.
75. The pay levels for most non-managerial employees are known since they are basically
the same for all positions.
76. There are limited employees that have access to pay information in my organization.
77. There are no consequences for discussing pay at my organization.
78. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual requesting
employees keep pay secret.
79. Upon request I can find out other employee’s pay information at my organization.

APPENDIX J

ITEM REFINEMENT SURVEY
(STAGE 2 OF STUDY 1)
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Listed below are the 79 items that have been generated to develop a pay communication
(pay secrecy and pay openness) scale. Future participants will be instructed to indicate
the degree to which they agree/disagree with each statement in regards to pay information
and their employing organization’s actions regarding pay information.
Part 1
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate each item based on the degree to which it is 1)
CONSISTENT with the pay communication definition (relating to either pay secrecy or
pay openness practices) provided below and 2) GENERALIZABLE to a wide variety of
organizations and occupations.
DEFINITION: Pay Communication is the organizational practice that involves which,
how, and when pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual
pay levels, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and communicated to employees
and possibly outsiders. The two forms of pay communication are pay secrecy and pay
openness.
Pay Secrecy (at an extreme level) is an organizational practice, possibly including
a pay secrecy policy, prohibiting the distribution and communication of certain pay
information to employees and possibly outsiders.
Pay Openness (at an extreme level) is an organizational practice that allows
employees to discuss their pay information amongst each other (and possibly outsiders)
while the organization distributes most, if not all, pay information to the employees on a
regular basis or upon request.

Not at All
Generalizable

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

|
j

o
o
o

o
O
o

Highly
Generalizable

Very
Consistent

o
o
o

Moderately
Generalizable

Somewhat
Consistent

o
o
o

Slightly
Generalizable

A Little
Consistent

Item #1
Item #2
Item #3, etc.

Generalizable to a Wide
Variety of Organizations
and Occupations

Not at All
Consistent

Consistent with Pay
Communication definition
(pay secrecy or openness)

| o
1 o
I o

Part 2
INSTRUCTIONS: Please rate each item based on the degree to which it is CLEAR and
CONCISE and will be understood by most respondents.
If you choose either ‘Not at All Clear & Concise’ or ‘A Little Clear & Concise.’ please
rephrase or edit the item in the space provided in the third column. If you believe the item
should be deleted from further analysis rather than be edited or modified, please write the
phrase ‘delete’ in the space provided in the third column.

217

Not at All
Clear & Concise

A Little
Clear & Concise

Somewhat
Clear & Concise

Very
Clear & Concise

Clarity and Conciseness

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

Item#l
Item #2
Item #3, etc.

Item Modification/Deletion

Rephrase or Delete

Part 3
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in
order for us to better understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept
strictly confidential and responses will only be analyzed at the group level. Please answer
all questions by marking the appropriate response and/or by filling in the blanks.
1) Gender:
o Male

o Female

2) Age:
3) Ethnicity:
□ African American
□ Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian

years

□ American Indian
□ Latino/Hispanic
o Other:

□ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Middle Eastern

4) How long have you been with your current employer?
o less than 1 year
o 1 - 5 years
o 6 - 15 years
o 1 6 -2 5 years
o over 25 years
o not currently employed
5) What level best describes your current job position? (check all that apply)
□ Committee Member
□ Doctoral Student/Candidate of Management at Louisiana Tech University
□ Other Doctoral Student/Candidate at Louisiana Tech University:________
□ Professor of Management at Louisiana Tech University
a Professor of Management at Other University:________________
Confidentiality will be kept for all participants in this study. Thank you again for your
participation.
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1. All individual pay information is only known to a select few staff members, such as
the HR hiring manager, accountant, and/or CEO.
2. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
3. An employees’ individual pay is strictly confidential at my organization.
4. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone.
5. Employees are well informed about pay policies at my organization.
6. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my
organization.
7. Even though employees at my organization are not supposed to discuss their personal
pay information they do.
8. I am aware of the current criteria required for receiving pay increases.
9. I am provided information only about my individual pay level.
10.1 am provided the pay average for every job in my organization.
11.1 am provided my job's pay range.
12.1 am unaware of whether my pay is at the lower, middle, or upper end of the pay
range for my job.
13.1 know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases presently
available.
14.1 know whether my pay is above, below, or equal to the average pay for my job.
15.1 recognize that pay at my organization is based upon certain things, such as
experience, years of service, education, and/or performance/evaluation scores
16.1 understand how my pay increases are determined.
17. Management openly discusses all employees’ individual pay.
18. My organization distributes pay ranges for every job in the organization.
19. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own pay with coworkers.
20. My organization does not have a policy, procedure, or unwritten standard on
discussing pay information. (RC)
21. My organization does not provide employees with any coworkers’ individual pay.
22. My organization does not provide employees with the procedures used to establish
pay.
23. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing their
pay with each other.
24. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay information
with coworkers.
25. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees.
26. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I understand.
27. My organization is secretive when it comes to employee pay.
28. My organization is very strict in regards to employees not talking about pay.
29. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential.
30. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my job.
31. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed under any
circumstances.
32. My organization makes the entire pay structure/model available.
33. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is determined.
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34. My organization requires employees to sign a contractual agreement stating they will
comply with the pay secrecy policy by not discussing their individual pay information
with coworkers.
35. My organization shows its’ concern for employees' privacy/confidentiality by not
releasing everyone's individual pay level.
36. My organization suggests individual pay information should be kept private.
37. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees.
38. My organization withholds my job’s pay average from me.
39. No pay information, other than personal pay level, is disclosed to employees at my
organization.
40. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my organization.
41. There are no negative consequences for discussing pay at my organization.
42. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual stating
employees should not discuss their pay with coworkers.

APPENDIX L

STUDY 2 SURVEY
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Part 1
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the description of pay communication in the workplace
and rate each statement based on the degree to which you agree or disagree with it in
regards to your knowledge of pay information and your current employing organization’s
actions regarding pay information. Each response should be based on YOUR personal
opinion, experiences, perceptions, and observations in your current employing
organization.

Agree

Strongly
Agree

o
o
o
o
O I o

Slightly
Agree

o
o
o

Undecided/
Unsure

o
o
o

Slightly
Disagree

Disagree

Item#l
Item #2
Item #3, etc.

Strongly
Disagree

DESCRIPTION: Pay Communication is the organizational practice that involves which,
how, and when pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual
pay levels, pay processes, and/or the entire pay structure) is distributed and
communicated to employees and possibly outsiders. The two main forms of pay
communication are pay secrecy and pay openness.
Pay Secrecy (at an extreme level) is an organizational practice, possibly including
a pay secrecy policy, prohibiting the distribution and communication of certain pay
information to employees and possibly outsiders.
Pay Openness (at an extreme level) is an organizational practice that allows
employees to discuss their pay information amongst each other (and possibly outsiders)
while the organization distributes most, if not all, pay information to the employees on a
regular basis or upon request.

o
o
o

o
o
o

o
o
o

Part 2
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in
order for us to better understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept
strictly confidential and responses will only be analyzed at the group level in summary
form, not by individual responses. Please answer all questions by marking the appropriate
response or by filling in the blanks.
1) Gender:
o Male

o Female

2) Age:
3) Ethnicity:
□ African American
□ Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian

years

□ American Indian
□ Latino/Hispanic
□ Other:

□ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Middle Eastern
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4) How many years have you been employed with your current organization?
o less than 1 year
o 11 - 15 years
o 26 years or more
o 1 - 5 years
o 16 - 20 years
o not currently employed
o 6 - 1 0 years
o 2 1 -2 5 years
5) On average, how many hours do you work per week?
o less than 10 hours per week
o 30 (full-time) - 40 hours per week
o 10 - 20 hours per week
o more than 40 hours per week
o 21 - 30 hours per week (part-time)
o not currently employed
6) What is your highest level of education completed?
o Did not complete high school
o High school diploma or GED
o Some college
o Technical college or Trade school
o Associate’s degree (i.e. AA or AS) o Bachelor’s degree (i.e. BA or BS)
o Master’s degree (i.e. MA, MS, MBA)
o Doctorate degree (i.e. PhD, DBA, EdD)
o Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (i.e. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
7) What is the principal industry of your current employer?
o Agriculture, Mining o Construction
o Communications, Utilities
o Government
o Health Care
o Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
o Internet
o Manufacturing
o Retail, Wholesale
o Nonprofit
o Services
o Transportation
oNotcurrentlyemployed
o Other:____________________________
8) How many employees are there currently at your organization?
o 10 employees or less
o 11 - 50 employees
o 51 - 100 employees
o 101 - 500 employees
o 501 - 1,000 employees
o 1,001 - 5,000 employees
o 5,001 - 25,000 employees
o 25,001 - 50,000 employees
o 50,001 - 100,000 employees
o 100,001 employees or more
o Not currently employed
9) What managerial and departmental level best describes your current job position?
(check all that apply)
□ Employee (no managerial duties)
□ Lower-level management
□ Middle-level management
o Higher-level (top) management
□ Human Resources department
□ Professional:__________________
□ Other:
□ Not currently employed
10) Which best describes your organization’s status involving unions?
o Yes, my job is unionized but other jobs in my organization are not unionized,
o Yes, my job and every job in my organization are unionized,
o No, my job is not unionized but other jobs at my organization are unionized,
o No, neither my job nor any job in my organization are unionized,
o Not currently employed
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11) Which categoiy describes your current income?
o $20,001-$30,000
o $13,500 or less
o $13,501 - $20,000
o $30,001 - $40,000
o $40,001 - $50,000
o $50,001 -$60,000
o $60,001 - $70,000
o $70,001 - $80,000
o $80,001 - $90,000
o Not currently employed
o $90,001 - $100,000 o $100,001 or more
12) Which state do you live in?
o Alabama
o Arkansas
o California
o Colorado
o Connecticut
o Delaware
o Florida
o Georgia
o Illinois
o Indiana
o Iowa
o Kansas
o Kentucky
o Louisiana
o Maine
o Massachusetts
o Michigan
o Minnesota
o Missouri
o Nebraska
o Nevada
o New Hampshire
o New Jersey
o New York
o North Carolina
o Ohio
o Oklahoma
o Pennsylvania
o South Carolina
o Tennessee
o Texas
o Utah
o Virginia
o Washington
o Wisconsin
o Wyoming
________
o Do not live in the United States
Confidentiality will be kept for all participants in this study.
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LIST OF ITEMS (STUDY 2 AND 3)
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1. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
2. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone.
3. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my
organization.
4. Even though employees at my organization are not suppose to discuss their
personal pay information they do.
5. I am provided my job’s pay range.
6. I know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases
presently available.
7. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own pay with
coworkers.
8. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing
their pay with each other.
9. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay
information with coworkers.
10. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees.
11. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I understand.
12. My organization is very strict in regards to employees not talking about pay.
13. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential.
14. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my job.
15. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed under any
circumstances.
16. My organization makes the entire pay structure/model available.
17. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is
determined.
18. My organization shows its’ concern for employee’s privacy/confidentiality by
not releasing everyone’s individual pay level.
19. My organization suggests individual pay information should be kept private.
20. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees.
21. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my organization.
22. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual stating
employees should not discuss their pay with coworkers.

APPENDIX N

STUDY 3 SURVEY
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Pay Communication Scale being Developed
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1. An employee could be fired for discussing pay
information at my organization.
2 . At my organization, all pay information is
available to anyone.
3. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the
‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my organization.
4. Even though employees at my organization are
not supposed to discuss their personal pay
information they do.
5. I am provided my job's pay range.
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6 . I know about the different types, sizes, and/or
frequencies of pay increases presently available.
7. My organization does not allow employees to
discuss their own pay with coworkers.
8. My organization enforces the policy/rule that
forbids employees from discussing their pay with
each other.
9. My organization has a policy forbidding
employees from discussing pay information with
coworkers.
10. My organization has a rule to not share pay
information with other employees.
11. My organization has a solid pay structure/model
that I understand.
12. My organization is very strict in regards to
employees not talking about pay.
13. My organization keeps all pay information
strictly confidential.
14. My organization makes it clear how pay is
determined for my job.
15. My organization makes it clear that pay should
not be discussed under any circumstances.
16. My organization makes the entire pay
structure/model available.
17. My organization provides employees with
information about how pay is determined.
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18. My organization shows its’ concern for
employees’ privacy/confidentiality by not
releasing everyone's individual pay level.
19. My organization suggests individual pay
1
2
3
4
5
6 7
information should be kept private.
20. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy 1
2
3
4
5
6 7
policy/rule with employees.
21. Only a few employees have access to pay
1
2
3
4
5
6 7
information at my organization.
22. There is a statement in my organization’s
employee handbook/manual stating employees
should not discuss their pay with coworkers.___________________________________

Nov’s POPS scale
Policies & Rules sub-dimension - items 1-6
Enforcement sub-dimension - items 7-11
Organizational Norms sub-dimension - items 12-14
1. My company has rules against discussing employee pay
with others.
2. This company has a formal policy that employees
should not disclose their pay levels to other employees.
3. My company forbids employees from discussing their
pay with others.
4. Employees are not allowed to discuss their pay at my
company.
5. My employer makes it clear that pay should not be
discussed.
6. My organization has a written policy concerning pay
secrecy. (For example, written into the employee
manual, offer letter, contract, etc.)
7 .1 could get in trouble if I get caught discussing my pay
with others.
8. This company is very strict about not talking about my
pay with other employees.
9 .1 would get into trouble if my superiors found out that I
had disclosed my pay to others.
10. This organization enforces the rule that employees not
discuss their pay with each other.
11. Discussing pay at my company is something I can be
reprimanded for.
12. My company likes to keep employee pay amounts
secret.
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13. At my company, there is an unwritten rule that pay is
not discussed.
14. My company is secretive when it comes to employee
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m L ______________________________________________________________________________

Mulvev’s Pay Knowledge scale
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1. I know the pay grade/band/level of my job.

2

3

4

5

2 .1 understand the basis for periodic adjustments made to
base pay ranges.
3 .1know the pay grades/bands/levels of other jobs in the
organization.
4 .1understand the rationale for my job being placed in its
grade/band/level.
5 .1know the average annual base pay increase percentage
awarded to employees at my organization.
6 .1 understand how my base pay increases are determined.
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7 .1 understand how my pay range is determined.
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Day’s Pav Communication scale

1. My organization has held formal educational sessions
in which they explain how pay levels are determined for
its jobs.
2. My organization provides employees with written
information about how pay levels are determined.
3. My supervisor has explained to me how pay levels are
determined for the jobs in my organization.
4 .1 have asked my supervisor to explain how pay levels
are determined for the jobs in my organization.
5. My organization has told me what the minimums and
maximums are for the pay grade my job is in._________
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Huselid’s HPWP scale
Employee Skills and Organizational Structures sub
dimension - items 1-9
Employee Motivation sub-dimension - items 10-13
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1. All employees in my organization are included in a
formal information sharing program (i.e., a
newsletter).
2. Most employees in my company have a formal job
description.
3. Most non-entry level jobs in this firm are filled
when they are open.
4. My employer administers employee attitude
surveys on a regular basis.
5. My organization has quality of work life programs,
quality circles, and/or labor management
participation teams.
6. Employees in my company have access to company
incentive plans, profit-sharing plans, and/or gainsharing plans.
7. Most employees in my organization receive training
at least every 12 months.
8. All employees in this organization have access to a
formal grievance procedure and/or complaint
resolution system.
9. Most employees are administered an employment
test prior to hiring in this organization.
10. Most employees have their performance appraisals
used to determine their compensation.
11. All employees of this company receive formal
performance appraisals.
12. Decisions about promotions in this organization
are based mostly on performance, and not on
seniority.
13. In the most common jobs in this organization,
most of the employees are qualified.____________
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Part 2
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in
order for us to better understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept
strictly confidential and responses will only be analyzed at the group level in summary
form, not by individual responses. Please answer all questions by marking the appropriate
response or by filling in the blanks.
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1) Gender:
o Male

o Female

2) Age:
years
3) Ethnicity:
□ African American
□ Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian

□ American Indian
□ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Latino/Hispanic
□ Middle Eastern
□ Other:_______________

4) How many years have you been employed with your current organization?
o less than 1 year
o 11 -1 5 years
o 26 years or more
o 1 - 5 years
o 1 6 -2 0 years
o not currently employed
o 6 - 1 0 years
o 21 -2 5 years
5) On average, how many hours do you work per week?
o less than 10 hours per week
o 30 (full-time) - 40 hours per week
o 10 - 20 hours per week
o more than 40 hours per week
o 21 - 30 hours per week (part-time)
o not currently employed
6) What is your highest level of education completed?
o Did not complete high school
o High school diploma or GED
o Some college
o Technical college or Trade school
o Associate’s degree (i.e. AA or AS) o Bachelor’s degree (i.e. BA or BS)
o Master’s degree (i.e. MA, MS, MBA)
o Doctorate degree (i.e. PhD, DBA, EdD)
o Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (i.e. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
7) What is the principal industry of your current employer?
o Agriculture, Mining o Construction
o Communications, Utilities
o Government
o Health Care
o Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
o Internet
o Manufacturing
o Retail, Wholesale
o Nonprofit
o Services
o Transportation
o Other:____________________________
o
Not currently employed
8) How many employees are there currently at your organization?
o 10 employees or less
o 11 - 50 employees
o 51 - 100 employees
o 101 - 500 employees
o 501 - 1,000 employees
o 1,001 - 5,000 employees
o 5,001 - 25,000 employees
o 25,001 - 50,000 employees
o 50,001 - 100,000 employees
o 100,001 employees or more
o Not currently employed
9) What managerial and departmental level best describes your current job position?
(check all that apply)
□ Employee (no managerial duties)
□ Lower-level management
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□ Middle-level management
□ Higher-level (top) management
□ Human Resources department
□_Professional:________________
□ Other:____________________
□ Not currently employed
10) Which best describes your organization’s status involving unions?
o Yes, my job is unionized but other jobs in my organization are not unionized,
o Yes, my job and every job in my organization are unionized,
o No, my job is not unionized but other jobs at my organization are unionized,
o No, neither my job nor any job in my organization are unionized,
o Not currently employed
11) Which category describes your current income?
o $13,500 or less
o $13,501 - $20,000
o $20,001 - $30,000
o $30,001 - $40,000
o $40,001 - $50,000
o $50,001 - $60,000
o $60,001 - $70,000
o $70,001 - $80,000
o $80,001 - $90,000
o $90,001 - $100,000 o $100,001 or more
o Not currently employed
12) Which state do you live in?
o Alabama
o Arkansas
o California
o Colorado
o Connecticut
o Delaware
o Florida
o Georgia
o Illinois
o Indiana
o Iowa
o Kansas
o Kentucky
o Louisiana
o Maine
o Massachusetts
o Michigan
o Minnesota
o Missouri
o Nebraska
o Nevada
o New Hampshire
o New Jersey
o New York
o North Carolina
o Ohio
o Oklahoma
o Pennsylvania
o South Carolina
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o Tennessee
o Texas
o Utah
o Virginia
o Washington
o Wisconsin
o Wyoming
o Do not live in the United States
Confidentiality will be kept for all participants in this study.

APPENDIX O

FINAL VALIDATED SCALE
AND SUB-DIMENSIONS
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Pay Policy Existence sub-dimension
1. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
2. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own pay with
coworkers.
3. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing
their pay with each other.
4. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay
information with coworkers.
5. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees.
6. My organization is veiy strict in regards to employees not talking about pay.
7. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed under any
circumstances.
8. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees.
9. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual stating
employees should not discuss their pay with coworkers.
Pay Structure sub-dimension
1. I am provided my job’s pay range. (R)
2. I know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases
presently available. (R)
3. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I understand. (R)
4. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my job. (R)
5. My organization makes the entire pay structure/model available. (R)
6. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is
determined. (R)
Organizational Norms sub-dimension
1. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone. (R)
2. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential.
3. My organization shows its’ concern for employee’s privacy/confidentiality by not
releasing everyone’s individual pay level.
4. My organization suggests individual pay information should be kept private.
5. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my organization.
Employee Norms sub-dimension
1. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my
organization.
2. Even though employees at my organization are not suppose to discuss their
personal pay information they do.

APPENDIX P

LIST OF ALL SCALES AND ITEMS
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Pay Communication
The following items refer to certain organizational pay practices. Please indicate to what
extent you agree with the following statements:
1. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
(PPE)
2. At my organization, all pay information is available to anyone. (R) (ON)
3. Employees discover coworkers’ pay through the ‘grapevine’ (gossip) at my
organization. (EN)
4. Even though employees at my organization are not suppose to discuss their
personal pay information they do. (EN)
5. I am provided my job’s pay range. (R) (PS)
6. I know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases
presently available. (R) (PS)
7. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own pay with
coworkers. (PPE)
8. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing
their pay with each other. (PPE)
9. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay
information with coworkers. (PPE)
10. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees.
(PPE)
11. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I understand. (R) (PS)
12. My organization is very strict in regards to employees not talking about pay.
(PPE)
13. My organization keeps all pay information strictly confidential. (ON)
14. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my job. (R) (PS)
15. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed under any
circumstances. (PPE)
16. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is
determined. (R) (PS)
17. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is
determined. (R) (PS)
18. My organization shows its’ concern for employee’s privacy/confidentiality by not
releasing everyone’s individual pay level. (ON)
19. My organization suggests individual pay information should be kept private. (ON)
20. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees.
(PPE)
21. Only a few employees have access to pay information at my organization. (ON)
22. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual stating
employees should not discuss their pay with coworkers. (PPE)
Workplace Deviance
The following items refer to certain employee behaviors. Please indicate to what extent
you have participated in the followed behaviors in the past 6 months:
1. Made fun of someone at work. (ID)
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Said something hurtful to someone at work. (ID)
Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark or joke at work. (ID)
Cursed at someone at work. (ID)
Played a mean prank on someone at work. (ID)
Acted rudely toward someone at work. (ID)
Publicly embarrassed someone at work. (ID)
Lost your temper while at work. (ID)
Taken property from someone at work (i.e., coworker or customer) without
permission. (ID)
10. Sexually harassed someone at work. (ID)
11. Blamed someone at work for mistakes. (ID)
12. Taken property (e.g., equipment, merchandise, or money) from work without
permission. (OD)
13. Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working. (OD)
14. Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace. (OD)
15. Come in late to work without permission. (OD)
16. Littered your work environment. (OD)
17. Neglected to follow your boss’s instructions. (OD)
18. Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked. (OD)
19. Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person. (OD)
20. Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job. (OD)
21. Put little effort into your work. (OD)
22. Left work early without permission. (OD)
23. Worked on a personal matter instead of work for your employer. (OD)
24. Called in sick when you were not. (OD)
25. Sabotaged equipment or merchandise. (OD)
26. Talked with another employee instead of working. (OD)
27. Misused discount privilege. (OD)
28. Wasted company resources. (OD)
Distributive Justice
The following items refer to the pay you receive at your organization. Please indicate to
what extent:
1. Does your pay reflect the effort you have put into your work?
2. Is your pay appropriate for the work you have completed?
3. Does your pay reflect what you have contributed to the organization?
4. Is your pay justified, given your performance?
Procedural Justice
The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at your pay. Please indicate to
what extent :
1. Have you been able to express your views and feelings during those procedures?
2. Have you had influence over the pay arrived at by those procedures?
3. Have those procedures been applied consistently?
4. Have those procedures been free of bias?
5. Have those procedures been based on accurate information?
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6. Have you been able to appeal the pay arrived at by those procedures?
7. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards?
Informational Justice
The following items refer to management or your supervisor who performed the
procedures used to determine your pay. Please indicate to what extent:
1. Has he/she been candid in his/her communications with you?
2. Has he/she explained the procedures thoroughly?
3. Were his/her explanations regarding the procedures reasonable?
4. Has he/she communicated details in a timely manner?
5. Has he/she seemed to tailor his/her communications to individuals’ specific
needs?
Interpersonal Justice
The following items refer to your manager who performed the pay procedures. Please
indicate to what extent:
1. Has he/she treated you in a polite manner?
2. Has he/she treated you with dignity?
3. Has he/she treated you with respect?
4. Has he/she refrained from improper remarks or comments?
Managerial Trust
The following items refer to your manager who determines your pay. Please indicate to
what extent you agree with the following statements:
1. My supervisor keeps my interests in mind when making decisions.
2. I would be willing to let my supervisor have complete control over my future in
this company.
3. If my supervisor asked why a problem occurred, I would speak freely even if I
were partly to blame.
4. I feel comfortable being creative because my supervisor understands that
sometimes creative solutions do not work.
5. It is important for me to have a good way to keep an eye on my supervisor. (R)
6. Increasing my vulnerability to criticism by my supervisor would be a mistake. (R)
7. If I had my way, I wouldn’t let my supervisor have any influence over decisions
that are important to me. (R)
Organizational Trust
The following items refer to your employer. Please indicate to what extent you agree with
the following statements:
1. I believe my employer has high integrity.
2. I can expect my employer to treat me in a consistent and predictable fashion.
3. My employer is not always honest and truthful. (R)
4. In general, I believe my employer’s motives and intentions are good.
5. I don’t think my employer treats me fairly. (R)
6. My employer is open and upfront with me.
7. I’m not sure I fully trust my employer. (R)
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Continuance Commitment
The following items refer to potential job opportunities. Please indicate to what extent
you agree with the following statements:
1. One of the few negative consequences of leaving this organization/company
would be the scarcity of available alternatives.
2. I would have many options if I decided to change organizations/companies. (R)
3. I am pleased that I have many alternatives available for changing
organizations/companies.(R)
4. I feel I have too few options to consider leaving this organization/company.
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors
The following items refer to certain employee behaviors. Please indicate to what extent
you have participated in the followed behaviors in the past 6 months:
1. Helped others who had been absent. (OCBI)
2. Helped others who had heavy workloads. (OCBI)
3. Assisted my supervisor with his/her work (when not asked). (OCBI)
4. Took time to listen to co-workers’ problems and worries. (OCBI)
5. Went out of my way to help new employees. (OCBI)
6. Took a personal interest in other employees. (OCBI)
7. Passed along information to co-workers. (OCBI)
8. Showed up on time to work. (OCBO)
9. Gave advance notice when unable to come to work. (OCBO)
10. Took work breaks only when instructed. (OCBO)
11. Spent a great deal of free time helping other coworkers. (R) (OCBO)
12. Complimented people at work. (OCBO)
13. Conserved and protected organizational property. (OCBO)
14. Adhered to informal rules devised to maintain order. (OCBO)
Please read and respond to the following demographic questions in order for us to better
understand the pattern of responses. All information will be kept strictly confidential and
responses will only be analyzed at the group level in summary form, not by individual
responses. Please answer all questions by marking the appropriate response or by filling
in the blanks.
1) Gender:
o Male

o Female

2) Age:
years
3) Ethnicity:
□ African American
□ Caucasian
□ Native Hawaiian

□ American Indian
□ Latino/Hispanic
o Other:

□ Asian/Pacific Islander
□ Middle Eastern

4) How many years have you been employed with your current organization?
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o less than 1 year
o 1 - 5 years
o 6 - 1 0 years

o i l - 1 5 years
o 1 6 -2 0 years
o 21 -2 5 years

o 26 years or more
o not currently employed

5) On average, how many hours do you work per week?
o less than 10 hours per week
o 30 (full-time) - 40 hours per week
o 10 - 20 hours per week
o more than 40 hours per week
o 21 - 30 hours per week (part-time)
o not currently employed
6) What is your highest level of education completed?
o Did not complete high school
o High school diploma or GED
o Some college
o Technical college or Trade school
o Associate’s degree (i.e. AA or AS) o Bachelor’s degree (i.e. BA or BS)
o Master’s degree (i.e. MA, MS, MBA)
o Doctorate degree (i.e. PhD, DBA, EdD)
o Professional degree beyond Bachelor’s (i.e. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
7) What is the principal industry of your current employer?
o Agriculture, Mining o Construction
o Communications, Utilities
o Government
o Health Care
o Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
o Internet
o Manufacturing
o Retail, Wholesale
o Nonprofit
o Services
o Transportation
o Other:_______________________
o Not currently employed
8) How many employees are there currently at your organization?
o 10 employees or less
o 11 - 50 employees
o 51 - 100 employees
o 101 - 500 employees
o 501 - 1,000 employees
o 1,001 - 5,000 employees
o 5,001 - 25,000 employees
o 25,001 - 50,000 employees
o 50,001 - 100,000 employees
o 100,001 employees or more
o Not currently employed
9) What managerial and departmental level best describes your current job position?
(check all that apply)
□ Employee (no managerial duties)
□ Lower-level management
□ Middle-level management
o Higher-level (top) management
□ Human Resources department
□ Professional:__________________
□ Other:____________________
□ Not currently employed
10) Which best describes your organization’s status involving unions?
o Yes, my job is unionized but other jobs in my organization are not unionized,
o Yes, my job and every job in my organization are unionized,
o No, my job is not unionized but other jobs at my organization are unionized,
o No, neither my job nor any job in my organization are unionized,
o Not currently employed
11) Which category describes your current income?
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o $13,500 or less
o $13,501 - $20,000
o $30,001 - $40,000
o $40,001 - $50,000
o $60,001 - $70,000
o $70,001 - $80,000
o $90,001 - $100,000 o $100,001 or more

o $20,001-$30,000
o $50,001-$60,000
o $80,001 - $90,000
o Not currently employed

12) Which state do you live in?
o Alabama
o Arkansas
o California
o Colorado
o Connecticut
o Delaware
o Florida
o Georgia
o Illinois
o Indiana
o Iowa
o Kansas
o Kentucky
o Louisiana
o Maine
o Massachusetts
o Michigan
o Minnesota
o Missouri
o Nebraska
o Nevada
o New Hampshire
o New Jersey
o New York
o North Carolina
o Ohio
o Oklahoma
o Pennsylvania
o South Carolina
o Tennessee
o Texas
o Utah
o Virginia
o Washington
o Wisconsin
o Wyoming
o Do not live in the United States
Reverse-scored items are identified by (R) after the item.
Sub-dimensions o f scales are identified in parentheses ( ) after the item.
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